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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This work is the first to analyze much of the vast body of Roh memory representations, which is 
an important step for understanding how he is understood by those within his country, caught 
among multiple scenes of remembering and forgetting. 
The initial premise of this dissertation was that an ongoing remembering and forgetting is 
underway of Moo-hyun Roh’s memory. Moo-hyun Roh was committed a suicide at 2009 after 
the prosecuter’s investigation of the bribery. After this sudden death, the cultural memory of Roh 
is composed of a tangle of medial, temporal, and political relations, revolving around his 
personage. South Koreans invest him with certain identities, and in turn, he provides 
transformation and proliferation of those identities. Most notably, memory as such is composed 
in good part as forgetting: remembering via dispositif and the identities it produces change over 
time. On the one hand, memories must always be anchored in the past; in this case, the other 
figures of the minjung movement form a “fixed point” of cultural memory (Assmann, 1995, 
p. 129). On the other hand, those identities that are linked to the imagined nation that are 
generated are more hallucinatory. The memories of Roh are multiple and, what is more, 
thoroughly contradictory. 
This dissertation aimed to illustrate how a collective memory was selected under the 
norms of covert silence. The selective nature of memory has been known from the beginning; it 
remained a question how the process of memory’s intertwining with forgetting is actually 
enacted. In fact, the concept of active forgetting (Nietzsche, 1989) allows considerations of the 
memory–identity–politics nexus of contemporary South Korea. This project shows that identity 
is, in fact, never purely faithful to the past, but is always trans- and sub-formative for the given 
conditions, and forgetting plays a role in constructing identity, which is always on the move. 
Some traces of Roh were erased to provide a pivotal space, open to the other memories. The 
memory of Roh was influenced by the ongoing events of the present. In other words, 
remembering Roh by South Koreans becomes a focus of political struggle among the then-
government and the various groups of people including mourners, ilbes, as well as the strangers 
who were participating as they were looking for a sole cast to sculpture their desired memories in 
iii 
 
the real world. Roh and a large group of sympathizers were produced as antithetical to the then-
government, especially its policing policy, reinforcing the identification with the minjung 
movement for the collective emotional memory that has been reproduced continually since the 
1970s. Notably, the memory of Roh is based on forgotten memories. With this empty signifier, it 
opened up the possibility for other memories to become vocalized, through the very community 
it constructed. Through the practice of active forgetting, individuals in South Korean society 
undertook their political sovereignty. It also proves that if collective memory were the memory 
of the contemporary, forgetting would be a huge contribution that makes remembering to be 
contemporary.  
In Chapter One, I argued that forgetting should be regarded as a lens for interpreting 
memory and temporality. The work of several philosophers on memory was examined, and it 
was recalled that anamnesis is categorized as remembering tied now to action. In this 
remembering, forgetting is not a bankruptcy of human capability, but the product of a time which 
often entails that parts of the past be omitted. Here, oblivion, as we imagined it existing in 
remembering, is a way of molding one's identity as well as giving oneself a greater degree of 
choice in the flux between selective tradition and the sense of now. As Martin Heidegger (2004, 
p. 140, 2008) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1997) suggest, forgetting is the process of forging the 
realization of now-time behind a perceptive yesterday. 
The later part of that chapter explores the possible meanings of the fact that contemporary 
media technology has the power to reshape our ways of remembering and forgetting. 
Contemporary new technology is rooted in digital hypomnemata (Stiegler, 2010, p. 85), meaning 
that, on the one hand, we can more easily remember by inscribing and recall by re-accessing our 
memories. However, this cannot secure complete recollection of the past, as changes impose 
other issues onto our sense of the timeline. Instead of there now being a completely linear time, 
we now possess plural time spaces. Thanks to this plurality, I argue, the sense of now is blurred 
and is no longer a singularity. In a way that techno-positivists do not recognize, thanks to the 
new hypomnemata, we are as likely to forget the past as the present. 
This theoretical excursion brought us to a point where we could begin to understand the 
way Roh was memorialized in May 2009, in particular, the noje ceremony, not as to efface him 
but to remember him in a different way, which was the core of Chapter Two. To deal with an 
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issue of political urgency, Roh's mourners chose to covertly silence the past (Vinitzky-Seroussi & 
Teeger, 2010). His image was emptied out, and its contents were replaced by another truth. 
During noje, sympathizers imagined Roh using the tropes of collective ressentiment, called han, 
and thought of him as a member of the minjung, or an oppressed class maintaining an unsettled 
emotion. To create the imagination of Moo-hyun Roh’s life, the ceremony was performed using 
particular aesthetics. Notably, during the ceremony, many parts of Roh’s life that appeared to 
contradict this freshly imagined memory were silenced. However, with this forgetting practice, 
room was spared to invite other memories. Here, noje functioned as a hallowed symbol, inducing 
other emotions tied to other unsettled memories of the near past, rather than to Roh’s life itself. 
Chapter Three depicted a pair of contested memories of Roh that emerged following the 
funeral. That is, the memory of Roh, which was maintained and strengthened through dialectics 
between truth and myth, became layered in his mourners by 2010, through the interpretation in 
popular media content as a variation of Roh’s narrative. However, there also began to appear 
other memories of him. The radical meanings hidden in the memories of Roh, centered in the 
online community Ilbe, were attacked to neutralize them by parodying the contradiction between 
the real figure and the memory of him. With this practice, opponents attempted to skim the aura 
from Roh’s memory, which was largely done by sympathizers of the government. For them, Roh 
should not have a role in the present social imaginary. Thus, the mediatized memory of Roh 
became political, on the one hand, while on the other, it did not function as a stabilizer for further 
social conversation. Instead of being a publicly owned object (Casey, 2004), Roh’s memory 
existed as fragmented, antagonistically forgotten by different groups of people who refused to 
talk to each other. 
Chapter Four examined the way Bongha constructs the tourist experience, using 
continually maintained silence regarding certain aspects of the past. This town serves as 
memory-dispositif, putting forward memory aids for Roh that are chosen to selectively highlight 
his life. The most important point is the following: from my observation of the site, visitors 
participate in this covert silence by coordinating their behavior into unscripted but noticeable 
norms. Touring Bongha brings one into an encounter with mediated memory, and the mourners 
atone and engage in a pilgrimage to this remote site, full of pre-given memories of Roh. 
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By selectively delinking the past, forgetting edits the memory for “making sense” of the 
present. Not shaping the present by the past conversely, with selective remembering as well as 
silently performed active forgetting, collective memory serves the desire of the present. Their 
divergent interpretations of the past and of emerging events keep bringing up contentions about 
the personal history of Moohyun Roh, as he who lived in this world with a level of complexity. 
Regardless of who he really was, the remembering practice to a large extent empowered 
individual authority to shape an ongoing event, enabling individuals to challenge institutional 
narratives. 
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Introduction. The Time of Mourning 
 
On May 23, 2009, breaking news reports came that Moo-hyun Roh, the former president of 
South Korea, had thrown himself off Owl’s Rock, a mountain cliff near his birthplace in the town 
of Bongha. Over the following five days, the downtowns in every city in South Korea were filled 
with thousands of people lining the streets to pay their tribute to Roh, holding flowers and yellow 
balloons. In larger cities, such as Seoul, the lines on the streets stretched to almost a mile long; it 
took three hours to reach the front of the line. The faces of those waiting, wearing black suits, 
bluntly expressed feelings of loss and sadness. Some cried silently, and others were shouting in 
their confusion. Riot police formed lines, pushing their unsentimental faces against the mourners 
holding signs pledging, “We will never forget you!” 
This pledge may be undercut somewhat by a consideration of last few years of Moo-hyun 
Roh. In 2006, the last year of his office, Roh’s approval rating reached 5.7%, which was the 
lowest for any president at any point in the history of Korean polling (Tongadatk'ŏm, 2006). As a 
legitimately elected candidate, he once symbolized a new era for the nation. Having earned a 
reputation as a human-rights lawyer, he came on the scene with the reputation of a righteous 
politician, dedicated to democracy. With the support of grassroots citizen groups, he went from 
the least likely candidate to the hero of the 2002 election. However, betraying the hopes of the 
left, he spearheaded the nation’s rapid transition into a neoliberal economy, creating a flexible 
labor market and ordering the brutal put-downs of unions, resulting in 137 injured (Park, 2005). 
In late 2008, journalists learned of Roh’s ongoing prosecution and the public became outraged. 
The route to the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office in Seoul was live broadcast by helicopter (Sbs 
news, 2009). Editorials in newspapers were filled with discussions of the criminal charges facing 
Roh, most of which treated the outcome as a fait accompli. 
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However, on that Saturday, May 23, 2009, all this hatred appeared to be forgotten. For the 
six days following Roh’s death, more than five million people visited shrines located across the 
nation, including one in Bongha at the place where he died, where a million visited (Kang, 
2010). Since that Saturday, he has been remembered as the greatest president South Korea has 
ever had. In 2010, a survey found that 45.6% of South Koreans remembered him as the president 
they supported the most (Kang, 2011). In 2016, when South Koreans were asked which president 
had contributed the most to the country, they ranked him in first place (Realmeter, 2016). Even 
now his words and image are often used in criticisms of the current government’s unsatisfactory 
practices. Politicians and celebrities visit his grave to promote their own political activity (Ch’oe, 
n.d.). The observation of these commemorative practices raises certain questions: Where did the 
five million saddened faces come from, on the occasion of Roh’s death? Had all of them 
forgotten about Roh’s actual tenure in office? If this reaction is a response to something, what 
allows the accompanying forgetfulness? 
This dissertation examines how the memory of Moo-hyun Roh in the culture of South 
Korea is preserved, forgotten, and re-inscribed. Roh’s memory has played a role in the formation 
and negotiation of the political sense of self among South Koreans. In this process, South 
Koreans have chosen specific sets of relationships with past and present politics, which then 
compose the vicissitudes of political memory over time. The case of the contemporary memory 
of Moo-hyun Roh in South Korea furnishes an opportunity to examine in detail the specific and 
multiple relationships of remembering and forgetting that have formed cultural memory for over 
a decade. Questions of media, temporality, and politics are crucial in the emerging field of 
memory studies, and the case of the memory of Roh provides an opportunity to identify and 
analyze in what way forgetting is a choice made in the assembly of cultural politics. 
It is widely acknowledged that memory is exceptional, but forgetting is banal. That is, 
much is forgotten, due to the human incapacity to handle the mind’s weakness (O’Hara et al., 
2006; Ricoeur, 1999, 2004). Using this understanding to assess the massive scale of mourning of 
Roh, we could easily conclude that it is nothing but further evidence of the bankruptcy of 
memory. Even worse, it would be possible to judge this to be the result of the immaturity of the 
mind of the nation, driven by irrational and irresponsible pathos alone. 
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This project, however, takes the stand that memory and forgetting do not stand in simple 
contradiction; rather, they are mutually enabling and constitutive factors. There is little question 
that remembering is selective. In politics, the past is domesticated by the purposes of the present; 
politicians are called upon to be symbolic, to act as saviors in response to contemporary political 
issues (cf., Zelizer, 1992; Bunch, 2011). Work in memory studies has identified remembrance as 
being produced by networks of conflicting meanings and competing claims to the ownership of 
history and memory among individuals, among groups, and among individuals or groups and the 
state (Bodnar, 1994; Greenberg, 2006; Rothberg, 2009; Schwenkel, 2006; Sturken, 1997; 
Verdery, 1999). However, the role that forgetting plays here has been neglected or minimized. 
This dissertation examines the experience of those who participated in the forgetful 
remembrance of Moo-hyun Roh, as revealed through textual analysis, interviews, and participant 
observation, and it thereby contributes to current debates on collective memory, proposing a 
developed vision of communal memory, that is, of memories that are held by a collective on the 
condition that other aspects of the past are forgotten. 
The following chapters will show memory is fundamentally a product of now; it is 
updated and reinscribed according to the purpose of the time (Aristotle, 2004; Krell, 1990; 
Ricoeur, 2004). Further, forgetting functions to allow memory to adapt to the time we live in. By 
continually refreshing remembering by means of forgetting, we define ourselves as timely and 
updated. Observing the memories of Roh, from the period immediately following his death in 
2009 until the present, I seek to answer the call for a more spontaneous, communal, and 
phenomenological perspective on collective memory that can be inclusive of forgetting (Casey, 
2000; Erll, 2008; Halbwachs, 1980, 1992). Following current debates about mediatization and 
multidirectional memory (see, for example, Hoskins, 2009a, 2009b; Landsberg, 2004; Rothberg, 
2009), this dissertation interrogates the regeneration and transformation of memories, taking the 
reordering (Verdery, 1999, p. 36) and reinscribing (Greenberg, 2006, p. 129) of Moo-hyun Roh, 
following his dramatic suicide,  into the sense of the here and now, while producing multiple 
memory traces juxtaposing many past images, from the anti-government movement of the 1980s 
to the sacrifices of the present. As a symbol, South Koreans’ memories of Roh are dispersed, 
differentiated over time and space. Forgetfulness of who he was in life and how he had 
previously been remembered is commonly practiced. 
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Justification for the Study 
Three questions relevant to the interdisciplinary fields of memory studies, media studies, and 
Korean studies are addressed here. First, this study captures social memory in South Korea out of 
collective imaginaries that have included active forgetting by social participants. The most 
notable aspect of the South Korean memory of Moo-hyun Roh is that this remembering is 
intertwined with a silence that is a collective, covert form of active forgetting. 
Following the suggestion of Hans Ruin (2015), this dissertation posts a different 
understanding of memory as a way to “[preserve] this ancient correlation between the ability to 
hold on to the past,” based on what is called “anamnemonic subjectivity” (p. 198). The word 
anamnesis, translated as “remembering,” features as an important term in Aristotle’s discussion 
of memory in his short dissertation “On Memory and Recollection” (2004), a densely packed 
analysis of memory in the sense of a mental function. The argument in this document shows that 
the process of recollection requires being able to attend to differentiations of magnitudes or 
proportions of the interval between “now” and “before.” “The main thing is,” Aristotle writes, 
“that one must know the time” (Aristotle, 2004, p. 177 [452b7]). The starting point for such 
recollection is, of course, controlled by the person recollecting; nevertheless, during the act itself, 
several paths are open to reminiscing. In other words, in any given search, as anyone who has 
done archival research can testify, there is always the possibility of finding something 
unexpected, going down a false path, or finding nothing at all. Traversing particular intervals of 
time through recollection is, ultimately, a form of reasoning: it follows chains of inferences from 
an origin point to a successfully recalled event or object. 
Hermeneuticians have learned from Aristotle that memory delineates, in a constant play 
of attention, recall, and forgetting, the space of awareness and receptivity in which temporality 
and historicity are enacted. In Memory, History, Forgetting, Paul Ricoeur (2004) concludes that 
forgetting is not the opposite of memory. Rather, forgetting and memory condition each other in 
a complex interplay, which constitutes the human historical condition. Without a reserve of 
forgetting, there can be no recognition, no recollection, and no memory. Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(2006) also adds that “forgetting and recalling belong to the historical constitution of man and 
are themselves part of his history” (p. 14). Thus, the past, as having-been, transforms the reserve 
of forgetting into an resource for the work of remembering, making repetition possible precisely 
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because it does not transform the past into something that is wholly irretrievable and gone. For 
this reason, forgetting is constitutive for the search process that is anamnesis. To understand this 
interplay that produces memory, the modes of forgetting must be studied. 
On a critical level, this dissertation investigates the practice of memory as regards the late 
South Korean President Moo-hyun Roh’s life and death, as mediating the selective past by means 
of emerging political actors. It is not surprising that the collective memory of the anti-
dictatorship movement of the 1980s is yet a factor in our century, the metaphoric meaning of 
Roh’s death remains to be studied, along with how the political engagement of South Koreans 
reacted to the event. Here, I examine the collective memory practices through which South 
Koreans incorporated Roh’s death, retaining their memories of Roh while forgetting distressing 
or uncomfortable aspects, and mobilized themselves to strengthen positive memories over time. 
Forgetting can thus be a precursor of the realization of one’s own political sovereignty. The 
tactical instrumentalization of images of the past images is part of the selective tradition that 
creates the current culture and is fundamentally a political decision. When authenticity is 
dismembered, there can be greater openness to the horizon, inviting other memories and creating 
a sense of common, bonding memories. An interpretation of this sort may appear in many places, 
both online and offline, in response to malpractice by the current government. 
Second, this study explores sites as a dispositif1 of memory, where collective discourses 
emerge and are contested. The dispositif is a constellation of heterogeneous elements within a 
system and the relationships between them, which together produce a particular tendency. It 
means a historical formation, and the relations that compose it change over time (Foucault, 1980, 
p. 200). For Deleuze, the dispositif is a method as well as a concept: “Untangling these lines 
within a social apparatus is, in each case, like drawing a map, doing cartography, surveying 
unknown landscapes, and this is what he [Foucault] calls ‘working on the ground’” (Deleuze, 
1992, p. 159). 
                                               
1 Here, the term dispositif incorporates more than is implied by the English translation of 
the word, apparatus. Moreover, that translation is problematic because it connotes the 
mechanical and fixity. Further, as Frank Kessler points out, an apparatus in no way incorporates 
the idea of a disposition, as is implied by dispositif, “both in the sense of ‘arrangement’ and [of a] 
‘tendency’ that the arrangement brings forth” (Kessler, 2013, p. 1). 
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Through visiting sporadic dispositif that mediate the memories of Roh, this dissertation 
engages current scholarship on media agency as well. New mnemo-technologies allowed 
memories of Roh to be kept up to date and to reappear in South Korean society. Such new 
memories bring Roh’s metaphoric presence to the fore in multiple narratives that were 
reproduced in both popular culture and in spontaneous recollection. However, the image 
delivered is not always a coherent, sacred image of Roh; some parodic or satirical appearances of 
his memory also emerged to confront the memories of Roh as a martyr and as the unifier of the 
nation. These humiliating comic images of him were latter attempts to re-amalgamate the 
meaning of his memory as a failed politician. 
Media repertoires and popular culture impinge upon these mnemonic practices. This 
project captures this tension, or even contradiction, in emergent mnemonic patterns of conduct 
by visiting the Roh’s memorial in Bongha. This study, thus, investigates how these memory 
practices are in the contemporary moment actively producing knowledge concerning the past, 
which ultimately attests to their performativity (Lagerkvist, 2013). This focus adds a processual 
sense to evolution of as yet undefined or unsettled rhythms and memories in such memory 
practices. With such comparative studies of various loci of memory, this study examines how 
collective memory is developed and diversified in different meaning-making practices. 
Finally, this dissertation investigates the incorporation of past memories in responses and 
contributions to the transformation of political subjectivity in South Korea, in its present post-
dictatorship and neoliberal society. To this day, few studies have investigated emotive and 
sensory responses to Roh’s memories and how they have evolved in time and space.2 This 
project offers, using a different approach, a remedy to misgivings or gaps in knowledge 
occurring in previous works on this subject. Examining how mourners can contribute to the 
memory of Roh in both the myth and the fabric of the past–present imaginary, this dissertation 
will investigate how sovereignty is imagined and performed in mnemonic practices, including at 
                                               
2 Notable studies of this have been published in Korean in an edited book (Wiwŏnhoe, 
2009). In this work, Ki-Ho Em (2009) reads the occasion of Roh’s death as a space of mourning 
for others who could not be mourned. Also Won Kim reads the funeral as an emotional rite gone 
through by the collective, whose participants could not identify where their sadness came from 
(Kim, 2009). Junman Kang, in addition, views Roh’s funeral as a kind of communication to the 
dead, as well as to the living (Kang, 2010).  
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Roh’s funeral, annual commemorations, and online memorials. While the heroization of Roh 
currently dominates, a sense of solidarity in various memories has also gained prominence in the 
testimonies of mourners, memorabilia, and mourning performance. Roh, who was never a 
farmer, has been painted standing in a rice paddy, wearing a straw hat. An image of Roh was 
posted online with recent victims of police eviction. This disjointure in representation shows the 
performativity of remembering, not as planned by the political institutions, and it also invites 
different memories through being imaged in each rememberer’s embodied performance 
(Connerton, 1989). A recalled past forms a repertoire for performance that “enacts embodied 
memory [that is] ephemeral, non-reproducible knowledge” (Taylor, 2003, p. 20). I argue that 
both inscribed, mediatized memory and embodied remembrance take part in creating an 
individual to reacquire a sense of presentness in politics. The result of this, as we have already 
observed, is a dramatic reversal in public opinion, which no longer remembers Roh as a real 
figure but as a political symbol for the strong but plastic identity of an anti-government group. 
Aim and Research Questions 
This dissertation explores what emerges when memory and the politics of time interact, with a 
particular emphasis on the performance of spontaneous forgetting and selective recollection. 
Furthermore, the project attempts to depict the mode of memories, that is, that they consist of 
both remembering and forgetting, in the space of new mnemotechnology, which brings our 
imagination to the aid of memory. That memory is selective is well known, but how this 
selectivity occurs in fact remains an open question and is empirically discussed in this 
dissertation. The processes explored here are dealt with in four stages, each of which is guided 
by a different research question; these are listed below. 
Chapter One discusses the concepts of memory, that is, remembering, forgetting, time, 
and technology, to develop a foundation for later exploration in following parts of this document. 
The research question for that chapter is as follows: 
• Why should forgetting be treated as an active aspect of memory? Is it possible to actively 
forget the past? How do now-intertwined mediating technologies impact remembering and 
forgetting? 
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Chapter Two reads an ethnographic site that examines two aspects of Moo-hyun Roh’s 
funeral in 2009, namely, yŏnggyŏlshik3 and noje4, using the concept of active forgetting. The aim 
is for an overall approach to be established through a decontextualization of history and covert 
silence in service of the politics of the present among the participants in mourning ceremonies. 
The guiding question for that chapter is as follows: 
• Is it possible to read the mourners’ interpretation of the death of late president as active 
forgetting, which left a space open for other marginalized memories? 
The following chapter observes the afterlives of the mediatized memory of Roh. Notably, 
between 2010–2015, memory-practices about Roh were in circulation that were consumed by 
different social groups. The analysis of when, where, and how their practices of making 
memorabilia such as memes from counter-memory will be addressed in Chapter Three. This 
chapter will attempt to investigate how the mediatized memory that came to prominence after his 
physical death remains political and has resulted in reproductions of other various 
representations. Through the analysis of each mode of memories, the third chapter also tests the 
possibility of the convergence of memory, which could create a discursive space in society. The 
question for this chapter is as follows. 
• How did the traces of Roh attract the memory interpretations of different groups? How do 
their meanings converge internally while not emerging as the memory making of another 
group? 
The final chapter of this dissertation explores further the perspective on performance that 
Taylor (2003) elaborated by narrating the experience of visiting Bongha, focusing on how 
memorial spaces are populated by visitors through their own imaginaries. The aim is to develop a 
greater understanding of tourist performance and its sense of place in relation to mediatized 
                                               
3 Yŏnggyŏlshik denotes a ritual performed by mourners to give notice to the deceased that 
he or she will have to “leave this world” forever before the burial (Kim, 2016). This is the more 
official ceremony in the funerals of well-known figures. 
4 Noje is another funerary stage in traditional South Korean culture. Family members, 
relatives, and bier-carriers stop several times on the way to the burial ground and perform a ritual 
for the dead soul. For more detail, see Chapter Two of this dissertation. 
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memory. This chapter also questions whether there is placement of forgiving as a mode of 
forgetting. This chapter responds to the following question. 
• What is the performance of place among tourists at a space related to their reading and 
understanding of media spectacle regarding that space? 
Although it may appear that only one case is used for the length of the dissertation, each 
chapter examines collective remembering and forgetting in a different time and place and the 
changes between them. The site of empirical research for this dissertation is the posthumous 
memory of Moo-hyun Roh. Each chapter adopts a different theoretical approach and uses 
different methods. Consequently, the empirical material differs from chapter to chapter, ranging 
from social media forums, to governmental statements, to observations, and to interviews with 
tourists. While Roh’s memory is foregrounded throughout, I view it using different theoretical 
approaches, spaces, and timeliness. In the introductory chapter, only the central theoretical 
approaches are explored in detail; other theory is examined more thoroughly in the individual 
chapters. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation includes an introductory section, four main chapters, and a conclusion, followed 
by a compilation of all references used in the dissertation. Each chapter also includes an auto-
ethnographic prelude that conveys the experience of being at the given site. The introduction, as 
mentioned, provides an overview of Roh’s memory in current Korea, presents the aim of the 
dissertation, and the research questions guiding the remainder of the study. 
Chapter One, “Ars Oblivionalis,” contains a literary review outlining the theoretical 
framework, which combines media theory with memory and performance studies. Incorporating 
Nietzsche’s work on active forgetting, the chapter elaborates further on the concept of forgetting, 
while exploring the dynamics of memory and recollection. Furthermore, the chapter also 
provides an overview of the discussion of media and memory, endeavoring to open up an 
intellectual space in which performance of memory can be approached as occurring in, as well as 
with, the media in their mutual co-constitution. 
10 
 
Chapter Two, “Five Days after the Suicide,” discusses the moment of commemoration on 
May 29, 2009. Roh’s funeral had two parts, and the chapter interrogates how the memory 
practice of the 1980s pro-democratic movement resonated with the feeling regarding the anti-
government movement among the participants. Memories from the 1980s and 2009 are explored. 
The noje event referenced the past, but did not bring forth the same performativity from the 
participants. 
“Afterlife Memories of Moo-hyun Roh” is the title of Chapter Three, which depicts two 
conflicting memories of that which followed the funeral, especially those found on online 
bulletin boards. With the analysis of when, where, and how practices of making memorabilia (or 
memes) occurred, the chapter investigates how the mediatized memory that followed Roh’s 
physical death could remain political and result in reproductions of various representations. The 
condition for public memory, which Edward Casey isolated as “formation through ongoing 
interchange of ideas and thoughts, opinions and beliefs” (2004, p. 41), is investigated. The two 
memories centrally examined in this chapter do not create a public memory which would give a 
consolidating vision of the past, and my analysis attempts to clarify the reasons for this. 
Chapter Four, “Talking to the Small Tableau,” focuses on the relationship between 
mediated memory and embodied performance of Roh in Bongha, where he is buried. 
Functioning as memory-dispositif, this town now attracts a million visitors each year. Through 
the architectural decisions made in the town and visitors’ engagement with it, this chapter will 
examine how contemporary memories of Roh are laid out, intersecting questions of memorial 
spaces, vocalized by the visitors in their own imaginaries. I address why particular gestures of 
dominance and debauchery are so prevalent, analyzing, in conjunction, mediation (inscribed 
memories), performance (incorporated memories), and space (settings). 
The final chapter, Conclusions, presents the findings of the individual chapters and the 
overall conclusions of the dissertation. 
Methodology 
The complexity of this analytical research project necessitates the application of multiple 
methodological designs. 
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This research follows and expands upon a body of literature in various disciplines, 
philosophy, memory studies, cultural theory, anthropology, and media studies. This literature 
shifts attention from representation to embodiment and performance, from intellectual discourse 
to lived experience, that is, from mediated memories to performances of memory. 
An asset of equal importance to the existing work of others is my own experience of the 
reconfiguration of Roh’s memory. I was at Seoul Square at the noje in 2009. This experience 
gave me insight to understand the event, not being limited to reading texts produced later by 
others. Ever since I have been a follower of commemorations afterwards both online and offline. 
I was between discussions, doubts, and thoughts that South Koreans generated for remembering 
and forgetting Roh. All of these experiences may give me the ability to use my own personal and 
emotional memory as source material for auto-ethnography, an accredited tool to reconstruct 
affective response and invoke particular emotions and individual memories. Multiple scholars 
(Denzin, 1997, 2010; Ellis, 2008) have argued that auto-ethnography is an approach to research 
and writing that seeks to describe and systematically analyze personal experience in order to 
understand cultural experience. Auto-ethnography creates evocative texts, showing that their 
design brings “readers into the scene”— particularly into thoughts, emotions, and actions — to 
“experience an experience” (Ellis, 2008, p. 142).  
Agreeing on this intriguing and promising qualitative method, I included my auto-
ethnographies from different scenes that I expectedly or unexpectedly encountered while 
studying this project. These writings are intended to be relevant but independent, named as 
“prologues” and placed in front of each chapter. Each piece is aimed to be a bridge to the coming 
chapter that is more dedicated for broader understandings of a sociocultural phenomenon. For 
instance, I recalled my “first-time” the moment I learnt Roh’s suicide in 2009 and the tide of 
complex emotions out of remembering him before the first chapter. My piece on attending Roh’s 
noje was placed before chapter two, that discusses the funeral’s differentiated mode of 
remembering. However, I also purposed it can be read as a complete piece, as I value self-
focused, individual memory-writings as the present form of remembering the past. It is my hope 
that, by recreating specific memories through visualization, my experience could transform the 
place where the event performed or is still performing memories, illustrating for my readership 
that the specific structure of feeling around this complex remembering as “something felt both 
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through strong emotional responses and multi-sensuous experiences...and interactions" 
(Lagerkvist, 2013, p. 6).  
Another principal method of research in this project were observational. Such 
observations were inspired by the methods and approaches developed in anthropology, including 
fieldwork, interviews, and participant observation. The purpose of using these observational 
methods was to create descriptions of what people say and do (Sanger, 1996). Analyses, textual 
interpretation, fieldwork, the research problem, the research questions, and areas of concern all 
emanated from experiences and materials gained and impressions gathered from my fieldworks. 
For instance, I visited Bongha as any other tourist would, though I had already been conducting 
research. My observations began during during the three-hour journey from Seoul to Bongha and 
included the hours I spent at the site and on journey back. I conducted observations at Bongha in 
November 2016, May 2016, and November 2017. I spent seven to ten hours per visit, including 
the time spent waiting at the bus stop and on the bus and taxi rides. This transit time also 
provided opportunity for observations, because I could see tourists both before and after visiting 
the site, as well as while they were there. While the focus of my observation was the 
performances of the tourists, everything else at the site, such as signs, the shop, the organization 
of the premises, and so on, was also observed. 
The observations were augmented by ad-hoc conversations, and these conversations 
often developed as open-ended inductive research. While there are several critiques have been 
raised including the lack of transparency in sampling strategy, choice of questions and mode of 
analysis, interviews still offer an effective way for understanding knowledge, values, beliefs or 
decision-making processes of stakeholders, and strengthening research design and output (Young 
et al., 2018). As McNamara (1999) notes, interviews are particularly useful for getting the story 
behind a participant’s experiences. As this project attempts to read the meaning of past-memory 
as a process which navigates between different levels of experience and embedded in the 
narratives and texts it produces are the historical and contemporary relationships of power that 
structure everyday life, people’s ruptures and continuities, past events and forgotten episodes can 
be investigated, not as objective historical occurrences but as constructed and reconstructed 
accounts of the past acting in and on the present. Interviews may offer a method to acquire how 
memories of the past are being verbally registered in present form. For this reason, oral 
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historians have favored qualitative interviewing for the detail and depth that it provides 
(Keightley, 2010). These interviews are largely conducted on a one-to-one basis, however in 
many cases couples and small groups were also interviewed together to elicit collective accounts 
which allow the discursive negotiation of mnemonic accounts to be seen first-hand. Especially 
the unstructured format allows the participant to lead the discussion and fully explore and 
articulate their remembered experiences (Keightley, 2010). 
To investigate memories of Roh’s noje (Chapter Two), more formal interviews in 2017 
were conducted, a total of nine, ranging from 15 to 30 minutes. The interviews exhibited the 
interviewees discussing their memories and making meaning from Roh’s death in 2009, as well 
as present-day impressions of the event. The interviews began with the question why the 
interviewee had decided to participate in the noje on May 29, 2009. Depending on the answer 
received, this was followed up with a variable question, which depended on whether they had 
been an active supporter of Roh before his death or they had not expected while he was alive to 
feel this way about him. At Bongha (Chapter Four), the conversations were unstructured. A total 
of eight casual conversations were noted for the three visits. These conversations began with 
introducing myself, followed by asking the person why he or she had decided to visit Bongha. I 
asked how my interlocutors felt about the town and the site, as well as for their memories of 
Moo-hyun Roh. Most respondents gave a judgment of Roh while responding with their memory 
of him. In this way, I captured tourists’ descriptions of their own actions and of the media 
products they consumed and used, which I could then relate to their performance and sense of 
place. 
Memories of Roh are extensively expressed in media spaces; for this reason, textual 
analysis of memorabilia formed a part of this project. This method is often implemented in media 
studies and other social sciences as “a way for researchers to gather information about how other 
human beings make sense of the world” (McKee, 2003, p. 1). First, information was collected 
from a range of online entities, including blogs, community bulletins, user comments on online 
news articles, and posts and comments from social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter. 
Official statements, including official eulogies from the mourning ceremonies, press releases, 
and reports were examined. Media documentaries, news coverage, television shows, and print 
media (newspapers, journals, and books) were collected and analyzed to illuminate how the 
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event was framed in traditional media formats as well. This created the core of the analysis in 
Chapter Three. 
Throughout this dissertation, I approached the research object applying mnemohistory. 
Jan Assmann proposed this approach, which observes “the past as it is remembered” while it 
“deliberately leaves aside the synchronic aspects” (Assmann, 1998, p. 9). To study the remains of 
memory, he urges, one must survey “the story-lines of tradition, the webs of intertextuality, the 
diachronic continuities, and discontinuities of reading the past” (Assmann, 1998, p. 9). The 
following chapters are the outcome of my attempt to share his view. 
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Prologue One. “We have to be prepared for this.” 
 
There is no escape from yesterday, because yesterday has deformed us, or been deformed 
by us. (Beckett, 1999, p. 13) 
 
It was a bright Saturday morning and I was walking outside. I was attending a friend’s wedding 
later that day, so I was wearing a black suit, which was unusual. Inside the subway there were 
not many others wearing the same type of formal clothes. The day was rather good for mountain 
climbing or a picnic. Then I saw an anchorman on a screen wearing the same black suit. He 
looked serious. A glaring news alert streamed across the screen: “Former president Moo-hyun 
Roh found dead.” Soon I received a text from my manager: “Heard this? We have to be prepared 
for this. Come quick.” I did not understand what he meant. It was Saturday and we were neither 
journalists nor the police. What should booksellers have to do about the death of a president? 
I never liked Roh. Perhaps it was because I did not live through the dramatic moment of 
his campaign for the presidential election in 2002. I was in an army training camp at the time, 
where, for the purposes of training, no stories from outside were allowed in. Later, I heard there 
was something magical about Roh that drove supporters to volunteer to participate in his 
campaign. They spent countless nights calling their friends, sending endless text messages to 
anyone they knew, writing blog posts, and commenting in online communities. When the 
election was called, they cried with joy alongside their candidate Moo-hyun Roh. But this was 
just what I heard. A friend sent me a letter and said, “The nation may be changed after all.” This 
declaration surprised me almost more than the election, as he was not the type to speak of 
tomorrow. 
But the change my friend dreamed of never arrived. Instead, I watched as the South 
Korean government joined the U.S. invasion in Iraq, which resulted in the kidnapping of a South 
Korean civilian by the Iraqi militia. I watched on the television screen as the victim screamed 
and sobbed, begging us to pull the troops out of Iraq. “Please, save me. I don’t want to die! I 
don’t want to die!” Roh refused to meet the kidnapper’s demands, and the man was beheaded 
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(Spinner & Faiola, 2004). I heard Roh give the government permission to wield law and order 
against the people during labor disputes, sacrificing his supporters to the deliberately sharpened 
edge of combat police shields (Hadl, 2011; Kwon, 2016). I heard about the time Roh ordered the 
military to disperse activists and locals who were protesting against building a new U.S. Army 
base in P’yŏngt’aek – my friends wielded bamboo sticks against heavily-armed, trained soldiers 
(Choe, 2006; Yeo, 2011, p. 2). Once when I was sitting on a wooden bench near Kwanghwamun 
square, I saw the phrase “All this is because of Roh” carved into the bench. That phrase was 
popular during the time I lived under his government. It was even not surprising to me when I 
heard that he was under investigation for bribery. 
When I returned to the office, after hearing of Roh’s death, I found that my co-workers 
had already designed an aesthetic and mournful banner-image on the main page. My manager 
was right. Despite my doubts, there were already piles of order-slips waiting to be processed. I 
joined my co-workers who were already working on handling the orders. Swamped with orders, I 
had no time to consider the implications of his death, while the banner on our website asked each 
visitor: “What did Moo-hyun Roh mean to you?” 
Something was changed. On my way home that day, I saw many people dressed in black. 
Some were openly sobbing on the street. This was obscene. It seemed his choice to die by 
jumping from a cliff had deformed many, including himself. Roh climbed the cliff as a corrupt 
politician; when his body landed on the ground, he became a question. It was a question about 
the past, that suddenly flooded to the present. That question, perhaps cannot be answered 
properly in any way, convoked me into one of them. Perhaps one mistake was not asking 
ourselves that question in the present tense: “What does Moo-hyun Roh mean to us?” His suicide 
was like a nail in the floor; we knew the sharp thing had been there a long time, and finally, when 
the nail came to hurt us, we looked at our bleeding feet and confessed that we had always known 
it was there, but we never knew when to bring it up. I never liked him. And my manager was 
right; we should have prepared for his death. But, in truth, no one ever could prepare something 
like this, the known-unknown or the unknown(unspoken)-known. 
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Chapter One. Ars oblivionis in the era of networked memory reproduction 
 
Normally, strange things circulate discreetly below our streets. But a crisis will suffice for 
them to rise up, as if swollen by flood waters, pushing aside manhole covers, invading the 
cellars, then spreading through the towns. It always comes as a surprise when the 
nocturnal erupts into broad daylight. What it reveals is an underground existence, an 
inner resistance that has never been broken. This lurking force infiltrates the lines of 
tension within the society it threatens. Suddenly it magnifies them; using the means, the 
circuitry already in place, but reemploying them in the service of an anxiety that comes 
from afar, unanticipated. It breaks through barriers, flooding the social channels and 
opening new path ways that, once the flow of its passage has subsided, will leave behind 
a different landscape and a different order. 
Is this the outbreak of something new or the repetition of a past? The historian never 
knows which. (De Certeau, 2000, p. 1) 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework of this dissertation. The roles that Moo-hyun 
Roh’s memory has played recently in the formation and negotiation of South Korean identity are 
undergirded, as I will attempt to prove in this project as a whole, by specific sets of relationships 
that make up memory over time. I argue that the eruptive expression of the collective memory of 
Roh at the time of his funeral was something that previously only “circulated discreetly below”; 
it “comes as a surprise” and is reemployed by the present (2000, p. 1). A dramatic shift occurred 
in public attitudes to Roh, who had formerly been called a corrupt politician but was mourned at 
his death by five million people all across the country. 
Is this yet another instance of the failure of human memory? It could be. Does the false 
identification of Roh speak what had been left unspoken? I say yes: Roh’s death and the 
remaining commemorative culture “leave behind a different landscape and a different order” (De 
Certeau, 2000, p. 1). Here, I propose that forgetting can be performative (Plate & Smelik, 2013; 
18 
 
Santino, 2004; Taylor, 1989; Van Dijck, 2005). As Laura Basu (2012) notes, enduring collective 
memories are “never made by politicians, monuments, or individual media representations 
alone” (p. 2), although power relations in media and politics are essential to their existence. If a 
performance exposes a strand of cultural memory, what follows it may be allegoric if the 
narrative performed has twisted relations with the past, or it can be ironic by implicating other 
occasions that have only weak links to it (De Man, 1979; Derrida, 1989). The selective gesture 
incorporating the memory of Roh may create an advantageous opportunity to closely examine 
the specific and multiple relationships of media, power, and time that have formed a cultural 
memory in recent South Korean society. 
The identification of what has been circulating below the surface of Korean society from 
the year 2009, begins here with an examination of the modes of memories, beginning with 
chapter 2, where I will discuss specific cultural meta-memories erected by Roh’s death. This 
chapter serves to sketch the theoretical shape of active silence as a mode of existence of 
forgetting before identifying the particular meta-memory practiced together with forgetting at 
Roh’s death. Questions of forgetting, temporality, and media are all crucial in the emerging field 
of memory studies, and the case of Roh provides an occasion for identifying and analyzing these 
factors that are all interwoven in selective forgetting. 
The chapter will consist of three parts. First, I will discuss some challenging views on 
forgetting in the understanding of memory. Memory is taken to be the foundation for an ideal, 
truth-seeking, and independent identity, and forgetting is denounced as decay or interruption. We 
are lacking a vigorous discussion of forgetting. The ideas of repression, denial, and amnesia are 
more commonly mentioned. Taking philosophical ideas on forgetting as a foundation, this part 
will explore forgetting as a normal part of the memory-making process. 
In the second part, I will expand my argument on memory and forgetting to focus on its 
relationship with temporality. How can we judge the present with forgetting? For Nietzsche, 
Bergson, and Heidegger, memory creates a space for facing the now. Here, I contend that this 
must be considered together with forgetting, which empties out what chained the freedom of the 
individual (Derrida, 1989, p. 35). In this conception, a new projection toward the future is only 
available on the condition that there is a rupture in our experience. 
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Then, the omnipresent then-and-now media will be examined as an active agent of a new 
mode of memory in the present. The precise question in this part concerns the changes to our 
mode of remembering and forgetting resulting from the shift in media technology. Here I play 
the mythologist who, according to De Certeau, is “providing the eruption of strangeness with 
forms of expression prepared in advance, as it were, for that sudden inundation” (De Certeau, 
2000, p. 1). Eschewing decisive pronouncements, I will explore the possibilities offered by the 
new media ecology. 
Activeness in forgetting 
The banality of forgetting 
With the rare exception, such as Daoism (Chen, 2015),5 our culture finds greater value in 
remembering than not. This dichotomous conception of human memory has long been dominant, 
claiming that memory is superior and that forgetting is banal; this is a mere representation of the 
human incapacity to handle the mind’s weakness (Garde-Hansen, 2011; O’Hara et al., 2006; 
Ricoeur, 2004). It places importance on remembering, while thoughtful consideration of oblivion 
has disappeared from mainstream academic discussions. Forgetting is frequently related to 
uncivilized nature; for instance, scholars speak of the mind of “[being] lazy” (Stone, 
Gkinopoulos, & Hirst, 2017, p. 287). Or, as Anne Whitehead reports, while the memory is 
viewed first and foremost as a “deposit and storage,” forgetting plays no decisive role in this 
system except to be the result of a “fault in the storage systems or from a decay or 
misrecognition of the memory traces” (Whitehead, 2009, p. 48). Forgetting is commonly 
described as water, as Harald Weinrich illustrates in his essential book on this issue, Lethe: The 
art and critique of forgetting (Weinrich, 2004, p. 16). For contemporaries, forgetting is found to 
                                               
5 According to Chen (2015), Daoist philosophy highlights the importance of forgetting 
(wang, 忘). The word wang appears in many passages of the Zhuangzi: “Fish forget one another 
in the rivers and lakes, and men forget one another in the arts of the Dao” (p. 50). When one 
forgets, one becomes closer to transforming the self and attaining oneness with the Dao. To 
nourish the mind and enter Heaven, it is necessary to forget things, forget heaven, and forget the 
self. This forgetting discussed here implies the breaking away from physical and mental desires 
that can cause harm to self and others, including the excessive indulgence in material things and 
judging, using the mind’s limited knowledge. In place of rejecting or destroying the world, 
forgetting is here “a kind of sublation that inherits the position and, through a synthesis, 
transcends to a higher realm” (Chen, 2015, p. 180). 
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be an uncontrollable force of nature acting on our consciousness. Modern psychologists, taking 
this view, consider amnesia as an abnormality of the mind, caused by aging or other negative 
influences that block the memory system from its proper functioning (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 
2004, p. 11). The objective of studies derived from this knowledge exhibits the ambitions of 
diagnosing and curing memory disorders caused by injury, sickness, or aging. Generally 
speaking, forgetting is considered a lack, an absence, or an end. These ideas on forgetting and 
other forms of failure of memory reflect a conception of it derived from the ancient Greek idea 
of alētheia, or not-forgetting, as the truth of memory. The variations on an oversimplified 
account define forgetting in terms of neglect, failure, and injustice: “the shady villain . . . lurking 
behind the scenes” (Brockmeier, 2002, p. 15). 
Nevertheless, as theorists have increasingly argued in recent years, remembering is 
currently considered to be inseparable from forgetting. Forgetting is instead something 
betokening a dialectic “presence by absence” (Singer & Conway, 2008, p. 281; see also, Ricoeur, 
2004, pp. 433 and 458). Something forgotten is not misplaced or displaced from our 
consciousness but rather is a proof of its own past existence. Forgetting “in this paradoxically 
active sense” is not simply a matter of ignoring events but of being able to ignore them despite 
their potentially troubling character (Rigney, 2012, p. 52). Echoing this, in a recently published 
article, Plate proposes the necessity of studies of forgetting (Plate, 2015). In the search of 
answers to the questions how and why we forget, she suggests, we must understand the discrete 
“moment and act” of interruption or disruption that is productive of oblivion, as well as what 
serves to maintain it. She concludes that such study will open “the relationship between memory 
and knowledge on the one hand, and oblivion and ignorance on the other”; most importantly, it 
will reveal “how individual oblivion is produced culturally” (Plate, 2015, p. 148). 
However, the term forgetting encompasses a vast territory. Ann Rigney calls it an 
“umbrella term” (Rigney, 2012, p. 240). It signifies many different modes of loss of memory and 
inability to express, including amnesia, oblivion, silence, and omission (Plate, 2015, p. 148). It 
can also be used to name a broad range of sources of elimination of memory including repressive 
erasure of traces, benign neglect, repetition, over-writing by other priorities, self-imposed 
silence, mutation, to obsolescence (Rigney, 2012, p. 240). One particular mode of absence of 
memory was called “aphasia” by Ann Stoler, in that for this case, information on the past 
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remains, but the testimony of the past is not spoken (Stoler, 2011). Jan Assmann, in a way that is 
at once similar and different, articulates an idea of encrypted memory, according to which 
memory exists inside a crypt that is held within culture; thus, it is invisible, but it can be revived, 
either as is or in a different mode of existence (Assmann, 1998, p. 216). Counter-memory, as a 
practice imposing vernacular memories on top of official ones, is an exercise of forgetting 
(Foucault, 1980, pp. 160–161, 206–211). To systemize the ways forgetting is treated in the 
foregoing scattered references, sociologist Paul Connerton (2008) offers a taxonomy of 
forgetting in seven types. 
1. Repressive erasure (Connerton, 2008, p. 60), in which a dominant political regime, e.g., of 
totalitarianism, remakes history; 
2. Prescriptive forgetting (Connerton, 2008, p. 61), which eases conflicts from the past that 
cannot easily be dealt with in present time; 
3. Forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of a new identity (Connerton, 2008, p. 62); 
4. Structural amnesia (Connerton, 2008, p. 64), what the collective is aware of but does not 
speak of, such as patriarchy; 
5. Forgetting as annulment (Connerton, 2008, p. 64), e.g., the growth of archives and 
computers; 
6. Forgetting as planned obsolescence (Connerton, 2008, p. 66); and 
7. Forgetting as humiliated silence (Connerton, 2008, p. 67). 
Connerton’s article has provoked a number of negative responses; its categorization caused 
“initial confusion” as it “illustrated with examples from very diverse areas” (Wessel & Moulds, 
2008, p. 288; see also, Singer & Conway, 2008). Scott Timcke (2013), in response to these, 
recategorized the above seven above into “1) repressive erasure, 2) forgetting as constitutive, 3) 
planned obsolescence” (p. 376). However, the clear product of this discussion, as discussed 
above, is the realization that the idea of forgetting is not universal. Instead, “there are a variety of 
pressures and mechanisms that are at play” when one forgets, and condemning them out of hand 
is premature (Timcke, 2013), 
In relation to the topic here, I will dwell on and expand Connerton’s third category, 
forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of a new identity (Connerton, 2008, p. 62) (in 
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Timcke’s second recategorization, this is forgetting as constitutive, which is nearly identical to 
Connerton’s conception). With this criterion, Connerton suggests that forgetting can be used as a 
method to build one’s identity. He writes 
The emphasis here is not so much on the loss entailed in being unable to retain certain 
things as rather on the gain that accrues to those who know how to discard memories that 
serve no practicable purpose in the management of one’s current identity and ongoing 
purposes. Forgetting then becomes part of the process by which newly shared memories 
are constructed because a new set of memories are frequently accompanied by a set of 
tacitly shared silences. (Connerton, 2008, p. 64) 
Here forgetting is voluntary; groups and individuals consciously create silence on a particular 
part of the past in forging the identity politics they need. The present necessity forces the 
recreation of what is remembered and what is not. 
This type is the employment of forgetting in the occasion of the creation of a new self. 
Paul Ricœur depicted a similar process in his work Oneself as Another (Ricœur, 2008), where 
identity is shown to be the product of negotiation dependent on the eradication of previous 
aspects of life-history. He distinguishes two modes of the sense of identity: idem identity is the 
sameness in the self; it represents the claim not to change during the course of time and before 
events around the subject change themselves. Change, however, does occur, and one should not 
deny it but negotiate. This negotiated identity is ipse identity. For Ricœur, the difficulty of 
dealing with changes over time is one reason why identity is so fragile. Here, again, forgetting is 
not a loss. Rather, it exists as an affirmative force that maintains the identity within a negotiation 
with the present. This paradigm of forgetting as both a reserve and deletion is at the origin of 
what Paul Ricœur calls “the disturbing threat that lurks in the background of the phenomenology 
of memory and of the epistemology of history” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 412). For him, the best use of 
forgetting “is precisely in the construction of plots, in the elaboration of narratives concerning 
personal identity or collective identity”; that is, “we cannot tell a story without eliminating or 
dropping some important event according to the kind of plot we intend to build” (Ricoeur, 1999, 
p. 9). Forgetting, in this mode, functions as an offer to reconcile the past and moving forward 
(Rieff, 2016). 
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1.2. Active forgetting to enable current action 
Friedrich Nietzsche highlights this idea of the must erasure of the past for the sake of the present 
life. In his famous second meditation from Untimely Meditations (Nietzsche, 1997), Nietzsche 
coins the expression “active forgetting” (p. 62). In this context, Nietzsche calls for an 
abandonment of the past, as excessive focus on fossilized remembrance can diminish the value 
of the present, which “returns as a ghost and disturbs the peace of a later moment” (1997, p. 61). 
As a radical solution, he proposes critical discourse on the past “that would be attentive to the 
needs of the present and able to distinguish between what in the past is advantageous and what is 
disadvantageous for life” (Ramadanovic, 2001). 
As Louis Pojman (2001) notes, “the present is fleeting, effervescent, uncatchable” 
(p. 231), meaning that memory and knowledge of the past provide groups with sense-making 
processes that form present values and beliefs. What happens next is the hegemon’s use of the 
past to set “hegemonic systems of control” that “become . . .  incorporated into everyday life, 
organising popular sentiments and discourses” (Sue, 2015, p. 115). 
Thus, for Nietzsche, forgetting enables human beings to step outside of history and to feel 
unhistorically. According to Aleida Assmann “active forgetting is implied in intentional acts such 
as trashing and destroying.” She explains that “[a]cts of forgetting are a necessary and 
constructive part of internal social transformations” (A. Assmann, 2008, p. 97). This differs from 
censorship, which is a more forceful “if not always successful instrument for destroying material 
and mental cultural products” (A. Assmann, 2008, p. 98). Active forgetting is elevated for its 
potential to rescue human beings from their disastrous history. This resonates with Nietzsche’s 
other anti-platonic ideas, including his idea of Dionysian wisdom, which is “[j]oy in the 
destruction of the most noble and the sight of its progressive ruin: In reality joy in what is 
coming and lies in the future, which triumphs over existing things, however good” (Nietzsche, 
1968, p. 224). 
Thus, what Nietzsche “press[es] vigorously forward” (1997, p. 110) was the idea of 
forgetting as an active force that can help make the future new. Forgetting, here, is a power that 
is destructive to the past, thus anti-hegemonic, like Walter Benjamin’s much-discussed “divine 
violence,” which “boundlessly destroys [boundaries]” (Benjamin, 1986, p. 297) although some 
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scholars disregard the concept for dismissing “the complex hegemonic mechanisms” (Sue, 2015, 
p. 113). 
Active forgetting offers a different temporal condition, liberation from the time that is 
dictated by history’s legitimacy. In relation to this, Nietzsche rationalizes the relation to the past 
and renders conscious—so that it can be overcome—all those haunting memories that return to 
disturb the calm of a later moment. Joshua Dienstag (2004) notes that new time is forecast “as 
something constantly in flux, constantly in the process of becoming and, thus, constantly in the 
process of destroying . . . It recommends no cure for the pains of existence, only a public 
recognition of their depth and power” (2004, p. 87). This is “a moment, nowhere and then gone, 
nothing before it came, again nothing after it has gone.” The moment “nonetheless returns as a 
ghost and disturbs the peace of a later moment. A leaf flutters from the scroll of time, floats 
away—and suddenly floats back again and falls into the man’s lap” (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 61). 
Considering that this should be a product of a perspectival shift that sifts through evaluations 
created from a former perspective to keep only what can be reconciled with a new point of view, 
active forgetting is Nietzsche’s proposal to decolonize the very possibility of memory from the 
rigid dominance of history. Sarah Kofman characterizes it in this way: 
If time is indeed a necessary condition for the forgetting of the first evaluations, it is not a 
sufficient one: forgetting only has to occur because new forces have prevailed and been 
able to make other evaluations triumph. (Kofman, 1993, p. 50) 
In Nietzsche’s examination of forgetting, the aim is to the destruction of the horizon. It is to 
escape from its obtrusive regime in culture, whose articulation on the subject is also narrated in 
another work of Nietzsche’s in the following way: 
Only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with any repose, 
security, and consistency: only by means of the petrification and coagulation of a mass of 
images which originally streamed from the primal faculty of human imagination like a 
fiery liquid, only in the invincible faith that this sun, this window, this table is a truth in 
itself, in short, only by forgetting that he himself is an artistically creating subject, does 
man live with any repose, security, and consistency. (Nietzsche, 2000, p. 86) 
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Time and temporality of memory and forgetting 
Bergson and Halbwachs: memory for the active now 
Nietzsche’s discussion shows that the mode of memory cannot be considered separately from its 
impact on the sense of time. That is, time and memory—with forgetting included as well as 
remembering—are two interwoven, inseparable products of our temporal sense. The focus on 
nowness and individual freedom in recollection—characterized as creativity in the above text 
and plasticity, describing true possibility (Malabou, 2017, see also, 2010) in Malabou’s reading 
of Nietzsche —has continued to appear in modern philosophy of memory. 
Henri Bergson sees memory as a kind of duration that contains within it a past that is 
always present, that gnaws at the future, a past that we access through leaps into its layers to 
extricate that which recollection calls up. “Memory,” he claims, is “inseparable in practice from 
perception, imports the past into the present, contracts into a single intuition many moments of 
duration” (Bergson, 1988, p. 73). That is, recollection is not a work that can be manipulated. 
Instead of retrieving a specific memory for the particular situation, Bergson suggests, all of our 
past experiences should always be available to us at any moment and able to impact it.6 The 
multiplicity of temporal layers of memories continue to hover around the edges of the present, 
adding vibrant color and shaping the present intuitions. In other words, through recollection, the 
sense of the now in the present can be made heterogeneous, because it continues to be made. No 
matter how fleeting, each instant always contains within it a multitude of remembered elements, 
which are contracted into recollection. 
Bergson’s idea strongly contrasts with that of John Locke who finds the very possibility 
of our sense of subjectivity in the continuity of remembering (cf. Peters, 1989).7 For Bergson, the 
                                               
6 Here Bergson lays out his position on what would be called the phenomenology of time 
by Edmond Husserl and Paul Ricœur. Our conscious life is in perpetual oscillation between the 
dynamics of retention and protention. The phenomenology of time allows us to explore the 
meaning of our past in a way that is intimately associated with an enhanced understanding of the 
future. 
7 Locke takes memory to be a power of the mind “to revive perceptions, which it once 
had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before” (Locke, 1998, 
p. 182 [II, X, 2]). Locke prioritizes the memory of an individual that can only guarantee the 
integral subjectivity of the individual, since one who remembers his/her own past can preserve 
one’s own integrity. The agency to form one’s present self is also supported by one’s past 
experiences, based on making one’s decision to be credible to oneself as well as other people: I 
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past is not merely a moment in time that slips away and then is recalled later. Instead, all time is 
ever -present. This offers a rich trove that continuously conditions and enhances our experience. 
The past image is virtual, before parts of it take the form of recollection—“little by little it comes 
into view like a condensing cloud,” it passes into the actual and tends to imitate perception—“but 
it remains attached to the past by the deepest roots, and if, once realized, it did not retain 
something of its original virtuality . . . we should never know it for a memory” (Bergson, 1988, 
p. 134). 
Most importantly, it should not be omitted from Bergson’s idea that the present is the 
locus of action. Memories are inert, but they condition now time, which can act: “The past is 
only idea, the present is idea-motor . . . the past is essentially that which acts no longer,” and it 
is, therefore, essential to make “a real distinction between it and the present, i.e., that which is 
acting” (Bergson, 1988, pp. 68–69). Bergson writes that “there is much more between the past 
and the present than a mere difference of degree. My present is that which interests me, which 
lives for me, and in a word, that which summons me to action; in contrast, my past is essentially 
powerless” Bergson (1988, p. 137). Memory and the present are interconnected: the past 
conditions the present, and the present conditions the past. The past itself may be unable to act, 
but it works on the present and allows it to operate. The current itself calls up the memory, 
actualizes it, and helps to give it form. 
This is, arguably, an Aristotelian conception of memory, in whose theory the presentness 
of the time of recollection is emphasized. That is to say, memory–recollection is not reactionary. 
Recollection does not occur in chronological order but as an untamed, intertemporal, and 
ongoing activity inside one’s many memories. Bergson later defined two senses of memory, as 
durée and as imagination. In his treatise on memory and recollection, Aristotle distinguishes 
between memory and remembering (mnēmē or mnēmoneuein), on the one hand, and reminiscing 
or recollecting (anamnesis or to anamimnēskesthai), on the other (Aristotle, 2004, p. 449a:4–
                                               
am the one whom I remember in my past (Locke, 1998, pp. 126–127 [II, I, 13]; see also, Ricoeur, 
2004, p. 5 and pp. 102–109). No doubt, part of the allure of this position is its connection to the 
experience of remembering. Moreover, Locke thinks, even if two individuals share a memory of 
the same thing, the remembered object has the status of something that is viewed from different 
perspectives. Thus, for Locke, consciousness is an achievement of remembering—a means of 
integrating the past and, hence, of guiding, organizing, and constructing the self. 
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453b:11; see also Krell, 1990, p. 13). Like Bergson’s memory as durée, mnēmē is the simple 
presence or affection of a memory to the mind, which secures its character as an image or 
representation of something absent. The past was part of the present. In contrast, anamnēsis 
creates a trace in the process of recollection, which is written through mnēmē. Recollection 
flourishes, according to Aristotle, insofar as one kinēsis generates another, and we find what we 
are trying to remember. Kinesis, variously translated as motion, change, animation, or impulse, 
here means coming-to-presence or self-showing of a being that till now was absent from 
memory. Thus, while mnēmē is a “simple presence to mind” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 15), in anamnēsis 
is the active, deliberate process of seeking out and bringing to consciousness these imprints or 
memories. Memory, as anamnēsis is based on kinetic movement, our recollection is always 
possible to become intertemporal. It entails memory or representation of a certain fact that 
happened in the past (Bergson, 1988). 
The idea that the sense of now shapes how society remembers the past is expressed in the 
notion of collective memory. In a shift from the long-shared Lockean faithful-to-the-past 
subjectivity, Maurice Halbwachs coined the term collective memory in his 1925 book, Les 
Travaux de l’Année sociologique (1992), suggesting that memory functions according to the 
rules, norms, and logic of a symbolic order in its preservation and transmission. Memories are 
social products, as they are 
recalled to me externally, and the groups of which I am a part at any time give me the 
means to reconstruct them, upon [the] condition…that I turn toward them and adopt, at 
least for the moment, their way of thinking. (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 38) 
The most substantial differentiation here is that one no longer assumes any way memory ought to 
be. Halbwachs disclaims epistemological history as abstract, totalizing, and dead (Erll, 2008, p. 
6). Instead of being loyal to the past, individuals should recall memories within social frames 
that allow them resources through which they can reconstruct their memories. Memory is 
collective, but it is not universal or homogeneous. Halbwachs’s central idea was to try to 
understand the various ways in which what we speak of as an individual’s memory is, in fact, 
largely maintained and made possible through that individual’s belonging to a community, 
whether the relevant community be the family, nation, or culture. All these levels function as 
different frameworks that enable individuals to have memories (Halbwachs, 1992). The 
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collective forgetting, on this view, can be a dynamic and constructive process: all selective 
frameworks need to dispose of certain elements before incorporating new ones (Minarova-
Banjac, 2018). He uses the example of modern bourgeois societies where couples must form new 
collective memories from potentially incompatible family memories. He states, “to avoid 
inevitable conflict which cannot be adjudicated through norms accepted by both, they tacitly 
agree the past is to be treated as if it were abolished” (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 77). 
Thus, collective memory may even be particular, meaningful, and living (Erll, 2008, p. 
6). In collective remembering, recollected memory is interpretatively tied to the present, and a 
necessary part of an account of the past may be deleted or distorted in the service of present 
needs. As a result, for Halbwachs and scholars of collective memory, the past is tied 
interpretatively to the present, and a necessary part of any account of the past can be deleted or 
distorted in the service of present needs; remembrance gives greater emphasis to the social and 
political contestation that is part of many accounts of the past and, thus, is understood as a 
phenomenon of the present. 
However, this idea of collective memory, focusing just on the presentness of memory, 
assumes the present to be firm and solid ground where a person is rooted. The general criticism 
of both static frames of reference and unconstrained flows of living tradition gives rise to new 
conceptions of the dimensions of time and space within social theory, associated with the 
attempts to transcend the divisions between structure-oriented and action-oriented theories. 
Collective memory theorizes memory from within durable social frames at the time of 
establishment; however, memories are under ongoing contestant aerations; one changes its 
appearance and often appears reshaped in unexpected ways. Collective memory often puts 
boundaries on the memories of particular collectives, resulting in rigid ideas, which perhaps 
undercuts the mobility of memory. 
Some concepts that alter these notions, such as Aleida Assmann’s cultural memory, 
liquidates the inflexibility of the temporality of the notion . By altering the notion of collective 
memory to cultural memory, Assmann discloses memories that have been passively stored and 
“deprived of their old existence and waiting for a new one” (2008, p. 103), owing to the fact that 
they are “no longer needed or immediately understood” (2008, p. 106). Cultural memories based 
on that achieved memory of futurity are granted relative flexibility; unlike rigid social 
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(ideological) memory, the plastic nature of cultural memories is the key to surviving the memory 
itself in its present form, as well as the key to society as a whole. In other words, cultural 
memory is not about testifying to past events as accurately and truthfully as possible, nor is it 
necessarily about ensuring cultural continuity. Rather, it is about making meaningful statements 
about the past in the given cultural context of the present (Holtorf, 2008). Putting the precise 
point of the rescue on the futurity of memory, Assmann alters what was considered to be “lived” 
to something that is “be-living.” Forgetting here functions as neither absence nor loss. It is 
instead an apparatus of adjustment for the present, especially for the time of protention. An 
inevitable and necessary part of cultural memory-making, forgetting can be liberating for 
individuals and communities that seek to separate themselves from old traditions and memories 
that continue to impact current politics. 
Heidegger: forgetting and the realization of now 
Activeness in forgetting can be observed in other respects. As a process of memory, forgetting 
also functions as a preferable apparatus of adjustment for the present time, such as in Nietzsche’s 
proposal of active forgetting. The value of forgetting is not just as one’s ability to acquire agency 
in time-politics, but forgetting also offers a special moment that may bring forward the intense 
possibility of understanding the deep relationship between time and memory. The absence of 
memory is often not a simple loss but a rupture or crisis of our understanding. If we, as Jacques 
Derrida proclaims in multiple places, accept that our forgetting involves the new in every act of 
repetition, we must also accept that memory cannot unproblematically retrieve past experiences, 
reconstruct the past as it was, or be associated with the transmission of unchanging traditions 
through time. 
Martin Heidegger, who without a doubt valorizes alētheia, truth as unforgetting, never 
simply disempowers forgetting. Memory and recollection, for him, are not merely “power to 
recall”; remembrance is instead a gathering of the things that “speak to us in every thoughtful 
meditation” (Heidegger, 2004, p. 140). Memory is working on a “constant concentrated abiding 
with something;” thus our memory is “not just with something that has passed, but in the same 
way with what is present and with what may come” (Heidegger, 2004, p. 140). What is past, 
present, and to come appears in “the oneness of its own present being” (Heidegger, 2004, p. 
140). Thus, he notes: 
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Inasmuch as memory—the concentration of our disposition, devotion—does not let go of 
that on which it concentrates, memory is imbued not just with the quality of essential 
recall, but equally with the quality of an unrelinquishing and unrelenting retention. 
(Heidegger, 2004, p. 140) 
This thoughtful meditation of recollection should include the process of forgetting. As Stephan 
Käufer explains (2011, p. 53), our forgetfulness (Vergessenheit) is the inauthentic mode of 
having been. Forgetting is “not . . . just failure of to remember . . . it is rather a ‘positive,’ 
ecstatical mode of one’s having been.” Heidegger clarifies this: 
Remembering is possible only on that [ground] of forgetting, and not vice versa. For, in 
the mode of having-forgotten, one’s having been “discloses” primarily the horizon into 
which a Dasein lost in the “superficiality” of its object of concern, can bring itself by 
remembering. (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 338–339 [G339, i.e., German p. 339 G]). 
In other words, forgetting cannot be about what is forgotten. It is another relationship with the 
past, which existed as what has been in the present. Using Bergson’s word, forgetting is not an 
absence: rather, it is a memory that is present, as virtual. Then forgetting is within our real 
essence, Dasein, as it meets opportunities in the present. 
For Heidegger, forgetting is ambivalent. If Dasein falls into inauthenticity, its existence 
loses itself in its concerns and becomes absorbed into the daily tasks of living. Rather than being 
concerned with its own primordial potentiality for Being, Dasein’s everyday existence involves 
the projection of a specific, existential understanding of Being, based on a non-thematic 
readiness to deal or cope with things. This facility in one’s daily activities, Heidegger suggests, 
corresponds to a kind of forgetfulness. He writes: 
With the inconstancy of the they-self Dasein makes present its “today.” In awaiting the 
next new thing, it has already forgotten the old one. The “they” evade choice. Blind for 
possibilities, it cannot repeat what has been, but only retains and receives the “actual” 
that is left over, the world-historical that has been, the leavings, and the information about 
them that is present-at-hand. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 443 [G391]) 
However, it does not stop there. For Heidegger, forgetting foregrounds the true remembrance, 
that is, the historical meaning of Dasein, and projects possibilities into the future. Heidegger 
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believes that time, the essence of being, is given to Dasein to be opened. Time does not just flow 
but offers a true possibility to leap over one’s own frame and then articulate the true truth. The 
past, thus, is not merely facts that happened; rather, it “is first opened up for the present by its 
direction into the future” (Leichter, 2011, p. 87). 
The ecstasis (rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing away in the face of one’s 
ownmost “been,” and of doing so in a manner which is closed off from itself-in such a 
manner, indeed, that this backing-away closes off ecstatically that in the face of which 
one is backing away, and thereby closes itself off too. Having forgotten [Vergessenheit] as 
an inauthentic way of having been, is thus related to that thrown Being which is one’s 
own; it is the temporal meaning of that Being in accordance with which I am proximally 
and for the most part as-having been. (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 388–389 [G339]) 
Thus, if there is forgetting, it is not simply of past events; in forgetting, Dasein closes itself off 
from the fact that its Being is questionable, that is, the question of Dasein can never be fully 
settled. Now one must be opened up to the world, and forgetting partakes of such an opportunity. 
Put differently, Heidegger claims that remembering is meaningful insofar as it is an attempt to 
recover something from forgetfulness. 
Only on the basis of such forgetting can anything be retained [behalten] by the concernful 
making-present which awaits, and what is thus retained are entities encountered within-
the-world with a character other than that of Dasein. . . .  The awaiting which forgets and 
makes present is an ecstatical unity in its own right, in accordance with which inauthentic 
understanding temporalizes itself with regard to its temporality. (Heidegger, 2008, p. 389 
[G339]) 
Dasein’s dispersion among its current possibilities means that it loses both the understanding of 
who it truly is and any sense of the concealed and forgotten possibilities contained in the cultural 
tradition it has inherited. Rather than retrieving those possibilities that the past harbors, Dasein’s 
thinking becomes constricted, and the possibilities through which it understands itself and its 
world are judged according to their usefulness. In this passage, Paul Ricœur explains, having-
been refers to “the complete anteriority of the past with respect to every event that is dated, 
remembered, or forgetting. An anteriority that is not confined to removing it from our grasp, as is 
the case of the past as expired [Vergangenheit], but an anteriority that preserves” (Ricoeur, 2004, 
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p. 442). This is a past that is always already with us but that cannot be given a specific date in the 
past. Rather, it is, as Steven Crowell suggests, “spectral,” which is to say, incapable of being 
narrated while also being the ground for narratives (Crowell, 1999). The past, as having-been, 
makes the reserve of forgetting an immemorial resource for the work of remembering forging 
repetition possible, precisely because it does not condemn the past to being wholly irretrievable 
and gone. 
Derrida: saying “yes, yes” to affirmative memory 
For Derrida, Heidegger’s belief that memory enables the emergence of consciousness capable of 
establishing conditions of autonomy and freedom is naïve. In his work on memory and mourning 
Memoires: for Paul de Man (Derrida, 1989), Derrida finds that the Heideggerian notion of being-
in-time still works within the limits of the binary constitution of metaphysics and thus is lacking. 
He doubts the ability of consciousness to grasp what might be understood as the text within the 
temporal horizon, while correcting Heidegger’s merger of two concepts, which according to 
Derrida must be considered separately: Anwesenheit, or the presence of being-in-general, and 
Gegenwartigkeit, or the presence of being-in-time. Derrida considers it essential to draw this 
distinction, since it is what allows us to perceive the trace as a prisoner of the text, whereas, in 
Heideggerian philosophy, being is only a prisoner of itself. The chain, thus, to which we belong 
is very far from the sense of a continuous flux within imagination (Derrida, 1989, p. 27). What 
Heidegger imagined for the Dasein is rather written by the law, which continues to apply not 
only to attempts to deal with tradition but also to the orientation directed toward the uncertainties 
of the unconscious (Derrida, 1989, p. 35). 
Memory, then, is neither of the past, nor from the present, but is affirmative. It creates a 
simple alliance with the sense of now. We can only refer to something being “in memory of”; 
thus, différance, with its letter “a,” can play a role in explaining the movement of an ever-
continuing production of differences. Memory as an act is inscribed in traces, or survivals of a 
past, which mark every ongoing inscription. It has no concrete existence in itself, and it is always 
contiguous to the act of being narrated. However, it does exist and is sanctioned by living 
peoples who share a moment together, such as for example before the place of mourning. Derrida 
illustrates how people can hold memory through the tactics of a storyteller who can save it, 
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weaving tales that promise to affirm the memory of something other, through promising 
themselves to such an affirmation. Thus, memory is bound by a double yes-saying oath: 
[T]he “yes,” which is a non-active act, which states or describes nothing, which in itself 
neither manifests nor defines any content, this yes only commits, before and beyond 
everything else. And to do so, it must repeat itself to itself: yes, yes. It must preserve 
memory; it must commit itself to keeping its own memory; it must promise itself to itself; 
it must bind itself to memory for memory if anything is ever to come from the future. 
This is the law, and this is what the performative category, in its current state, can merely 
approach, at the moment when “yes” is said, and “yes” to that “yes.” (Derrida, 1989, p. 
20) 
The first yes does not occur without the second or its promise, even as the second is the memory 
of the first, with the yes itself being internally divided into yes, yes. This affirmation of memory, 
as Maclachlan describes it, thus begins “by calling, without assurance, for repetition, in a series 
one would hesitate to qualify once and for all as diachronic” (Maclachlan, 2014, p. 250). 
Ironically, this exposes memory, for both recollection and forgetting is based on 
utterance, an oath or a double promise. This memory’s very mode is a promise by the one who 
shares “memory of”; the second is a signature affirming that memory is “being remembered as 
promised” (Derrida, 1989, pp. 26–29). The fact that this is extremely present-dominant, however, 
does not imply the delegation of the future or the past. In this double-bounded promise, we can 
understand that the very nature of memory is performative. Each memory, whether it present 
(remembering) or absent (forgetting), is a declaration of a status in time and behaves just as it is 
declared. Forgetting can be, in this understanding, a practice of identity politics. The politics that 
claims the subject’s sovereignty, however, makes a gesture of ambivalence, as it is neither a 
denial nor an affirmation of the past. Forgetting in this sense becomes performative. In her book 
Antigone’s Claim, Judith Butler (2002) portrays Antigone as neither denying nor admitting being 
submerged into the words of the law. Butler instead depicts the speeches and actions of Antigone 
as the subversive caesura. Antigone’s speech “obeys the demands” of the law, the law of the 
present, which is the order of the symbolic, “but [only] promiscuously” (Butler, 2002, p. 60). 
This, as Butler argues elsewhere, “inverts against itself the indictment it would level against the 
other” (Butler, 1997, p. 190). 
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To conclude this series of explorations, I assert that forgetting, at least, should not be 
designated as an incapability or banality in modern life. Instead, through dismantling what 
constituted the ground of our understanding, forgetting returns power to the people who share the 
presence or absence of memory. Oblivion may be deliberate, to design the practice of their own 
identity in actively performed silence or utterance of forgetting. Deeds re-resource the past. 
Reconfirmation, through a web of plural recollection and forgetting, is required for finding a 
temporal foundation for the now. The instability of subjectivity is part and parcel of the subject’s 
not having fully been in the past yet not quite but being in the future. 
Mediatized memory, mediatized forgetting 
Here, issues relevant to our understanding of forgetting are examined through discussion of the 
recent interventions of technology into our memory processes—the mediatization of our 
memories. Above, I have examined different approaches to forgetting as a kind of partaking in 
the realization of now. These approaches can lead us to rethink South Korean reactions in 2009 
and determine whether they derived from a failure of consistency or, instead, from anxiety over 
the present state of politics, resulting in collective action.  Within this action, individuals chose 
not to speak of specific past images. This leads to the following question: is covert silence or 
denial of representation a response to a new media ecology? 
Mediatized forgetting in new media 
A proper approach to so-called new media may require a shift from previous grounds for 
memory and media studies. What is meant when we add the word digital to the pre-existing 
notion of remembering and forgetting? Indeed, if re-inscribing the past is to update the 
knowledge to the present era, this issue can be discussed in line with another long-debated 
conundrum whether media-technology monopolize monopolizes our knowledge. The reply is 
promptly forthcoming that digital memory offers increased capability of storage and access. 
However, as Chun notes, “Memory, with its constant degeneration, does not equal storage” 
(Chun, 2008, p. 148). More space does not simply expand understanding. Likewise, memories 
using technology cannot be simply understood to bring human beings an improved supplement 
to the memory. 
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It is impossible to deny, however, that when a medium appears, it can significantly 
reshape our remembering. Our access and exposure to media dramatically directed our way of 
remembering the past. Yet media’s effect on human memory and how this affects the way we 
recall history are less-discussed. While one might assume that more documentation, 
communication, and modes of delivery would improve memory for historical events, multiple 
psychology studies observe that media affects the content of memories, the recollection of 
memories, and the capacity of memory, ultimately influencing the way we remember history 
(Molokotos, 2018; Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011; Tamir, Templeton, Ward, & Zaki, 2018).  
Media modifies not only what we remember but how we remember. Studies warn of 
possible inaccuracy in media representation for the past event. It often associates with false 
information, exaggeration, and dramatizing in recollection. This idea is supported by studies 
showing that introducing misleading or false information about an event can lead to an 
inaccurate recollection (Lawson & Strange, 2015; Polage, 2012). Moreover, people’s memory of 
the source for where they learned information is also affected by familiarity. According to one 
study, people attributed more familiar information as coming from a credible source, highlighting 
the feasibility of transmitting false information when illegitimate news sources repeatedly 
present false stories and facts on wide-reaching platforms such as Facebook and Twitter (Fragale 
& Heath, 2004). 
More importantly, studies report media not only affects our ability to recall events 
clearly; it also impacts our memory capacity by removing the burden of remembering from our 
biological-self. With the advent of the Internet as the main source of retrieving our public and 
private past, internal memories for events seem to be no longer necessary. We only need to recall 
where and how to find information about an event, rather than the event itself. Psychologists 
refer to this decreased dependency on internal memory storage as the “Google effect” (Sparrow, 
Liu, & Wegner, 2011). In this study, it shows that people who expected to have access to 
information later on more readily forget information than those who did not. Furthermore, people 
show better memory for where to locate the information than the actual information. 
Philosopher Bernard Stiegler explains that human memory is irresistibly prosthetia. 
Language is forgetful: instead, objects, what he calls “epiphylogenetic” ones, are required, as we 
rely on artifacts for our memories (Stiegler, 1998, p. 155). They are nonliving and thus concrete 
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things that serve as memory supports and thereby as the means by which past experiences, 
thoughts, ideas, and arguments, to name a few examples of epigenetic memories of the 
individual, are handed down to successive generations within a particular culture. For Stiegler, 
“[t]he prosthesis is not a mere extension of the human body; it is the constitution of this body qua 
‘human’” (Stiegler, 1998, pp. 152–153). Epigenetic memories are “set in advance, already there 
(past),” as well as comprehended in the context of “anticipation (foresight)” (Stiegler, 1998, p. 
152) and hence are directed to the future. 
Stiegler examines today’s computational technical memory aids in particular; these he 
calls, digital hypomnemata. They differ from industrial hypomnemata of technical recording 
(photography, phonography, cinematography) in that they create an “associated hypomnesic 
milieu” in which “receivers are placed in the position of senders.” Rather than dissociating 
consumption from production, as broadcast mass media (from phonography to global real-time 
television) did, today’s microtechnologies and the social networking practices they facilitate 
connect them: if these technologies can be used to consume, Stiegler suggests, they can also be 
used to produce (Stiegler, 2010, p. 85). This is also why he thinks microtechnologies have more 
in common with writing than they do with broadcast media like film and television. By renewing 
the possibility for self-expression and hence for self-exteriorization today’s digital hypomnemata 
restore a positive dimension to our coevolution with technics. 
Thus, it appears likely that the contemporary is dominated by mediation with a blurred 
boundary between what traditionally distinguished senders and receivers. However, this should 
not mean that the media will be destructively subversive in their relationship with human agency. 
The senses we realized from media that are being shaped, denied, and reshaped continuously.  
In his book, The Bias of Communication (2008), Harold Innis illustrated how the new 
media can monopolize knowledge by eliminating the mode of life with old media. "The 
monopoly of knowledge centering around stone and hieroglyphics was exposed to competition 
from papyrus as a new and more efficient medium" (2008, p. 35). He claims, for empires in 
history, it was really the "monopolies of knowledge" which are were at stake in the longevity of 
power. New media can reconfigure the social division between a mass of the ignorant and a 
knowledge elite by how much they could adapt this emerging technology unless those media can 
be enlisted in the service of the previous power structures. "The social revolution involved a shift 
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from the use of stone to the use of papyrus and the increased importance of the priestly class 
imposed enormous strains on Egyptian civilization and left it exposed to the inroads of invaders 
equipped with effective weapons of attack" (2008, p. 35). If priests can gain a monopoly on 
papyrus and writing, then they will gain power relative to the king who depends on stone 
monuments. The boundaries of the empire shift, expanding and contracting. The shift of 
perceptions redefines "knowledge," what those in power claim needs to be known. New 
allegiances are formed. New monopolies created. 
Innis also thought monopolies of knowledge promote tendencies toward instability. 
Competitors and critics are always looking for ways to subvert monopoly power, and perhaps 
gain it for themselves. This links to our time’s positivism to the Internet. With the emergence of 
this new technology, people expected such shifting monopolies in the delivery of news to the 
masses from newspapers to radio to television to the internet.  
However, humans can no longer be understood as alienated from technics. The term that 
describes this close relationship between the human and the technical sphere, "transduction" 
introduced by Gilbert Simondon (2016, pp. 155-156, see also, Mackenzie, 2003, 2006), means 
that one term or element cannot be without the other. The subject, or "who", of humanity is thus 
inseparable from the object, or the "what" of technics. Each of them is not totally submissive to 
the other. They are joined in a transductive relation. 
For Heidegger, the resonances of the Greek, tekhne offer the possibility also for thinking 
of technics as poiesis, or the unveiling of what is concealed (Heidegger 1977, p. 21). What 
prevents technics from being appreciated as poiesis is the dominance of the instrumental view of 
technics as a means and the dominance in science of the causa efficiens, the efficient cause. 
Heidegger wants to rethink this historic perception as only little thinking occurs when technics is 
conceived in this way. Technology, for him, rather has to be linked up with the idea of revealing 
– of revealing the truth of Being, in fact. Thus, tekhne becomes a "bringing-forth" linked to 
poiesis. Instead of an instrumental version of technics, which would enable humanity to do 
things in its own interest, Heidegger wants to poeticise technics and in so doing claim it for a 
thought which allows Being to come into unconcealment. This, for Heidegger, is the ultimate 
truth (aletheia). And this is, I argue, the true meaning of remembering.  
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Gregory Ulmer has drawn attention to the distinction between ‘lived’ and ‘artificial’ 
memory (Ulmer 1989, pp. 133–134). The idea of lived memory has been extremely influential in 
the history of thought. With respect to the recall of an experience of an event, lived memory 
would be the direct and unmediated representation of the perception of the event. In lived 
memory it is as though the event is being experienced for a second time as if it were the first 
time. Artificial memory, on the other hand, implies not only that memory entails a certain loss, 
but also that knowledge, understanding and insight are more important in recall than raw 
information supplied by perception. Memory becomes the code(s) individuals use to recall. The 
agency of human, the power to forget selective things, can decide remembering as being 
thoroughly individualised, derived as it is from biographical and other materials originating in 
personal experience or historical events. Here memory becomes a form of invention, since a link 
between the material to be recalled and the mode of recall is created.  
Scholars identify that now memories are “on the move” (Blom, Lundemo, & Røssaak, 
2017). Often, this type of change appears to occur thanks to our new mediation, leading the 
analysis to focus on the power of media, as if this is something new. For instance, Andrew 
Hoskins writes that “contemporary memory is thoroughly interpenetrated by a technological 
unconscious in that there occurs a ‘co-evolution of memory and technology’”. For Hoskins, 
memory is readily and dynamically configured through our “digital practices and the 
connectivity of digital networks” (Hoskins, 2009a, p. 96, see also 2014, 2016). Particular images 
of the past are defined in more pervasive ways, as repeating reveal themselves with their 
prosthetic presences. Hoskins discusses the mediatization of memory, defining it as the extended 
“impact of the media upon processes of social change so that everyday life is increasingly 
embedded in the mediascape” (Hoskins, 2009a, p. 29). Media here are no longer the 
precondition. Media today are powerful agents of memory, and they produce versions of the past. 
Indeed, memory is lived in a media ecology where the abundance, pervasiveness, and 
accessibility of communication networks, nodes, and digital media content scale the past in a 
new way. 
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger explains in his 2009 book Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in 
the Digital Age that human forgetting “has become the exception, and remembering the default.” 
(Mayer-Schönberger, 2009, p. 2), which contradicts Ricoeur’s conclusion from his study of 
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history that memory is generally considered exceptional, and forgetting is banal (Ricoeur, 1999). 
Forgetting, in this immediate technology of time space, is now affordable (Connerton, 2008, p. 
65). The change Mayer-Schönberger and Connerton identified is based on the observation that 
media now have the capacity to store individual memory materials. This could hardly have 
happened during the broadcast era, when media delivered memories but no space of individual 
remembrance (Merrin, 2010). In the post-broadcasting era, as Francisco Delich explains,  
Computers have memory but, as far as I can tell from my reading, they have no 
memories. Neither are they able to forget, since they would no longer have a “raison 
d’être.” It is a perfect memory, which can be destroyed but not self-modified. It can be 
partly or wholly replaced, intentionally or not, but nothing forgotten will come back, no 
memory will disturb the perfect order of the system. (Delich, 2004, p. 69) 
On the other hand, people in this new relationship do not always wish to remember themselves 
as they were. Thus, the new media capacity for storing past things does not inevitably mean the 
completion of memory or allowing us to obtain unforgetful selves. Geoffrey Bowker concludes 
that in the provision of new ways of archiving and memorializing, new ways to access our past 
and new temporalities come into play, which he terms potential memory: 
One read on the current set of memory practices is that we are moving culturally from the 
era of recorded memory to one of potential memory. There are so many and multiple 
determined traces out there on the Internet, and they are so easily searchable, that I (this 
is the comedy of the commons) do not have to worry so much about collecting my own 
books and films, annotating them, jotting down obscure facts and quotes on index cards, 
memorizing genealogies. (Bowker, 2007, p. 26) 
Thus, while a vast amount of information exists in the networked machine, current users of 
technology abandon their access to personal memory, as it can be suspended (Gudmundsdottir, 
2017). In a pioneering text, Lev Manovich predicts, as our memory and recollection rely on what 
is off the body (externalized) and objectified (Manovich, 2002, p. 74), they are combined into 
even larger objects. He forecasts that in our time, “by the end of the twentieth century” the 
problem would be no longer in the representation of memories; rather, it would be “how to find 
the object which already exists somewhere” (Manovich, 2002, p. 55). Consequently, memory 
becomes ephemeral (Chun, 2008) as well as constantly updated (Chun, 2017); the memories that 
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we “loop across a range of media” can be made use of in a variety of ways, most of which we 
have little or no control over. This impinges on our relationship with the past, possibly 
refashioning to some extent how we remember and forget. These traces can at times be our own 
aide-mémoire, which we can google ourselves to remind ourselves when we did, said, wrote, or 
shared this or that. (Gudmundsdottir, 2017, p. 93). 
For these reasons, Hoskins characterizes contemporary memory as precarious. “[It] is 
principally constituted neither through retrieval nor through the representation of some content of 
the past in the present. Rather it is embedded in and distributed through our socio-technical 
practices” (Hoskins, 2009b, p. 92). Scott Lash defines this as the end of collective memory and 
the entry into the age of “the Proustian perplexity, the undecidability of the novel, the political 
takes on vastly different contours” (Lash, 2002, p. 133). The political and the meaning of beings 
and human beings come to appear in a space of undecidability, a space of difference (Grosz, 
2004). Here both memory and forgetting are “simultaneously undergoing a social diffusion 
process and an ongoing series of code-based modifications” (Karpf, 2012, p. 640). 
Here recollection, or memory in general, always in search, easily decontextualized and 
recontextualized, results in immediate and indirectly relevant memories. Here, memories are 
what Bergson calls has been, that is, none of them are no longer. The temporality of the Internet, 
here, is continuous and emergent, in distinction from more traditional media technologies, which 
render our experience of events as punctual (Hoskins, 2014, p. 673). The Internet is also 
intensely archival, but the archive itself is part of the continuous present: “digital networks 
simultaneously enable a massively increased availability of all things-past (which Chris 
Anderson calls ‘the long tail’) and the heightened connectivity of, and in, the present” (Hoskins, 
2014, p. 667; see also, Anderson, 2004). Pessach (2008) notes: 
Just enter YouTube, search a newsworthy entry, or any other type of cultural item, and 
immediately you will notice the novel frameworks and mechanisms through which the 
various layers of life and people’s experiences are being documented, narrated, situated, 
contextualized, indexed, classified, and, at least potentially, preserved for future 
generations. Wars, disasters, political events, public affairs, popular culture, personal 
items, as well as many other fractions of people’s experiences, encounters, and life-
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hoods, are now being assembled into a network of networks, in which individuals are 
active participants in the construction of future’s past. (Pessach, 2008, p. 83) 
The times, with the sign-less cloud of technology called the typewriter 
Then, what is the digital punctual (Hoskins, 2014, p. 673) or punctum (Barthes, 1983) that media 
would lead us to? 
Mediated memory is “created when needed, driven by the connectivities of digital 
technologies and media and inextricably forged through and constitutive of digital social 
networks: in other words, a new ‘network memory’” (Hoskins, 2009a, p. 92). It is followed by 
the porosity of digital memories, the recontextualization of an event by people, in a way that 
might be inauthentic to history but accurate for those seeking solidarity. Alison Landsberg (2004) 
mobilizes the concept of prosthetic memory to argue that the cinema can implant memories of 
events that audiences have not experienced by audiences that are unknown to them. Here, it is 
proposed that the experience of watching certain kinds of films is indistinguishable from lived 
experience and has the potential to create long-lasting memories that have the capacity to remold 
identity. The sense of time here reaches the synchronous. People relate historical memories to 
each other less clearly but with a greater degree of relation. 
Thus, our time has become plural. Yet this plurality leads to other communicational 
problems. In his lecture Parmenides (1992), Martin Heidegger gave close attention to a specific 
artifact of modern technology, the typewriter.8 For Heidegger, the typewriter turns the word itself 
                                               
8 In the empirical sense, at the level that Feenberg called the ontic (Feenberg, 2000, p. 
447), Heidegger would agree that there has been a transformation of humanity by technologies 
through differences in the temporal sense. Heidegger’s assertion is well known that technology’s 
gestell, en-framing, is a gathering of things together, doing so through a calling forth of, or a 
challenging summons to, the human. Human beings are summoned or challenged forth to put in 
order that which, as Heidegger puts it, is put in standing-reserve (Heidegger, 1977b). In his 
widely read article on technology, his argument outlines the tension between the human and 
nature. There, although poetry is given pride of place, above any other craftsmanship, with the 
right tool, the hand can do a similar thing. In his lecture, he discusses how the hand can only be 
part of the human being: “no animal has a hand, and a hand never originates from paw or a claw 
or a talon”—because “the hand sprang forth only out of the word and together with the word” 
(Heidegger, 1992, p. 86). As Harris and Taylor (2005) note, the hand is thus the prerequisite of 
language, just as language is that of the hand. Thus, the relation to the hand is in keeping with the 
nature of the authentic production outlined above, not a relation of ownership but one of co-
production or indebtedness; human, hand, and language belong together in bringing forth. 
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into something other, which “no longer comes and goes by means of the writing hand, but by 
means of the mechanical forces it releases.” Handwriting, a site of the co-production of man, 
language, and hand, is replaced by typing, which is thoroughly mediated by technology. 
However, such mediation is never neutral—the typewriter is no mere instrument; instead, the 
activity it mediates is irrevocably altered, as is the entity that carries out this activity: “Therefore, 
when writing was withdrawn from the origin of its essence, i.e. from the hand, and was 
transferred to the machine, a transformation occurred in the relation of Being to man” 
(Heidegger, 1992, p. 85). The typewriter occludes this relationship, as “it tears writing from the 
essential realm of the hand.” Furthermore, as it is an intermediate thing, occupying a middle 
ground between tool and machine, the typewriter vividly demonstrates (because of this 
intermediate status and its proximity to those activities and faculties associated with man’s 
bringing forth) the manner in which technology engulfs the true being of man. The 
transformation shares the logic of challenging forth; it is characterized by the pressing into 
service of elements that had previously revealed themselves; this ordering results in a range of 
technologies that mechanically order language. This ordering reflects Heidegger’s fundamental 
thesis that Being consists in a simultaneous process of concealment and disclosure. 
The typewriter veils the essence of writing and of the script. It withdraws from man the 
essential rank of the hand, without man’s experiencing this withdrawal appropriately and 
recognising that it has transformed the relation of Being to his essence. [Thus] the 
typewriter is a signless cloud, i.e. a withdrawing concealment in the midst of its very 
obtrusiveness. (Heidegger, 1992, p. 85) 
Intermediation, with this signless technology at hand, should be thought together with the 
very possibility of brokerage in transmitting the meaning. Technology grants us a certain degree 
of liberation. We might even say that technology ordering language fuses mnemotechniques and 
mnemotechnologies, furnishing artificial supports for individual (and collective) memories 
existing within and being nourished by a larger mnemotechnological milieu—the system of the 
Internet. This is also signless cloud because the memory witnessing the presence of the personal 
digital archive cannot be the same as it was, although we do not use the entire memory collection 
in digital space. Heidegger admonished the students who sat in front of him, saying, “though 
well-intended, [you] have not grasped what I have been trying to say” (Heidegger, 1992, p. 85), 
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because of the typewriter. Martin Heidegger’s precaution is still valid. His warning does not stem 
from a Luddite passion. Rather, at issue here is prosthetic mnemo-techonology, or the 
temporality of hypomnemata. Epiphylogenetic memory has a temporal character. 
For Stiegler as well, the question of time is apprehended on the basis of the technological 
problematic of artificial memory, the memory of the human qua already there. The already there 
is the pregiven horizon of time, like the past that is mine but that I have nevertheless not lived, to 
which my sole access is through the traces left of that past. This means that there is no already 
there, and therefore no relation to time, without artificial memory supports. The memory of the 
existence of the generations that preceded me, without which I would be nothing, is bequeathed 
through such supports (Stiegler, 1998, p. 159). 
However, for Stiegler’s teacher, Derrida, consciousness is never the simple perception of 
the world as a continuous now, as it is always enmeshed in an improvisatory engagement with 
the world. While Stiegler tried to resolve such gaps in time through the inheritance of technical 
programs or anticipations that allow the world to appear in different ways, for Derrida, there is 
no pure sensory data. As noted earlier, for Derrida, memory of past is irresistibly forgettable; 
thus, every moment, no matter which technology is relied on, slips past. What we shared as our 
past is in fact subjective. Memories of the deceased are owned by each individual mourner, 
neither by the one in the coffin nor the collective. Their narration should be impossible or even 
fictitious (Derrida, 1989, p. 28). 
Stiegler resolves this absence by means of technical programming at the heart of sense, 
which enables faith, belief, and trust to be possible. Every technical device must be trusted to be 
used or to be, in Heidegger’s terms, ready to hand. This trust is a fundamentally human gesture 
of faith or belief, the source of morality and ethics, and is just as constitutive of humanity as 
technics. This faith is pragmatically accepted, trusted, and used by us, something whose history 
we did not live and have only because it is left for us and is our technical inheritance. In this way, 
the technical object allows human beings to relate to time while simultaneously anchoring this 
relation within a history. However, while it can transform our coexistence, technology also 
causes incommunicability between itself and the human. 
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Derrida calls this trust noted above the mark of an absolute past or of God. The 
unknowable past of a technical object, the freedom to believe in it and to use it leaves open a 
space of life outside programmability, opening the future or that which is to come as an absolute 
future, but always through technics, through the program: “Empiricity ‘invested with spirit’” 
(Stiegler, 2001, p. 260). For Stiegler, this duality of a technical constitution and a necessary trust 
or faith in the unknowable past that determine consciousness as extended outside itself, where 
memory is deposited in technical objects, and determined by the historical epoch of its technical 
environment. For Derrida, this can only be, again, affirmative, but in any case, it cannot be 
absolutely reliable. 
These determinations create difficulty in the prognostication of the phenomenon of 
remembering and forgetting. The contemporary might be undergoing a crisis, a development 
Pierre Nora explored using his famous concept milieu de mémoire (Nora, 1989). However, this 
may delimit the new ironic possibility of the post-modernity of our society, such as Nietzsche’s 
dream of delinking the past from the present, with the hope that a new sense of time could open. 
A networked memory may partake in a space of action, although its very origin is doubtful. 
Weakened authenticity would be able to be more empathetic and contemporary, as space is 
rooted in here- and nowness in current politics, as in the idea of the strength of weak ties 
developed in sociology, where individuals with more weak ties are found to have greater 
opportunities for mobility (Granovetter, 1973). 
The ontology of remembering/forgetting with new technology: grammartization or amnesty 
Here we return to mediatized memory and forgetting within the context of new technology. 
Within this chapter, I argue that one mode of forgetting may liberate the subject to introduce an 
action to the contemporary. However, this should not be taken to mean that all forgetting 
benefits. Ricoeur warns of the danger of manipulated memory, which comes to the fore when 
higher—i.e., authoritative—powers exploit the blank spaces of memory and “impose a canonical 
narrative [on social actors] by means of intimidation or seduction, fear or flattery.” Then, “[a] 
devious form of forgetting is at work here, resulting from stripping the social actors of their 
original power to recount their actions themselves” (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 448). Forgetting becomes, 
in such cases, semi-passive and semi-active. Social agents, while remaining manipulated to a 
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degree, still bear a responsibility for their situation, especially where forgetting is avoidance, or a 
wanting not to know (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 449). 
Here lies an undeniable strength of digital memory. On the one hand, new digital 
memories can be a safeguard for keeping one’s memory, to escape from banishment. As Plate 
argues (2015) “at the level of cultural and collective memory, there are all kinds of lethotechnics 
that are applied” (p. 148). A number of technologies have been used that are designed to foster 
collective amnesia. Archives are locked or burned, people are “disappeared”(thrown into the sea, 
or into oubliettes), sites are destroyed traces are erased, and new names and alternative stories 
are circulated (Whitehead, 2009, p. 155). Memories in digital media can provide a dwelling place 
for such endangered memories. However, even in this seemingly irresponsible space, a memory, 
of what and by whom, can expedite social change or strengthen the political power of a regime. 
Derrida, in an interview with Stiegler, highlights the necessity of being aware of the double 
danger of remembering through technology: 
On the one hand, one might be tempted, in a very spontaneous way, to say: We need a 
politics of memory, we need to set up archives, we need to give everyone, or as many 
people as possible, access to the archive so that they will be able to know, work, do 
research. But at the same time, every politics of memory, if the word “politics” has a 
classical and strict sense, implies the intervention of a state. It’s a state that legislates and 
acts with regard to the nonfinite mass of materials to be stored [a stocker], materials 
which must be collected, preserved, whatever the current. . . . A politics of memory is 
necessary, perhaps, doubtless, but it is also necessary, in the very name of this politics of 
memory, to educate . . . I don’t dare say citizens anymore . . . I don’t dare, for the same 
reason, say subjects either . . . it is also necessary to educate or awaken “whomever” to 
vigilance with regard to the politics of memory. Whoever is in a position to access this 
past or to use the archive should know concretely that there was a politics of memory, a 
particular politics, that this politics is in transformation, and that it is a politics. We must 
awaken to critical vigilance with regard to the politics of memory: we must practice a 
politics of memory and, simultaneously, in the same movement, a critique of the politics 
of memory. (Derrida & Stiegler, 2002, pp. 67–68) 
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Given this awareness, we should find, contra Stiegler’s or other expressions of techno-
positivism toward prosthetic memories, something familiar: the responsibility of new media for 
memory/forgetting. In this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate a possible understanding of 
forgetting as a new ground for action. As Heidegger states in many places, responsibility rests on 
the human hand. Characterizing the modern sciences as a process of research, as opposed to one 
of knowing, in which open-ended and ongoing activity occurs, in the essay “The Age of the 
World Picture” (Heidegger, 1977a), Heidegger suggests that the modern sciences express an 
unprecedented ontology, determined by their existence within a dual temporality, their previous 
existence and their coming into being in the modern world. This ontology is encapsulated in the 
term subjectum as described as that which lies before, which is doubly articulated in its ongoing 
activity and the implied spatial setting of the world.  
The notion of the world is further interrogated in its relationship to the notion “picture” 
(Heidegger, 1977a, p. 134). A seed (technology) is yet unknown to anyone, except a good 
gardener who wills to hear what is inside. The gardener and the seed should have a free 
relationship. This relationship comes about as a form of destining, in Heidegger’s term. 
However, this should not be understood as fate, and neither is it an act of individual will. It is a 
source of freedom to hear and listen to the voice of destining (Heidegger, 1977b, p. 25). Here, 
agency should be in the human, or in Derrida’s witty interpretation, the hand, not in technology. 
As Feeberg pointed out, a medium only reveals the ontic but not the essentially ontological 
(Feenberg, 2000, p. 447). 
Technology has never had a single meaning such as enframing which summed up all its 
potentials. Nor does it make much more sense to describe our culture as uniquely 
oriented toward domination. The ability of the computer to mediate normal human 
language is not a startling reversal of ontological trends, but merely an expression of the 
complexity and flexibility of technology that is revealed as it is appropriated by a wider 
range of actors. (Feenberg, 2000, p. 449) 
Given this, perhaps, it may be that the new spacetime imposed by digital technology would grant 
us an unchanged role. A rupture in time with a new setting may refer to space that is less 
historically dominant. While authenticity is less highlighted, filling this contextual gap becomes 
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the people’s role. Individuals are now taking a more active part in the retrieval and distribution of 
works with cultural and historical significance.  
The resulting outcome forms a kaleidoscope of individuals working through culture and 
creating a bricolage of new paths and directions in collective remembering. With new media 
technology, memories are not singular; many memories differ from each other. As argued earlier, 
this may be due to the possibility of our forgetfulness, in that our experience, including the 
memory-knotting process, does not emerge from a synchronous time frame. Our memory of the 
past may rather be, in Derrida’s characterization, prosopopeia, a trace that is individual as well as 
changing over time, which allows us to witness multiple creations of memory in diversity. Time 
and space exist in dispersed multiplicity. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued three main points. Forgetting is an identity-creating behavior. It is 
thus a spontaneous gesture of subversive social activity. Forgetting, like remembering, can offer 
a space for a new sense of temporality; for Heidegger, this is even an essential process for 
realizing things anew, behind everyday sensation. Forgetting and remembering are both 
mediatized in advanced technology, resulting in a different sphere of oblivion. 
This leads to the question, which memory is active in Roh’s mourning and funeral and the 
following commemorations? Problems concerning the definition of memory involve differences 
in the forms of time consciousness that may be related. If the past is understood in a mnēmē-nic 
manner, Roh’s previous life should be expected to be more complex than the way it is 
remembered in the present. However, it is commonly thought that his suicide was individualistic, 
a kind of admission of shame and thus read as egoistic. 
However, although this reading may portray one aspect of Roh’s life and death, its 
findings do not constitute the memory of the people, because it ignores the very ground of such 
recollection, namely, the present. In other words, in the contemporary memory of Roh after his 
suicide, memory holders’ sense of present politics stem from a deeper level. Here, as noted 
above, the present is shaped by both what is remembered and what is forgotten, and this has 
implications in the search for a present identity, as Ricoeur writes (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 448). If 
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people’s memory of Roh is deficient or disdains certain historical facts, this partial oblivion can 
be read in a number of possible ways. Those who condemn silence as being unfaithful to the past 
may see that ignorance or denial is a symptom of purposeful amnesia of the humiliating past. 
This can be understood as structural amnesia if one suspects the culture of the activists. While 
the categories here are reduplicated, I suggest the existence of an unvocalized past inside the 
cultural memory of Roh that exercises the desire of memory holders, instead of any other 
external forces. Details to support my case will be presented in the ensuing chapters. 
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Prologue Two. “We will remember you forever!” 
Tell me what you forget and I will tell you who you are. (Augé, 2004, p. 18) 
 
Six days later, I was standing in Seoul Square and the noje was about to begin. I do not 
remember why I went there. Instead, I remember people on TV kept saying there would be a 
million people on the street that day.9 I wore a black shirt and did not tell anyone that I would be 
in noje. I also remember the smells on that day. In Seoul, the capital of our post-colonial nation, 
almost everything was destroyed during the war, and the senses are often void. The smell of the 
city usually carries random things. On that day, it was the sweat of a half million other people; a 
humid, damp, and dank smell that bound us together into a single entity.  
I also remember the sounds on that day. Everything was mumbled, like we were in a 
pool. Some people cried, others murmured, a few were speechless, and several laughed. People 
were talking on cellphones trying to find each other in the crowd. The old ones, aigoed, were 
mock-crying, tearless wailing in the style of Korean funerary culture. This sound is meant to 
show that the wailers are going through something emotional. Despite the chaos of all of these 
noises, the site was weirdly calm. There, with other mouners’ stillness, I became, effortlessly, one 
of them. I never liked Roh before, as I would tell anyone before. Now I became us, the 
practicianer of noje.    
From time to time, we cast glances toward the road. A gigantic screen run by the 
conservative newspaper at Seoul Square seemed to obsess about the number: “A million 
gathered!” Out of our shared, deformed past, we created a sense of fellowship and mourning, 
with 2,000 blue, yellow, and red manjangs (the traditional funerary flags) waving in the street, 
whispering, “We will remember you forever.” 
From the moment of Moo-hyun Roh’s suicide, Seoul metropolitan police sent thousands 
of combat police officers (chŏn’gyŏng) into the streets. At one point, they blocked the whole area 
                                               
9 After the ceremony, the count was that a half million participated in noje. 
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of Seoul Square until the representatives of noje negotiated to lift the barricade. Yet, while the 
people were allowed to observe the ceremony, thousands of highly trained, armed police troops 
were waiting inside nearby alleys around the square, each squad forming a tactical formation, 
ready to march into the square at the moment the voice over the remote transmitter gave the 
order. We trembled as the troops watched us. 
Our fear came from precedent. A year prior, people had taken to the street to say that they 
did not want Korea to make a free trade agreement with the U.S. and the police came with the 
sunset. It happened in the same square, Seoul Square, and the police blocked the entire area. 
After they built a four-sided wall of police shields, they slowly narrowed their gap, shooting 
water cannons and spraying fluorescent tear gas so they could arrest protesters who were unable 
to open their eyes while their bodies were glowing in the dark. 
Of course, we all saw what happened in Yongsan where former tenants decided to 
become squatters. They were standing at the top of their building, watching as the police troops 
raided using an air-lifted container full of officers. A fire suddenly broke out and the flames 
concealed the whole sector. Someone screamed, “There are humans! There are humans!” We saw 
that too – on the TV and our computer screens. It was a lesson for us that the police could 
“accidentally” burn a whole floor yet still charge survivors for squatting, while no police officials 
were forced to resign (Kim, 2009). 
I do not remember why I was in Roh’s noje. Instead, I remember those events have 
become our trauma. Then it became a part of who we are. Perhaps I was there to answer the 
screaming from Yongsan a year ago, that there were humans. I knew it was too late. It was late 
for Sun-il Kim, beheaded in 2004. It was too late for Roh as well. Everything was too late. 
Yes, the TV said a million would be there to see Roh’s funeral. The number mattered 
because we knew it was what we would be remembered by. We would also be remembered by 
the uncountable number of people in the photographs. This is a template of remembrance for us; 
ever since 1987 and the famous funeral of Han-yeol Lee, the same frame has been used. A later 
image was taken under the same frame of people cheering during the 2002 World Cup. It was 
also used for the anti-USA demonstration, the anti-FTA agreement protest, and the so-called 
protest against mad-cow disease.  
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Perhaps more important that the gathering of people for a common cause was the sense of 
spectacle created by such an impressive picture Thousands of people doing the same thing 
creates an unavoidably eye-catching image that can easily decorate the front page of a newspaper 
or be highlighted on television news in both domestic and foreign coverage. We knew  there had 
been already a handful of photographers holding their camera on the roof of the old Plaza Hotel 
located behind Seoul square to take their best shot. The organizers of the ceremony, who 
themselves were veterans of the democratic movement during the 80s, were also well aware of 
this; it was the primary reason the noje was held in Seoul Square, a historic place in South 
Korea’s modern history. We all knew this spectacle would add more depth to the intertextuality 
of the site. 
The number, one million, had specific importance. This number would make a statement 
to the police that it would not be easy for them to rule us down. It would be a memory for 
tomorrow that there were a million people who wanted to say something before the death of one 
man that day. Seen from another perspective, the number was enough to forget yesterday’s Roh 
and to deform today. For six people, the police could lift one container to the top of a building 
with a few dozen armed police waiting inside. For one person in despair, the country refused to 
give way to the terrorists. For few thousand, they shot water cannon and tear gas into the crowds. 
What could they possibly do to a million of us? 
I attended the noje to implant more meaning to an empty cast under the the name of Moo-
hyun Roh, so that his sculpture could stand by itself and have a shiny bronze surface. This is 
perhaps why the people carried Roh’s picture with a straw-hat. Of course, we all knew he was 
not a farmer, but we strove to forget that. I, too, was there to forget who he was. I was also there 
to be remembered in the future. A million will be there, the media told us. We would be 
remembered by this million. The exact number that the police could not handle. Other things can 
be forgotten, but not a million of us. I do not remember why I was in the noje. I did not worry 
about who we were there to celebrate; at times, I even forgot who he was. 
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Chapter Two. Five days after the suicide 
Introduction 
This chapter delineates aspects of the day of Moo-hyun Roh’s funeral. In an earlier chapter, I 
have suggested a way of theorizing active forgetting as partaking in a moment to realize real time 
and space. This chapter uses ethnographic observation to provide an example of intentional 
forgetting to coordinate a subject’s sense of now action that represents a political claim. In other 
words, the forgetfulness of Roh’s criminal charge was a kind of covert silence (Vinitzky-Seroussi 
& Teeger, 2010) opening Roh’s death. 
Through the performance of particular aesthetics, a noje (street rite) attempted to 
replicate the meta-memory (Conway, 2003, p. 306) of the minjung, an active concept during the 
1980s, in the context of the democratic agitation that brought about a change in regime in 1987. 
The repetition of this idea enabled its alliance with other memories that had lost their 
representative form; Roh’s memory could be used as an empty symbol that could be managed to 
identify something other than Roh himself. Another purpose of this chapter is to trace which 
memories were provoked and how they were consumed and reflected back by the presence of 
five million mourners in the street. 
The chapter will explore specific moments from the funeral. Its first part compares two 
different interments as memory apparatuses. Beyond noje, another ceremony, called yŏnggyŏlsik, 
was created by the government and whose existence was antithetical to the people’s noje. Two 
different apparatuses competed to anchor the deceased’s memory into a different field of 
understanding. 
The second part of the chapter examines the role of the mourner as a witness and a 
participant and how this makes sense of the occasion of the funeral. Participating in the day’s rite 
on the street, I observed that mourners in noje understood what the noje was expressing. 
Moreover, they also appeared to invite other occasions to create weak ties with their memories 
around the time. Such ties were not directly related to Roh’s achievements during his life or to 
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anything to do with his death. Rather, his memory, at this stage, was twisted to bridge 
differences; the result was a spontaneous omission, which as performative gesture under a 
political agenda was being faced at that time. A gap in memory existed as a tacit understanding. 
Individuals’ slightly varying memories formed a unity to collide with the regime’s propaganda 
that attempted to consecrate an official memory among the people. 
Yŏnggyŏlsik — hegemonic commemoration of a life 
On May 29, 2009, Seoul, I, together with half a million others, was at Seoul Square, in front of 
city hall. Millions more were watching the event on television. This was the day of the funeral, 
five days after Roh’s suicide. 
On this day, the national funeral committee arranged two separate ceremonies. We were 
waiting for the noje ceremony. On gigantic screens surrounding the place, yŏnggyŏlsik, the other 
rite, was being broadcast. Both yŏnggyŏlsik and noje refer to stages in a traditional Korean 
funeral. In yŏnggyŏlsik, members of family bid farewell to the dead before the body leaves their 
home. The latter, noje, occurs later, and it is performed on the street during the funeral cortege. 
To display the emotional disquiet of the mourners, the coffin stops several times on their way, 
and  a rite including wailing, chanting, and saluting takes place (Mills, 2012; C.-W. Park, 2010). 
Noje and yŏnggyŏlsik both serve the purpose of expressing emotion and bidding farewell to the 
deceased. 
That day, however, the difference between the two ceremonies was sharp. It began with 
color. The people out in public to express noje wore yellow: many wore golden-yellow t-shirts, 
hats, bandanas, or at least a balloon; these were distributed at the gate by volunteers. However, 
Kwanghwamun, the place where yŏnggyŏlsik was being held, on the screens was in black and 
white. Many were dressed in formal suits; some women wore hanbok, the traditional Korean 
outfit, in all white. They were on aligned white chairs, and we were on the ground. They were 
quiet; we were loud. Cries, sobbing, phone calls to find friends, and songs playing created an 
unstrained atmosphere, and then, all at once, everyone looked at the screens and saw President 
Lee Myeong-bak. At the yŏnggyŏlsik being shown, no one appeared to be permitted to make a 
noise: only one member of parliament spoke, standing and demanding an apology from President 
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Lee. This MP was soon removed from the site. Later, it was learned that the Korean public 
broadcasting system eliminated this encounter (as “noise”) during its live coverage of the event. 
Roh’s yŏnggyŏlsik and noje were prepared and serviced for memory making. Both of 
these ceremonies, forming part of the public funeral, attempted to convert mourning into a 
unifying political stance for the community. It is well known that a funeral is an occasion to 
celebrate the shared identity of a community through the use of collective memory, using a 
highlighted and resketched link with the past (Seale, 1998, pp. 193–210; see also Kang, 2010; 
Bargu, 2014; Geană, 2005; Greenberg, 2006). The burial of the dead is a social event to initiate a 
relation of time to the individual to coordinate their perspective with the community’s position 
(Bargu, 2014; Bonilla, 2011; Geană, 2005; van Gennep, 1977). 
While most funerals provide one memory-knot at a time by delivering a unifying code to 
the participants, in this case, each rite served a different, conflicting political aim. The 
yŏnggyŏlsik was an anchoring of memory into the interpretation of the government. The noje, on 
the other hand, contested the yŏnggyŏlsik, as a ceremony of the autonomous people (J.-W. Park, 
2010). Both functioned as a memory dispositif, an apparatus to impose “a constellation of 
heterogeneous (memory) elements within a system, and the relationships between them, which 
produce a particular ‘tendency’” (Basu, 2012, pp. 2–7). A fierce competition occurred between 
two conflicting attempts to stabilize Roh’s memory. 
The yŏnggyŏlsik repeated other mourning ceremonies that try to find a higher meaning in 
death “to obtain some justification for the sacrifice and loss” (Mosse, 1991, p. 5). The 
government organized the yŏnggyŏlsik to represent a hegemonic interpretation. This ceremony 
was used to prioritize stabilization in the face of crisis and bring this absurd time back to 
normality. 
Many South Koreans believed that the regime engineered Roh’s suicide. It was common 
to hear that the prosecutor’s charges were planned to humiliate and disempower Roh from his 
symbolic political power. There was even a theory that Roh was murdered by a government-
hired security guard (e.g., see M.-K. Kim, 2009b). The administration had already experienced 
millions marching against the free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States only the 
previous year. The sudden re-appearance of a massive number of mourners on the street was 
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interpreted as a threatening sign. The government’s initial reaction was to retain control by 
controlling territory using police (Foucault & Rabinow, 1984). For five days, thousands of police 
surrounded public places throughout the country, including Seoul square, where the noje was 
planned. Many shrines were blocked or patrolled by police. Some were evicted without warning. 
The head of the Seoul police announced that it was prohibited to possess a stick made of bamboo 
at the funeral, in the fear that it could be transformed into a weapon to use against the heavily 
armored police force (Em, 2009). A mourner recalled the day he went to pay tribute to Roh as 
follows: 
The police were responding to this political death. Barricades blocked the road to the 
palace (where the altar is located), police made countless rounds of alleys, and they stood 
at the corners. They also were there during the march, the blocking crowds in on the other 
side of the road. Remembering [Roh’s] death was handled as a matter of public security. 
(Em, 2009) 
Yŏnggyŏlsik was intended to exhibit a hegemonic system of control (Sue, 2015, p. 115). It 
featured two keywords, namely, “farewell” and “national unity.” The first keyword implied the 
necessity of forgetting the deceased. Regarding the latter, the committee for the funeral 
continually repeated a given repertoire: invitations were sent to people at every level of society 
(Haengjŏnganjŏnbu [Ministry of the Interior and Safety], 2009). The ceremony began with a 
salutation to the national flag, followed by the national anthem. All major religious leaders were 
invited and performed various services, although Roh was known to be Catholic. This collective 
practice peaked when Prime Minister Seungsu Han read the eulogy, stressing that the funeral 
should be the moment for all to say goodbye: 
[Y]ou [Roh] . . . sacrificed your life to your mother nation and people. You were at the 
forefront of breaking down regionalism and separatism. . . . “Do not grieve for me,” you 
said. But I worry that too many tears from our people might keep you from going. 
(Chŏnjashinmun, 2009) 
The speech then moved on to a familiar South Korean time definition: this is a painful sacrifice, 
but it is time to move on. 
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We, the remaining, will pledge your will again to make a better nation. We promise our 
best to achieve the concordances and consolidation as you wished so long. We will build 
a noble, advanced, and developed country. (Chŏnjashinmun, 2009) 
As Lee and Yeoh (2004) show, here forgetting was “actively forged as products of the politics of 
inclusion and exclusion and by power struggles played out among global, national and local 
actors in globalisation processes” (p. 2296). The prime minister’s eulogy overbrushed other 
memories at the top of Roh’s individual life.  
Even more interesting in this memory-making process is the nature of the memories brought in 
to cover other, more threatening ones. Patriotic nationalism, which always highlights national 
unity and the belief in making a better nation (kŭndaehwa, modernization) is often used in South 
Korean politics to reinforce government legitimacy. The concept superimposes a Westernized 
image of nation-building, which has been criticized as the original epic, that is reproduced in a 
variety of meanings with historical twists and turns in state power (H. Kim, 2009; Han, 2000; 
Jeon, 2009; Nam, 2013). The banner of kŭndaehwa led general Chŏnghŭi Pak’s army in the coup 
against the democratically elected government in 1960. The brutal subjugation of labor and the 
democratic movement by Pak’s government were justified by kŭndaehwa. In 1980, under the 
banner of the unity of the nation, the military again rebelled and took political power. The 
government’s yŏnggyŏlsik used the same logic, the same repertoire; Roh’s individual life was to 
be absorbed. Highlighting unity and love of country, the ideology expressed at the yŏnggyŏlsik 
was intended to undermine the sense of mourning as a small sacrifice and implement fast 
development as the highest priority. It also attempted to stifle anger about Roh’s death. The 
prime minister’s perplexing eulogy, along with other occurrences, were, in fact, not celebrations 
of Roh at all but messages to angry South Koreans, urging them to return to their normal life. 
Forgetting here resulted from “new patterns of development that displace or destroy existing 
memories” (Minarova-Banjac, 2018, p. 25). 
However, although the government’s attempt to remember Roh for their benefit, most 
noje participants I observed felt differently about the yŏnggyŏlsik. During the rite, people 
preparing from the noje watched the process carefully, but without identifying messages from it. 
Most responses in Seoul Square expressed dissent, and mourners reacted to the appearance of the 
then-president with curses. 
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Repetition of excessive memories in the noje 
What was repeated? — noje on the street, by the people 
Noje then countered yŏnggyŏlsik. It expressed a collective attempt to settle Roh’s memory in a 
different place. However, this ceremony was also not about Roh’s individual life. 
The noje was mainly directed by volunteers from The People’s Commemoration 
Committee, an ad hoc organization. The leading director of the ceremony claimed that he handed 
off (or gave up) helping yŏnggyŏlsik in any way (M.-K. Kim, 2009a). The yellow clothing of the 
participants showed them to have been supporters of Roh in the 2002 presidential election, while 
the dress code of the yŏnggyŏlsik appeared more official. 
From an aesthetic perspective, the noje for Roh directly referred to noje from the 1980s. 
Thus, before explaining the 2009 noje, the relation between political suicide and democracy in 
South Korea must be examined. Beginning in the early 1970s, South Koreans witnessed a series 
of political suicides. Between 1971 and 2001, there were more than a hundred known political 
suicides. Analyzing 133 of these, Miri Im (2017) distinguishes two primary motivations for 
political suicide: some killed themselves out of a sense of duty, which was often related to a 
political agenda, including the desire for democracy, a better relationship with North Korea, or 
anti-Americanism. A last type of suicide has the intent to achieving better working conditions, 
such as halting crackdowns on unions or better wages. Historians and South Korean citizens 
generally understand such deaths as an expression of dissent and protest against injustice and that 
pushes history forward (Kang, 2010; Lee, 2009; Manabe, 2015; Tangdae Pip’yŏng Kihoek 
Wiwŏnhoe, 2009). 
Such suicides are called yŏlsa and praised as democratic martyrs, whose deeds bring the 
people, or minjung, to consciousness. The minjung is the collective identity of the South Korean 
people. This word signifies an opposition against elites and leaders, and often the educated and 
cultured, minjung has come to signify the oppressed in the sociopolitical system but who also are 
capable of rising against it. This group shares an emotional status called han, which accumulates 
collective memories through a series of generational experiences, such as unjust violence from 
those in power and failed resistances (Abelmann, 1996, p. 39; Yi, 1996, p. 57; Doucette, 2013; 
Suh, 1983; Wells, 1995). 
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To commemorate yŏlsa, during the 1980s, noje offered a way of both mourning and 
demonstrating. During the 1970s and 1980s, funerary rituals were used by protesters to create a 
new signification for death and to make a reverent reappropriation of the body of the deceased by 
the community. Such deaths were recognized as invaluable sacrifices for the nation and the loss 
of the grieving family was also ours. After its time with the family, the yŏlsa’s body was placed 
in a casket and carried on activists’ shoulder to a public place, such as Seoul Square. Here, 
greeted by thousands of other activists, the noje could begin, with the salutation for the dead and 
other martyrs. A shaman performed the kut, or ritual for the dead, which soothed the angry soul 
of the deceased, who departed with the following wish: “I will watch you move forward from the 
heaven. On the day of great victory, my silent yet heartfelt applause will ring out all over the 
world!” (H. Kim, 2008, p. 566). The purpose of such an event is to draw the right trajectory 
between the past and present to guide the direction to the future. The noje in this context is thus a 
service for the dead whose death was related to an anti-government cause, whether the death was 
a protest suicide or a governmental murder while the deceased was engaged in anti-government 
activity. With the use of the phrase “the rest is upon us” (S. Kim, 2009, p. 52), the noje is taken 
as a special event making a promise between the living and the dead.  
Wailing, hymns, revolutionary songs, and slogans are used as salutations to alleviate the 
grief of those left behind and provide occasions for the collective venting of anger as a way to 
cope with loss. Speeches and slogans emphasize calls for justice in the face of what acute 
injustice perpetuated in a highly asymmetric situation between the state and the present 
community. Speeches solidly affirm the issues of the present that have been revealed by the 
sacrifice. This produces a promise of the future: what might have marked an end for a particular 
protester is transformed into a new beginning for the minjung collective, a leap forward in the 
establishment of strength that arises out of unified action and a shared ideological stance, another 
step toward victory. In other words, the noje of the 1980s was characterized by a strong sense of 
emotion, which brought about an elevation of the atmosphere. Performances shared sadness on a 
massive scale. The collective emotional guidance was channeled successfully into certain 
slogans, hymns, songs, and poems. Within the rite, mourning was constrained, and the 
expressions of pain and sorrow were expressed in a way that was implicitly yet actively 
regulated. 
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How was it repeated? — Roh as an impossible martyr in the post-minjung era 
Like its predecessors, the 2009 noje focused on Roh’s martyrdom. As voices asserted that his 
death was mourned and that he would be remembered “forever” (M.-K. Kim, 2009a), the 
ceremony began, with the ch’ohon, the chief organizers, standing on a crane to call the soul. 
Shamans were invited to pay tribute to the dead. A traditional dance was performed. Songs, 
either minga, or protest songs, or favorite 1980s songs, were sung. These cultural practices, such 
as the performances of songs from the 1980s, were introduced from minjung culture (Lee, 2003, 
p. 558). 
The first aspect to notice in this noje was the sense of time among the participants at the 
event. Unlike the failure of the government yŏnggyŏlsik to create another kŭndaehwa out of 
Roh’s death, in the noje, the participants shared a sense of temporal background, as if it were still 
the 1980s. Furthermore, this feeling that appeared autonomous was created before the event. 
From the performances selected to the very logic of noje, which is to lead to the final revolt of 
the minjung against the unjust regime, the whole event seemed to be shared. That is, its 
revolutionary spirit was why the people who mourned Roh’s death chose noje. A good 
illustration of the participants’ state of mind can be found in following poem, read during the 
noje: 
[Y]ou jumped off from the train named democracy, which is rushing backward. You 
jumped, and you were crushed, as easily as a petal. I am sorry I wasn’t able to hold this 
petal in my two hands. I am sorry for not being able to prop it up with my two arms. I am 
sorry for not being able to embrace you with my heart. . . . I will not speak of sadness, 
though I am sad. I will not pound the ground, although I resent your death. I will not say 
“rest in peace” yet . . . So rise! You must set your broken bones; then stand up again so 
we can rise from this scattered ground. (An, 2009) 
The expression that the train of democracy was running backward referred to the judgment that 
in their time, they were seeing a regression away from democracy. Roh was defined as someone 
who refused to sit still and jumped off from this tendency. The last line calls upon Roh to be 
resurrected again, under a similar passion of martyrdom, to rise together with the participants, 
the 2009 minjung. A participant recalled as follows: 
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This [Roh’s death] was exactly like it was with the college students of the 70s and 80s 
who killed themselves to oppose Jeon Duhwan or Pak Chŏnghŭi. I remember that day in 
1987 because I was in the same place, in front of City Hall. As in 2009, there were waves 
of people who wanted to pull Jeon out of the blue house so badly. When I heard of Roh’s 
suicide, I immediately recalled that exact moment. It is not a coincidence that we had the 
ceremony at the same place. . . . History repeats.—Interviewee A 
These observations allow us to draw a political implication from the 2009 noje. That is, the rites 
of Roh’s funeral performed by people on the street commemorated a human being whose death, 
as the participants saw it, was caused by governmental injustice. The performance of the noje’s 
particular aesthetics again in 2009 was intended to make the funeral a memory-knot that could 
define the era. The organizer of the event has written that he intended to engineer Roh’s noje to 
convey the community’s self-understanding and political message to the world (M.-K. Kim, 
2009a). 
In contrast to the cases of the 1980s, however, it should be noted that there is a certain 
irony in taking Roh to be a true yŏlsa, a martyr. Beginning with 1987’s reform of the 
constitution, which brought democracy to the country, with the institution of general elections, 
the concept of minjung as the under-privileged from pre-democratic society began to recede from 
the public sphere (Doucette, 2013, p. 218). Because society appeared to have transformed into a 
Western-style democracy it came to be called a post-minjung (Doucette, 2013) or a post-
ideological (Kang, 2012) society. This led to Westernized individuals, as equal members of 
society, building and maintaining the public sphere (Ch’oe & Pak, 2010). 
Roh exhibited internal contradictions. In the strict sense, although Roh came to 
prominence as a humanitarian lawyer during the 1980s, as the president of the country he acted 
as yet another neoliberal politician, prioritizing the growth of the market and deregulation. 
Imposing an ideology of a flexible labor market by force, he took power from unions, brutally 
breaking strikes using the police, and deregulated industries. From November 22, 2006, to 
November 11, 2007, his administration filed four claims in court against anti-US-South Korea 
FTA activist groups which charged the participants the total of 2,428 million won (Im, 2017, p. 
233). This eventually resulted in 21 protest suicides, more than that of the administration before 
him (Dae-jung Kim’s administration, 9 suicides) and the one after him (Myung-bak Lee’s 
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administration, 9 suicides) (Im, 2017, p. 39). He reacted to the workers by requesting his staff to 
“deal with them . . . strictly according to law and order,” adding, “in this democratic era, 
workers’ self-immolation should not be used as a tactic, and suicide should not serve this 
purpose” (Baek, 2003). This and other events during his tenure resulted in massive 
disappointment with him, and he had the lowest approval rating of any South Korean president. 
Thus, it is more logical to say that like the yŏnggyŏlsik, the people’s noje was not about 
Roh himself, whose very life, even seemed to hinder the attempt to commemorate him. Parts of 
his life were intentionally forgotten from the moment of death. His bribery scandals were not 
mentioned, and reporters for public broadcasting and newspapers were evicted from the noje for 
lying when attempting to mention this and other factors. When I interviewed self-identified Roh 
supporters, their responses to my questions concerning the criminal investigation of Roh 
followed a pattern, calling the charges a lie, claiming that there was more to Roh than that. This 
more, however, was never clearly communicated. 
The noje followed a selective tradition (Williams, 1961, pp. 50–59), which “highlights 
and foregrounds, imposes beginnings, middles and ends on the random and the contingent. 
Equally, it foreshortens, silences, disavows, forgets and elides many episodes which—from 
another perspective—could be the start of a different narrative” (Hall, 1999, p. 221). It 
dismembers as aphasia “a political disorder and a troubled psychic space.” (Stoler, 2011, p. 153). 
Because he was a questionable politician, Roh needed to be dismembered. 
As Sigmund Freud found in Moses and Monotheism (1961), the biblical memory of 
Moses was configured as “a statue of bronze,” erected on “feet of clay.” In his book, Jan 
Assmann agrees that Freud suspected in Moses a transformed Egyptian memory of Akhenaton, 
an Egyptian political and religious leader who went against tradition. Here, the mode of 
recollection is shifted from its history and is fitted into another symbolism. Like Moses for Freud 
and Freud for Assmann, South Koreans sought an answer to the void in their present. In doing so, 
they detached part of the real Roh from the memory of him and attached other parts that came 
from a distance. As a consequence, Roh was erected as the rightful heir of the minjung 
movement. Roh became a species of bronze statue, whose flamboyant appearance is different 
from its foundation, the feet of clay (Assmann, 1998). For this purpose, Roh’s real legacy was 
minimized. 
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Allying memory with sadness 
Han as ressentiment — The unvocalized sadness 
A second characteristic of the noje was even more significant. Where Roh’s real life had 
departed, sadness filled the emptiness. At many times during the noje and later recollections of 
the day, many participants testified to a sadness, the source of which the participants themselves 
could not identify. For instance: 
I have a friend who I thought never went to Deoksu Palace to pay tribute. But he said he 
had gone. So I asked why such a depoliticized person would do such a thing. He said one 
of his friends who had as little interest in politics as much as himself asked him to go. His 
friend just kept crying. He asked why. His friend answered “let me cry. I don’t know why. 
But I am sad. Too sad. So let me be.” While watching this, he became sad, and he cried 
too. (Em, 2009, pp. 28–29) 
They are pitiful, their sorrows are sore, they have a thirst in the chest that has been 
clogged by stuffy reality. . . .  One said, “I do not know where my sadness came from, but 
I now realize that I am emotionally attached to him.” (W. Kim, 2009, pp. 52–54) 
I think now that I experience the same feeling of han when I think about our president. 
When I saw his picture and read his speeches or even when the news shows President 
Jae-in Moon, I feel that something is still unresolved. Something unsatisfactory, but I 
cannot do anything.—Interviewee B 
This unidentified sadness also characterizes the concept of the minjung. The political noje of the 
1980s was founded upon the belief that the minjung, an imaginative, collective identity, would 
rise up against the brutal history. It was portrayed as something holding an unresolved emotional 
burden called han (Doucette, 2013; Suh, 1983; Wells, 1995). 
Yuko Manabe, in her pioneering work on 1980s martyrdom, defines this emotion, han, by 
comparing it with the Nietzsche’s term ressentiment. As Didier Fassin (2013) explains, in On the 
Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche (1989) uses the French word ressentiment differently from its 
English translation, resentment. Ressentiment is the expression of the morality of the slave, 
which “directs one’s view outward instead of back to oneself” and “needs a hostile external 
world” (p. 10; see also p. 252). It arises as the product of long historical alienation and relates to 
long-term oppression and effects of domination. In most cases, it is generational, while 
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resentment is only temporal dissatisfaction, an ideological alienation that is a direct result of 
one’s current social position (Fassin, 2013, p. 252). Fassin applied these two, ostensibly similar 
but with a gap between them, to explain the two different phenomena, contrasting Black with 
White in South Africa’s post-apartheid era and rioting minorities with police in France. For 
instance, if a policeman loses a colleague, resentment may arise; however, they would not gain 
Nietzschean ressentiment, because their loss is not been repeated and performed under unevenly 
distributed social power over the time. A quotation from Oyoung Kim well summarizes how 
Manabe distinguishes han (ressentiment) from won (resentment): 
‘Han’ is an emotion that was deposited and stored inside a person. . . . Han seethes even 
if no harm is done. It is a sense of frustration that results from impossibility because 
either you have what you desire or you have only what you can do. Han is a dream that 
cannot be achieved and a dream that one cannot realize. ‘Won’ (resentment) disappears 
through revenge and release. But han is cold. If what is broken is not made complete, han 
remains. Won is anger, and han is sorrow. Therefore, won blazes like fire, but han piles up 
like snow. (Manabe, 2015, p. 49) 
That is, han is an emotion resulting from a long series of unfair outcomes that have not settled in 
one’s mind. This is a death that cannot be mourned. An outstanding illustration of han is given 
by the novelist Wŏn-Sŏ Pak, in one of her novels, when the main character recalls her brother’s 
murder during the Korean War, she says, 
We—father, mother, and sister—had just witnessed a gruesome, obscenely brutal death, 
and now we had to clean up. He was unrecognizable from the waist up, and remnant by 
remnant we, his family, gathered flesh, brain matter, and congealed blood without 
allowing ourselves the mercy of a single scream. . . . With artful composure, we devoured 
his death like wild animals consuming the afterbirth of their newborns and lapping up the 
bloody mess. 
When someone dies, we wail . . . And so we, the survivors, are drained; we get fed up, we 
grow poor serving the deceased, and as we become sick and tired of it all, we develop an 
undiluted disgust with everyone else, including the dead person. And then for the first 
time we, the living, are freed from those who are dead. 
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But Mother and I had consumed the dead. Clandestinely, treacherously. . . .  The deaths I 
had consumed continued to strangle my innards, an indigestion, a neurosis that interfered 
with my daily life. My life continued to be uninteresting, flavorless, tedious, as 
aggravating as shabby clothing infested with lice, and I wished I could strip it off, scrub 
and pound it clean. (Pak, 2009, pp. 14–19) 
This emotion of unsettlement, stemming from unmourned death and the inability to give proper 
burial, is han and is shared as collective memory, or a meta-memory, in which, according to 
Santiago Arango-Muñoz, “each time the subject is confronted with a memory task and elicits 
either a positive or negative metacognitive feeling that guides the decision” (Arango-Muñoz, 
2013, p. 135). During the 80s, minjung and the student protesters shared the same han, 
repetitively experienced through countless defeats by the police, the military, the government, 
and even foreign nations (Ko, 2007; Lee, 2009). In 2009, the participants in Roh’s noje shared 
han, a feeling of loss, unmourned death. 
Unmourned sadness as an invitation to the other 
In interviews and memorials, the term han appeared again and again, emerging as the right word 
to describe the people’s emotion of loss. The interviewee also associated something else with it, 
that can provide another clue to the origin of their sadness. 
I began to weep as soon as I saw the news. Then I began crying. It wasn’t about me, I 
know. It wasn’t about my family. But I was sad just as if I had lost something. I was 
angry that power makes people to give up their lives. I was upset about this. We saw 
Namdaemun burnt down. We saw Yongsan burnt down. Perhaps I felt sad because of all 
these incidents together. Because I thought the government ruled in awful ways, as when 
the FTA was enforced although millions protested. I felt I no longer live in a democratic 
country.—Interviewee C 
From the testimony above, I suggest two possible ways of identifying this empathetic emotion, 
which relates Roh’s death to others’. As scholars have suggested, emotions provide effective 
motivational forces. Researchers once stressed emotions in social movements (Aminzade & 
McAdam, 2002; Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001; Jasper, 1997; H Kim, 2002; Melucci, 1996), which 
implies that emotions are a commitment mechanism through which apathetic bystanders can 
develop new activist interests and movement activists can sustain and invigorate their activism. 
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For instance, James Jasper (1997) writes that “ostensibly cognitive concepts such as suddenly 
imposed grievances, cognitive liberation, frame alignment, and injustice frames are infused with 
emotions” (p. 129). Thus, he notes, “emotions give ideas, ideologies, identities, and even 
interests their power to motivate” (Jasper, 1997, p. 127). Following this, Moo-hyun Roh’s 
memory in the noje can be empathetic; han here was an emotional affect that shaped people’s 
mobilization. The death of Roh was symbolic, offering a space to express unmourned sadness 
from Roh’s or the other deaths. As Alison Lansberg notes (Landsberg, 2009, p. 223), here, an 
empathic memory allowed “a leap, a projection from the empathizer to the object of 
contemplating, which implies a distance between the two” (2009, p. 223). The unidentifiable 
sadness they went through reminds us that han occurred in their minds, and Roh’s suicide 
touched these (collective) memories, which seemed to be lost (Em, 2009). 
The other way of reading emotion is valuing cultural background more. According to 
Sang-Chin Choi (Choi, 1998, p. 246), Koreans understand “we” to include “identity, oneness, 
mutual dependence, mutual protection, and mutual acceptance.” In other words, the “Korean’s 
private self (or individual self) and social self (or collectivized self) overlap.” The subject “I” is a 
rather interdependent self in this culture (S. Kim, 2008, p. 70). For Fred Alford’s observation, in 
Korean morality and ethics, the line between “I” and “We” is frequently blurred. For Koreans, 
the human being is an inter-person (ingan), instead of a solitary, inner-directed, self-mastering 
individual (Alford, 1999, p. 49). Thus when something occurs, Korean mentality is eager to 
identify the object. The idea of responsibility exists in collective sense This understanding can 
also be applied to the sense of responsibility. Sungmoon Kim (2008) notes that instead of a 
collection of individuals, we (uri), as interrelated-selves, share a sense of “collective moral 
responsibility” (p. 71). This could explain the repeated verses in the poem that was read at the 
noje, saying, “I am sorry I was not able to save you” (An, 2009).  
As a community, perhaps, this collective experience of politics may increase the 
possibility of empathetic emotion or uri responsibility. I conclude that there was an empathic 
unsettlement that caused this level of sadness at that time. South Koreans were experiencing a 
time of repeated discouragement that was brutal and unmerciful to the people. Although there 
may not have been someone who had been brutalized, a sense of collectiveness, under the 
sadness, allowed them to engage and heal through the loss of a person. 
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In the lines about the democracy that is rushing backward, the poet expressed the point of 
view that in 2009, Korea was in a retrograde position in its politics. This was not true in strict 
terms, as there had been no change in the political system or constitution since 1987, but it 
should be noted that, South Korea did experience a number of political struggles. At this time, 
Roh’s death was particularly attritional, which Sian Lazar explains as involving “constant protest 
or negotiation, the continuance of the day to day of political life” (Lazar, 2014, p. 91). A year 
before Roh’s death, the South Korean left and liberals had been out on the street for more than 
six months to protest the free trade agreement that would result in beef imports from the US. A 
number of symbolic losses also transpired during that era. On February 10, 2008, a 
representative architectural creation of South Korea, the Sungryemun, was burnt down by a 
middle-aged man who later confessed he was “upset at housing prices” (Choe, 2008). On 
February 12, 2009, the top Catholic cardinal in the country, Stephen Kim Suhwan, who had been 
a protector of the democratic movement during the 1980s, passed away. The most tragic of these 
incidents happened at Yongsan, in central Seoul, only a few months before Roh’s death. On 
January 20, 2009, 40 tenants were occupying a watchtower on the roof of a four-story building, 
where they had previously run a business, in protest against insufficient compensation for the 
redevelopment of the neighborhood. Riot police stormed into the building. A fire broke out. Five 
evictees and one policeman were killed in the fire on live broadcast. No responsibility accrued to 
the police, while the survivors were imprisoned for their illegal squat. For many, this was 
traumatic. 
During the noje, I witnessed groups of flag bearers, holding funeral streamers. One of 
these placards was extraordinary: it pictured the faces of the Yongsan victims, as well as other 
union protesters, next to Roh. The protestors had no relation to Roh, but this unusual union was 
praised by the half million participants, who cried and shouted slogans before the banner. The 
imaginative relation between Roh’s suicide and the Yongsan deaths was recollected in many 
testimonies: 
We saw what happened in Yongsan few days before Roh was sacrificed. We saw, and I 
think there should be punishment of the high-ranking officials who ordered it. But we 
saw nothing. And then we also witnessed Roh. Then what now? It could be you, me, or 
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us. I was sad, but also, I was upset. I went a little crazy. And I am still crazy when I think 
about it.—Interviewee E 
Here, the memory of Roh acted like a Möbius strip in the noje. From two-dimensional materials, 
it presents a three-dimensional existence. Like this geometric figure, the memory of Roh has no 
distinction between inside and outside. If one follows any trail, both sides of the strip are passed. 
At first glance, this appeared to be another lieu de mémoire, replicating the past—the 1987 
democratic movement—to the present. This mimicking gesture is part of the picture, the 
performance of a minjung ceremony in the post-minjung era. If we track the strip, however, we 
may realize there is something more, something unspoken, and something emotional here. What 
appeared to be an irreversible and uncloseable gap was stitched with a twist and then gained 
another dimension. In noje, endless slippage of meaning allows a place for the Other. Forgetting 
and silencing strengthens the shared sense of community under Roh as the bronze statue, not the 
feet of clay. 
A new time for ritornello 
At nojes in the 70s and 80s, the ritual was dramatically designed for making the 
attritional time into a historic time (Lazar, 2013). It was the social and performative apparatus of 
experience, where the masses are called upon to be conscious, revengeful, and historical 
subjects—in other words, true minjung. The speeches and slogans emphasized the call for justice 
in the face of what is perceived to be an acute injustice perpetuated in a highly asymmetric 
situation between the state and the coming community. It was hoped that sadness would be 
replaced by fury, which, unlike sadness, is mobilizing and generative of further political action. 
The speech, thus, solidly affirms the dual quality of sacrifice: what might have been an end for 
particular protester is, at the same time, a new beginning for the minjung collective, a leap 
forward in the establishment of strength that arises out of unified action and a common 
ideological stance, another step toward victory. As the present is built upon the sacrifices of the 
past, the future will be built upon the sacrifices of the present. In speeches and banners, the 
citation of previous martyrs affirms that true revolutionary behavior, the path to be taken, and the 
values to live by may all be found in their examples. Displaying the presence of earlier 
democratic martyrs in commemoration created a diachronic sense of memories and history, thus 
their invocation attests to the continuing presence and influence of the dead in the world of the 
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living. The legacy of the martyrs gives meaning and endows legitimacy to new acts of self-
destruction, which will be the means by which the struggle is maintained, unity established, and 
victory reached. The speech repeatedly assures that victory is certain: “we have no doubt, we 
believe, we will win”. The public interactions with the corpse disseminate its sacredness onto the 
living members, purifying, elevating, and consecrating them as a community for which the 
sacrifice has been made. With this collective experience, the remaining South Koreans felt shame 
and obligation to reveal the true history.  
At 2008, noje is not for inciting Marxist revolution; the temporal difference between the 
1980s and 2009 may support what Francois Hartog (2015) called a “regime of historicity;” 
Hartog argues that contemporary Western societies have recently entered a new temporal order in 
which the present has become omnipresent. Hartog calls this regime of historicity “presentism” 
and defines it as an invasion of the present into the realms of the past and future. For instance, 
Hartog notes that the conception of the past as a bygone time has recently been replaced by that 
of memory, which revitalizes in the present what would hitherto have been considered as dead or 
obsolete. Memory thus appears as a “presentist instrument,” allowing for a “presentist use of the 
past” (2015, p. 184).  
Instead of meta-narrativist understanding of the history, what can be found is 
performative memory. Unlike Marxist historicism during the 70s, people’s memory making 
practices were rather “portable” (Kockelman & Bernstein, 2012), so their meaningfulness was 
widely applicable while contextually independent. At noje, Roh’s name was still chanted like any 
other martyrs, but the mourners also knew that Roh had a complicated life. That is to say, people 
commemorate Roh as symbol. They choose to be silent spontaneously but covertly so his death 
could remain political. Yarimar Bonilla (2011) reports a mode of “peripatetic commemoration” 
in Guadeloupe, involving “a particular kind of historical engagement—one immediately linked 
to space, feeling, and action” (Bonilla, 2011, p. 315). “The walk” in her article is to create 
counter-memory; it is anecdotal or even forgetting. “Rather than becoming lieux de mémoire 
(realms of memory), these sites have become lieux d’oubli (realms of forgetting), material 
evidence of a forsaken and deteriorating past” (Bonilla, 2011, p. 320). Jack Santino (2004) also 
notes a performative mode of memorization and commemoration in the sites he calls 
“spontaneous shrines.” Whereas all rituals are “public” (Santino, 2004, p. 365) there are certain 
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forms of commemoration that are voluntary, spontaneous, and declarative. Santino employs a 
performative notion of “spontaneous shrines” that emphasizes their transformative possibilities 
and privileges human agency. Instead of prepared and repeated commemoration, Santino depicts 
the phenomenon of non-official, “vernacular responses to untimely death” (p. 1) that he argues 
are increasingly popular in contemporary culture. Santino’s work focuses on how social actors 
engage the places and discourses of memory that structure their everyday lives. His collected 
cases of spontaneous shrines are potentially political, “communicative” acts of resistance, rather 
then simply public expressions of private grief. Given this, noje of Roh can still be thought as an 
event, that of remembering. This remembering is not based on authentic historicity that has 
obliged to recollect certain past memories. Although it lost the authenticity in memory-signs, it 
reveals unreleased emotion, such as anxiety, concern, worry and rancor to the present politics. 
The funeral and commemoration for false martyr, Roh, can be a mnemonic performance of the 
people who have limited sovereignty for their own interpretation of history. What the noje of 
Roh shows us a possibility of solitary memories beyond the chronology.  
Thus, unlike the past noje, where activists displayed the names and pictures of other yŏlsas who 
had shared the same political agenda, the noje in 2009 was inclusive of all other struggles, which 
all were against what seemed to be larger than themselves. The memory of Roh on cultural 
display at the noje was the reflection of this mourning, of Roh as well as other invitees. The 
circle drawn to distinguish inner and outer from their temporary alliance was large. The 
emotional upset of that time, han, was unresolved, but it reproduced threats to life in general. 
Roh’s suicide, although its real motivation was not apparent, was recognized as another case in 
meta-memory of han, that of the defeated, struggling underdogs. Like a Möbius strip, it seemed 
the mourning of Roh delivered an ever-expanding community confronting what imagined to be 
outside of the line. The noje functioned as a frequently offered vertex. 
With graphic illustration, in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari take the notion of ritornello from musicology and deliver it to 
politics. 
A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his breath. . . . 
Lost, he takes shelter, or orients himself with his little song as best he can. The song is 
like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of 
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chaos. . . . Now, we are at home. But home does not preexist: it was necessary to draw a 
circle around that uncertain and fragile center, to organize a limited space. The forces of 
chaos are kept outside as much as possible, and the interior space protects the germinal 
forces of a task to fulfill or a deed to do. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 311) 
Ritornello, which can be imperfectly translated as refrain in English, refers to, by the definition 
of The Oxford Companion to Music, “anything ‘returned to’” (Scholes 1970, 883). It is a 
continuous repetition, or returning, instead of the delivery of a progression of rhythm (motif) and 
melody (conterpoints). In Deleuze and Guattari’s political concept, the term signifies rhythmical 
repetition different from one to another iteration but with something noticeable in common. It is 
a way of life as play, emphasizing repetitional pleasure from/against daily struggle; this also 
supposes an eventually communal unity of solitary subjects. 
Individuals become connected in a temporal sense while singing ritornello, beginning 
with a child and then inviting a housewife and anyone who has a will to open the circle. 
Ritornello is continually performed, like our memory with its continual return from 
forgetfulness. This is also a memory that one can share with empathy, so that others with similar 
but different memories can connect together, not that which needed to be kept outside but that 
which calls us to be inside together. The us thus created is not uniform, nor does it share 
collective identity. It is an empirical us that includes me and may include those who have tasted 
the rather intoxicating power of the critical stance. This is an “attempt [at] some kind of artificial 
reterritorialization that would hopefully ‘save’ me from what is part of my own (constructed) 
identity” (Stengers, 2008, p. 42). 
I was sitting at the square when I first heard the story [of Roh’s death]. I was sad all day, 
then I decided to visit the square, because I saw a blog entry that somebody else would be 
there too. While many were going through emotional chaos, they commemorated Roh in 
their own way. I heard a song over the crying. I think it made me sad too, but somehow it 
was more manageable. I don’t know. I was different from what I felt at home. I felt more 
like I was doing something. I was protecting the place where the other people could visit 
and express their sadness. —Interviewee D 
The 2009 noje was, conceivably, a singing this song of ritornello. The repetition of brutalities, 
whether government directed or not, expressed a kind of return. In his examination of the 
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phenomenological context of spacetime, historian Reinhart Koselleck identifies the moment that 
allows the groundbreaking realization of a subject’s previous understanding. In Future Past 
(Koselleck, 2004), he suggests two conceptual spaces of the experience of time: “the space of 
experience” and a “horizon of expectation.”10 In this schema, historical changes can be oriented 
from within the subject’s consciousness of time. However, this realization comes to be through 
an experience where time is not and will not be as anticipated. That is, change does not stem 
from protention, as Gadamer and Husserl suggested, but from experience that contradicts 
prediction. This is an experience of rupture, which dislocates one from the timeline they thought 
they were living in. He observed that the former frustration of such experience, in fact, can 
motivate social change in a dialectical movement. When the gap between experience and 
expectations broadens, this difference allows one to acknowledge the real gap between history 
itself and modernity and offers the birth of a new horizon, which is often linked with political 
action (Koselleck, 2004). 
With the forgetting of Roh’s concrete past to fashion of him a mere symbol, the noje may 
have been an act of irony that results in a new projection in time. Other memories then coinhabit 
its space. Repetition here should be understood as the possibility of transformation, changing 
now as qualitative time into a dramatic kairos (Peters, 2015, p. 213). The memory of 1987 served 
here as a basso continuo that delivered not the main melody but provides the references for the 
chords that the players should play in an improvisational manner (Latham, 2011). While the 
1980s repertoire was being played, the 2009 noje also exhibited a practice of overt silence, the 
exercise of not saying what can be said. In active forgetting, a spare space of plurality is enabled. 
This may create a community, which is not based singular by in identity but in a multiplicity of 
truths, or, more precisely, a community which, Alain Badiou characterizes, based on “the only 
ethics [that] is of processes of truth, of labor that brings some truth into the world” (Badiou, 
2001, p. 28). Here the pivot of community is not a single collective memory but many memories 
in one condition: all sufferers at the current time were invited. Some showed an almost ironic 
representation of memories but still welcomed, presented, and shared a sense of emptiness. 
                                               
10 These pairing ideas are notably inspired by Hans Georg Gadamer’s theorization of the 
horizon in Truth and Method (2004; see Olsen, 2012). Gadamer, of course, considered the 
individual horizon of understanding to be limited but continually expansive through the 
experience of the other, making it thus ever dynamic (Gadamer, 2004, pp. 9–11). 
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Conclusion: A pro-democratic movement in democratic society. 
In this chapter, I have reflected upon the social experience of time in funerals, specifically that of 
a former President Roh of South Korea. Memories of Roh, especially of him as a martyr of 
democracy, resulted through the people’s sense of the now, the present, as participating in a 
historical narrative, with a relatively coherent version of the past as a flow of time divided into 
epochs or periods and punctuated by particular events and people. Here, these memories were 
not accounted for by the historical aspects of known facts; however, they served as a tool to 
construct a political space through prefigurative practices. The funeral was the event at which to 
proclaim repeated time. In particular, the noje framed the exhibit as the historical necessity of the 
re-continuation of a local struggle against the government. The point of rupture was settled in 
gaining these meanings. 
During the funeral, specific practices of mediating different temporalities were employed: 
for example, the commemoration resembled particular methods of protest during the 1980s, 
making the past present, in daily life and political protest. Participants may have experienced 
different time-senses, kairoi, not by Roh’s death itself, but by returning the present to a temporal 
sense from the past. Commemoration practices were thus practical and more cyclical. Songs, 
costumes, eulogies, and the means of dealing with participants’ emotions were re-performed to 
make historical time present. 
While forgetting acted as a knot to pull memories together, the repertoires of the 1980s 
pro-democratic movement significantly contributed: this was one memory that could offer a 
center or a meta-memory (Conway, 2003, p. 306) wherein it is easy to find a shared sense of the 
emotions of sadness, being lost, or resentment. In 2009, with Moo-hyun Roh’s death ritual, the 
unspoken, and not properly mourned deaths of others were brought together. Those memories 
targeted the government’s necropolitics (Mbembe, 2003), whose governance relied on policing. 
Tentatively, I propose that such invitations could be enacted through a promise or 
assertion of discontinuity and rupture, even when events may not have been experienced in this 
way during the time itself. Unidentifiable sadness and an unnamable sense of guilt and revenge 
offer us the ability to read participants’ emotional challenges, which will remain in the present, as 
examined in the following chapters. 
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Prologue Three. “We shouldn’t have let him go like that!” 
 
Once, I gave a presentation about Moo-hyun Roh’s funeral in a class for my graduate 
coursework. After the talk, a Korean student approached me in the corridor to talk about my 
ideas. With a small tear in her eyes, she concluded: “We shouldn’t have let him go like that.” I 
wanted to ask why she used the word “we”; how did she think “we” had such a right? But I could 
not speak. 
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Chapter Three. Afterlife Memories of Moo-hyun Roh 
 
 
Figure 1 (left). An image overlapping Moo-hyun Roh’s face to King Sejong’s body image (Ko, 
2011).   
Figure 2 (right). The first alleged image of “Rohala” in Ilbe (Panggaei, 2012).  
Introduction — Two memories of Moo-hyun Roh in contest 
 In November 2011, the producers of a new TV drama, Ppurigip’ŭn namu (“Deep-rooted 
tree”), held a press conference. It was a rare occasion given the fact that the series was already on 
the air. The purpose of the conference was to reject a widely spreading speculation. In the 
statement, the writers claimed that their main character, King Sejong, was “not written bearing in 
mind Moo-hyun Roh” (U, 2011). However, the rumor continued and was well-received, as 
Figure 1 demonstrates, with fan-art created for the drama’s main character with Roh’s face. 
A few months later, a user named Panggaei (2012). posted a brief entry with a new image 
he/she created on an online community called Ilgan-best Jeojangso (meaning “the storage for the 
daily best [post],” hereafter, Ilbe). The picture (Figure 2) was a composite image combining two 
existing photographs. One was Roh’s face, and the other was the body of a koala. The user did 
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not provide details but left a short comment: “This is not a koala. Yes, it is Rohala. Yes, it is.” 
(Panggaei, 2012). Of all Ilbe users, 35,231 read this post and up-voted, and subsequently, more 
posts depicting Roh as a koala began to be uploaded. 
The apparent contradictions in these two cases will frame this chapter. The purpose of 
this chapter is to consider in what conditions collective memories refuse to become broader and 
normative. Multiple memory scholars note the possibility and ask about the necessity of he 
reciprocal fusion of horizon in our understanding. As an exemplary case, in Public Memory in 
Place and Time, Edward Casey (2004) suggested what he termed “public memory” (p. 25). 
Using the prerequisite term “public,” he differentiated this concept from collective memory. This 
is a model of memory that is “collective” as well as “out in the open, in the koinos cosmos where 
discussion with others is possible” (Casey, 2004, p. 25). According to him, this communicative 
model would eventually serve “as an encircling horizon” of our understanding of the world, 
especially in a time of socio-political crisis (Casey, 2004, p. 25). Casey exemplified his 
contemporary memory of visiting a commemoration place at Penn Station in New York after 
9/11, where he, although unanimous agreement had not been apparent, was able to sense an 
“ongoing interchange of ideas and thoughts, opinions, and beliefs” (p. 30). On a similar note, 
Avishai Margalit (2004), in his book The Ethics of Memory, coined a term “shared memory” that 
“requires communication” (p. 51). Harald Welzer (2008) also spoke of “communicative 
memory” based on a comparable concept of the memory that is conversational: 
Construct and test mental images of that which is being discussed; fill in gaps where 
something is left unsaid; anticipate the further course of the conversation; prepare the 
next answer; and, last but not least, draw on memories related to the topic. (p. 294) 
For these illustrations, collective memory was imagined breaking what had been private, and 
emerged as a facilitator of social discussion. Margalit notes, the memory as common sense could 
“integrate and calibrate the different perspectives of those who remember the episode — for 
example, the memory of the people who were in the square, each experiencing only a fragment 
of what happened from their unique angle on events—into one version” (Margalit, 2004, p. 51). 
Although both understood that this particular mode of collective memories could not be static, 
they proposed a model of conversation that, in the precise moment after a series of debates, a 
memory becomes a history that provides a meaning. 
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The two examples I offer in this chapter will demonstrate something in contrast. The 
previous chapter illustrated two immediate attempts to construct the post-life memory of the late 
president. Both were variations from the original reference and were trying to dominate people’s 
memory on Moo-hyun Roh after he committed suicide. As a further development, the cases in 
this chapter show that the colligated memory of Roh was in fact diversified while polarizing and 
detouring within a year after the erection of his memory in funeral. Many conversations as 
memory-making practices were actively placed and spontaneously circulated since his death, and 
perhaps the Internet and the networked communication made available such opportunities.11 
However they remained to be fragmented, partially forgotten, but not emergent. 
As I will show later, users who still mourned Roh’s death revealed their unstoppable 
passion of grasping at their hero’s faint trace. However, the traces they claimed often remained 
indirect or less-relevant to Roh himself. For instance, against the writers’ denial above, audiences 
of Ppurigip’ŭn namu left numerous blog articles with their conviction that they saw Roh in King 
Sejong on TV. Multiple audiences providing such connections can be proven by the placement of 
small visual elements or lines from the character. According to their interpretation, the 
appearance of yellow flowers in the last episode of the series, for instance, is a coded message to 
the thoughts of Roh, since “yellow is, as we all know, the color of Roh” (Kŭrigo, 2011).12 
Nevertheless, a contesting memory rivaled this. The users of Ilber rigorously attempted 
nullification, claiming Roh-mourners’ blindness. They employed their skill to post memes 
online. By creating user-generated, funny but rough images (and other parody contents13), they 
attempted to impose a subversive impression on people’s imagination of Roh. Expected 
                                               
11 For sharing memories, Casey (2004) noted that three conditions would be necessary: 
“(a) having had the same history, at least via the proxy of another family member; (b) there 
having been a common place in which that history was enacted and experienced; and (c) being 
able to bring the history in-that-place into words or other suitable means of communication and 
expression” (pp. 22–23). Although Casey hesitated to claim a direct relationship with his 
preconditions to a certain technology – as with this denial, “[w]hat matters is neither the exact 
technology nor the precise location” (pp. 22–23) – for us, the conditions infer almost 
automatically the most accessible space in our time, the Internet network. 
12 It is true that yellow was the most dominantly used color for Roh’s noje as well as his 
election campaign in 2002. However, not all the yellow can be folded into such an intention. 
13 such as, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYibVU6Wbas and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VeMF9kzIy8U 
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controversy came to them, especially from roaring mourners’ sides.14 The gap in remembering 
and forgetting seemed to be not encouraged to be communicative; therefore, encirclement as 
such would not be possible. Indeed, the context of the memory of Roh tends to be improvised 
instead of following a legitimate, unifying, and collective orthodoxy.  
Observing these contrasting remembering-practices, this chapter will discuss what 
aspects of making memories of Roh failed to be a public memory. Unlike Casey’s (2004) or 
Margalit’s (2004) positivism on another level of collective memory, this chapter's collective 
memories seem neither to call for interpretive encirclement, nor to provide a sense of inter-
connectivity and inter-subjectivity. Casey imagined that a public memory would provide “a 
basso profundo in the chorus of the body politic, its medley of voices” (Casey, 2004, p. 25). 
Instead, the melody played by memories was a basso continuo. While basso profundo 
symbolizes an arch-memory that would be a basis for other memory-practices, basso continuo is 
more a musical practice where a player improvises every moment from having only minimal 
references (see Chapter 1). Then, what did the remaining memories of him prevent in such an 
emerging role? Why were the memories parallel, contesting, and avoided being communicative? 
Basso Continuo - The improvisations in people’s memories of Moo-hyun Roh 
The enshrinement of Roh’s memory after 2009 
 From the immediate moment of his death in 2009, Roh’s memories were thriving in 
various on-line locations. Soon after the news of suicide flashed, condolers flooded to reshape 
the network to be more responsive to their emotions. Millions urged online mega-portals, such as 
NAVER or DAUM, which both co-function as search engines as well as news outlets, to show 
their respect to the late president; together these resulted in an unusual update of the front page. 
Notably, the bright color of the logo was toned down to black and white, a short eulogy sentence 
was addressed on the front page, and a dedicated space where the users could leave comments 
was built and displayed in a most accessible place. 
                                               
14 Whenever each side had to meet there was harsh confrontation. In May 2013, the 
“Rohala” image was displayed in public at a shop in a small city. The high schooler who created 
this scandal took a picture of the scene with a finger sign of their community (Hani Online News 
Team, 2013). A small prank became national news, and the long-mourners were avid to discover 
who the culprit was and how they could punish him.  
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Figure 3. Changes in the logo(s) of Internet search engines (Pyŏlbitch’ŏrŏm, 2009). 
 
Figure 4. The memorial page in NAVER - Comment Page (Pasŭt’op’ŭ, 2009). 
 
Figure 5. The memorial page in DAUM - Comment Page (Pasŭt’op’ŭ, 2009). 
Condolers’ mourning practices also transformed what had been previously considered 
non-political space. For example, in several online-games, a collective demonstration was 
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organized for the tribute of Roh. Players met in front of a tree which they named “Roh’s tree” 
and rallied around the place while holding Roh’s image on their virtual self. 
 
Figure 6. The gamers in Mabinogi rallied to remember Roh (Chimbabŭllo3, 2014). 
 
Figure 7. The gamers in Mabinogi rallied to remember Roh (Chijiana, 2009). 
 
Figure 8. Other online services (non-political) logo change (Pyŏlbitch’ŏrŏm, 2009). 
In 2010, Roh’s memory was continuously recollected and updated in individual blogs and 
communities. Commemorations were spontaneously individual yet patterned to be collective: 
they usually occurred as an individual recalled one of Roh’s speeches or actions, which could be 
81 
 
applied to a current political agenda. Contrasting the one they could witness from the then 
current government, the memory here was a product of recreation as well as an imaginary 
reaction. For instance, in April 2010, the South Korean warship, the Cheonan, was split in half 
by an explosion and began sinking in the darkness with the loss of 46 lives. While North Korea 
had been the prime suspect, a user named Hhhon in Ohmynews, a participatory news platform, 
published an opinion that if Roh was alive, “there would not have been a battle in Cheonan that 
lost 46 lives” (Hhhon, 2010). In August, when a heavy rain storm happened, a user noted in a 
blog, “Roh had invested billions [to control the flood], but the current government canceled it 
all” (yTarzany, 2010). In November 2010, when North Korean artillery struck South Korean 
territory, Roh was summoned again as if he could control North Korea to stop such an act.15 
Though they were writing as if alternative history, (imaginary) images of Roh, a friendly 
politician of social underdogs, initially erected in noje was maintained persistently (see Chapter 
2). 
A deep-rooted memory — Interpreting almost everything as Roh’s trace 
 One notable remembrance, among many located in users online, was reading Roh’s trace 
through media texts. Since 2010, a trajectory of TV dramas and movies had developed with an 
apparently similar plot. While none of the production companies admitted that the narrative 
structure resonated Roh’s life, the content’s latent ambiguity dominated the audiences’ 
interpretations in specific ways. This practice was even more frequent in the genre of the 
costume drama: the hero, who is the legitimate heir to the ruling power but taken by another 
vested class, making a few friends from the lower class. The lower class, or more precisely called 
the minjung class, doubts the hero at first then joins with him to co-fight for the people. Their 
adventure ends with the upper class’ plot resulting in the deaths of many of the characters. The 
few surviving characters swear to the sky that their vision to revolutionize society will not be 
forgotten. 
Pu-ri kip’ŭn Namu is a case in point: instead of depicting the main character, King 
Sejong, who in fact ruled the Chosŏn dynasty from 1418 to 1450, as a majestic and authoritative 
                                               
15 Indeed, due to political reality, it was not easy to make a physical monument during 
that day. The same government that had targeted their responsibility in terms of the people after 
Roh’s death didn’t want to erect new centers of memory, especially before the coming 
presidential election. 
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ruler of the new kingdom, the drama imagined him as a warm-hearted and good friend of the 
common people. In the drama, the king antagonizes continuously about the vassalage, which is 
illustrated as opposing the king’s goodwill to create a more comfortable letter system through 
which the low social class attains literacy. His supporters are from the lower class, or young 
scholars who do not have much establishment but are sympathetic to the king’s vision. In the 
end, dozens of characters are trapped and lose their lives to protect the king (SBS, n.d.). 
Watching this, mainly in online spaces such as in blogs and fan-communities, audiences 
claimed it was Roh that the king represented. Moreover, speeches and behaviors were analyzed 
like crosswords, being matched with the remembered past of Roh’s life. Some examples of their 
interpretations follow: 
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Table 1. Mourners’ interpretation of costume drama and movie in relation with Moo-hyun Roh 
Roles and 
Themes 
Interpretation Kwanghae 
(‘Masquerade,’ 
Movie, 2012) 
Kwansang (‘The 
Face Reader,’ 
Movie, 2013) 
Pu-ri Kip’ŭn Namu 
(‘Deep Rooted 
Tree,’ TV Drama, 
2011) 
Protagonist Roh A false king, Hasŏn A high-rank 
general, Kim 
Chongsŏ 
King Sejong 
Antagonist Conservative 
Party 
The aristocrat and the 
real King, Kwanghae 
Prince Suyang The aristocrat and 
their secret society 
The oppressed Minjung People of Chosŏn 
dynasty 
People of Chosŏn 
dynasty 
People of Chosŏn 
dynasty 
Supporters Minjung A eunuch, a 
swordsman, and a 
scholar 
A physiognomist Young scholars, a 
swordsman, 
handmaidens 
Complication Pro-minjung 
policy 
Tax reform Stopping the 
dethronement of the 
rightful king 
The proclamation 
newsletters for 
people’s literacy 
Conclusion Roh’s suicide The hero flees while 
his supporters have 
been executed 
All dead. Prince 
Suyang enthroned 
All murdered, but 
the king succeeds 
Box-office (or 
rating in TV) 
 12,323,59516 9,135,54017 9-23% 
 
The plots were also maintained in many media narratives although in a modern setting. In 
many TV dramas and movies, a young and ambitious character from the lower-social class broke 
through the glass-ceiling. He/she dreamed of personal success, but then an event changed his/her 
goal of life for bigger causes. With help from the social underdog, he/she formed a pact with 
friends as well as his/her former enemies to build a society to be “better,” such as by protecting 
human-rights or organizing successful anti-dictatorship movements. Then, like the previous 
genre, this genre also became a riddle to the audience. 
  
                                               
16 The movie recorded 3rd in all time box office ratings at that time, but currently is 10th. 
17 Then 10th, now in 24th place. 
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Table 2. Mourners’ interpretation of modern drama and movies in relation to Moo-hyun Roh 
Roles and 
Themes In reality 
Pyŏnhoin (‘The Attorney,’ 
Movie, 2013) 
Taemul (‘Big Thing,’ TV 
drama, 2010) 
Protagonist Roh Lawyer Song Usŏk A female politician, Sŏ 
Hyerim 
Antagonist The conservative 
party and its 
government 
Security police, 
prosecutors, and the secret 
intelligence agency 
Jaebeol (corporate 
conglomerates) and the 
conservative 
The oppressed Minjung (people) University students and 
activists 
People 
Supporters Minjung Song’s friends A prosecutor from a low 
social class 
Complication Pro-minjung policy A legal suit against the 
nation 
Hegemonic power struggle 
Conclusion Roh’s suicide Lost the trial Sŏ’s retirement 
Box-office (or 
rating in TV) 
- 11,375,94418 17-27% 
 
For costume dramas and the modern ones above, the structure of the narrative seemed to 
be clearly inherited from minjung-narrative which was a popular and familiar way of developing 
the storyline in the 70s and 80s of South Korea. Experiencing rapid economic growth during this 
era, South Koreans were somewhat nostalgic about their historical suffering under feudalism, 
imperialism, and the cold-war. A movie, or TV series under this narrative themed a chronicle of 
the hero’s endless pain. Commonly the hero in this structure is a pure male or female, and the 
perpetrators often symbolize suppressive social and political forces around heroes such as the 
noble, colonialism, cold-war politics, and global capitalism. The genre was successful during the 
era, becoming popular among “common people” and often inspiring university students and 
intellectuals who wished to suggest a counter-narrative against the state-driven modernization 
ideology.  
In our examples, the idea of the suffering of minjung is continued but reshaped to be 
more projective of South Korean’s post-dictatorship and representative political system. Now the 
hero’s social class has elevated, for example, a ruler of the nation. However, in the storyline, the 
hero was denied the exercise of his/her political power, although the rightful legitimacy was due 
                                               
18 9th in all time box office at that time. Now 15th. 
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to the pre-existing cartel. The hero was isolated and coerced to surrender his political power 
unjustly to the unsanctioned, not-people oriented therefore undemocratic political power. And 
this has been interpreted as a tale of Moo-hyun Roh, who was believed to be a politician chosen 
by the commoner and weakened by the elite.  
Such inheritance seemed to have a good precedent. Movies and TV series went viral in 
the pre-social media era, and many captured the audience’s attention which led to success in the 
box-office. As the table 1. shows, Kwanghae (2012), a fictional movie that was widely 
considered as a connotative story of Moo-hyun Roh set in the old dynasty, attracted more than 12 
million audiences in theaters. It was the most successful movie of the year and the 3rd in all-time 
Korean box-office history. In the next year Pyŏnhoin (2013) in table 2., a film inspired by 
Moohyun’s young legal protest against the state police gathered another 11 million South Korean 
viewers. This was the second most-viewed movie of that year, next to the Myŏngnyang (2013), a 
story of a naval admiral who defended the Japanese invasion in 1597.  Pu-ri kip’ŭn Namu (2011) 
the TV series scored 25.4% in the ratings, the top among the programs at that time (SBS, n.d.).     
By the audience’s yet mournful mind, the symbolism of these contents were directly 
linked to Roh’s implicit presence. The reviewing practices functioned to reinforce Roh’s 
memories as the one’s established in noje. In addition, the media industry continued to develop 
products of a similar storyline, since such installments guaranteed market success. The audience 
also confirmed their memories of Roh and even enhanced their mourning while watching this 
content. With various modes of interpretations in multiple blog entries, which were often thought 
to be arbitrary, Roh, after his death, was constantly recalled, marking him as living with afterlife 
memories: 
(For the movie Kwanghae) In one scene, Hasun, the protagonist, said, ‘I cannot betray 
my wife. I would rather abstain.’ This was homage to the man Roh Moo-hyun, who said, 
‘Do you mean that I have to throw away my wife to get elected the president?’ (Hŏ, 
2012). 
(For the movie Kwanghae) Hasun spoke to his retainer, stating, ‘you should feel shame.’ 
Who said that the king should send the troops to Ming China. Roh also said the same to 
the generals, who were opposed to retaking the wartime operational control in 2006 (Pak, 
2012). 
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(For the TV drama Ppu-ri Kip’ŭn Namu) In the drama, Sejong often used swear words 
such as ‘damn’ and ‘bull shit.’ He also mentioned, ‘I cannot do this job [king’s work] 
anymore.’ These all remind us of Roh’s word usage in some sense. (… ) [also] we can 
find the appearance of former President Roh, who had been talking with the prosecutors 
who opposed the prosecution reform in Sejong, standing in front of the public gate and 
talking to the noble, which is protesting against the Hangeul campaign (I Sŭlki, 2011). 
(For the TV drama Taemul) Seeing the main character, Sŏ Hyerim, struggling in politics, 
it seems reasonable to recall what happened a day before the presidential election in 
2002, when Mongchun Chŏng’s revoked his earlier endorsement (Katshwin-dong, 2010). 
Roh as the bronze statue, living through the minjung narrative 
 Observing these interpretations, we can notice the following: Roh, at least during the era 
between 2010-2014, was joined to other heroes who appeared repetitively narrated in South 
Korean society - minjung narrative. This was what the 2009 noje ritual intended to naturalize 
(see Chapter 2). The audiences’ identification of Roh’s trace in various storylines implied that 
now Moo-hyun Roh began colliding with other heroes in popular folktales. Thus, for them, it 
was not a problem of whether what they saw in the TV was dressed as the king of the dynasty 
five hundred years ago (Pu-ri Kip’ŭn Namu), or a woman who lost her husband in the second 
Iraqi war (Taemul). For any character who stood for struggling minjung (people), they would 
find Roh’s trace, whether the creator of the story intended it or not. In other words, for those who 
mourn his death, Roh’s memory became a symbol that haunts our memories; now the memory of 
Roh is omnipresent. 
This symbolic status may mean the mourner/audience would define their experience of 
time by a given narrative. As Jens Brockmeier (2002) claimed, a narrative can guide one’s 
experience. It is not just a more effective medium for presenting an event but also shapes 
temporal dimensions of the experience. Michael Carrithers (1992) also argued that narrative 
consists not merely of telling stories but also of understanding complex units of actions and 
events. In this view, the human capacity for planning and anticipating events is basically not 
different from narrative thought: 
Human beings perceive any current action within a large temporal envelope, and within 
that envelope they perceive any given action, not as a response to the immediate 
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circumstances or current mental state of an interlocutor, but as part of an unfolding story. 
(Carrithers, 1992, p. 82) 
In other words, narrative endows the inherent historicity of human existence with cultural 
meanings. Thus, the decoding of TV drama and movies with given narratives is performed with 
the idea that the past is assembled through a simple act in the present. As if proving this point, in 
many reviews, the time in the narrative and the time in living experience exist as intertwined 
together: 
[In t]he appearance of King Sejong, I see President Roh Moo-hyun. Of course, for the 
KOR-US FTA I can not possibly say that President Roh Moo-hyun had no fault on it. 
[However,] like the noble class in the drama, the bureaucrats of our country, especially, 
the foreign affairs bureaucrats’ US-friendly position, it is in fact selling our nation to the 
foreign interest. (Hŭidongi, 2011) 
The above commentary tries to understand Roh’s political decision (KOR-US Free Trade 
Agreement [FTA]) as a machination of Pro-US bureaucrats. Then, while the facts and the details 
behind each historical moment—KOR-US FTA by Roh and the invention of Hangul by King 
Sejong—were equally dismissed, two pasts, one on the screen, and the other near-past in reality 
are regarded as the “same.” The unchallenged history remained the same for the bourgeois 
bureaucracy. This quasi-Marxist perspective to history, seeing it as a never-ending repetition, is a 
feature of minjung philosophy. In this theorem, minjung struggled under the unjust social 
exploitation in the past, and the hardship still exists for those who regard themselves as 
victimized by the noble class. As Jan Assmann (1998) asserted, Moses was a memory that may 
have survived, "obscured and distorted, but perhaps supported by individual members of the 
Priest cast through the ancient scripts" (p. 196). Here the people’s attempt to read Moo-hyun 
Roh’s presence in the media text, when even the producers’ of the series denied its relationship, 
may prove that his memory at this stage became and was maintained to keep memory as the 
“bronze statue” on “the feet of clay” (Freud, 1961; Assmann, 1998, See Chapter 2). 
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Rohala — Another afterlife of Roh’s memory 
 However, in opposition to this mournful practice, the other mode of the collective 
memory of Roh was hosted. Unlike the above case, this practice criticized some silence, 
especially the one “engineered” from noje’s intended forgetfulness. 
This new remembering was created in Ilbe and circulated widely in several online 
bulletins. Ilbe was built in April 2010 to be a repository for some favorite but extreme posts from 
another well-known website named Tissi Insaidŭ (Kim, 2014). From around 2011-2012, users on 
this site began to question the society’s “brain-dead adoration to Roh,” And the mocking posts 
began soon after. As noted above, in 2012, the post of Rohala imagined Roh as a koala and 
uploaded the picture. A similar image, which was more famous for its polished appearance, was 
also posted in January 2013 (K’agawaunji, 2013). The boom on making such memorabilia of 
Roh has dominated that community ever since. 
 
Figure 9. “Nohala (extremely hateful)” (K’agawaunji, 2013). 
The image reflected the community’s culture to indict the hypocrisy of their society. 
Moo-hyun Roh, at least in Ilbe’s discussion bulletin, was no more than the one who died because 
of feelings of shame. He was an irresponsible politician and disgraceful father of the family, yet 
the people outside, the left and the liberals, viewed him as if he was a hero of the age. They 
condemned the blindness of contemporary memories in which liberals viewed Roh as an idol and 
a false memory (H. Kim & N. Kim, 2009). In fact, the name Rohala (Figure 9) came from this 
logic. The name was a combination of Roh and Allah (see Figure 10). For Ilbe users, this image 
of Rohala can be an accurate representation of Roh because it revealed the authenticity behind 
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the cult of Roh. Through creating, sharing, and praising these seemingly meaningless practices, 
Ilbe users mocked the mourners’ blindness to the past. 
The same intention was well represented in other, less-humorous images. Figure 11 
shows another composite image of a young and then older version of Roh. As a young 
parliament member, Roh appeared on the left saying, “You must not just take the money if you 
do not reward them back.” However, the older image on the right shows Roh before the hearing, 
who defended himself by saying, “[I] didn’t know.” By stitching two different times of Roh into 
one place, the picture accused Roh’s defection as well as his followers’ blindness.  
 
Figure 10. Roh as a fanatic terrorist (meme korea518, n.d.). 
 
Figure 11. Conflicting message: From Roh in 1987 to Roh in 2009 (DJ nosi, 2016). 
For the image’s impoliteness, Hakchun Kim (2014) explained the method was based on 
the online community’s culture. The users shared a strategy called Ŏgŭ-ro, from an English word 
“aggravation,” which is a purposeful practice to make others angry, especially the ones who 
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often face harsh criticism. The main purpose of creating such images of Roh was to upset the 
many memories that decorated Roh as a hero. For them, the major purpose was to deny and de-
constitute what the society regarded as the divine. As in the nature of humor and satire, the 
strategy does not recognize an absolute value, and the users of Ilbe used their “emotional energy” 
(Collins, 2005) through the pleasure of destroying the divine. For Ilbe users, all of these people 
who don’t understand the self-contradiction of the divine are Ssipsŏnbi. This word consists of 
two Korean terms, one from a swear word “ssip-” and the other from “sŏnbi,” the scholars in the 
Confucius social class, who were often accused of moral hypocrisy. For Ilbe users, they are the 
hypocrites who do not have an ability to distinguish what was really wrong and what they (Ilbe) 
tried to do. They are “dyslexic” people who don’t understand the mood and prevailing attitude in 
the community. The word is more frequently used to refer to the liberals of South Korean 
politics, who proclaimed Roh a hero against “the facts.” Ilbes 
claimed to be logical and rational; members request evidence and calculation before any 
judgment. And these “facts” that they enthusiastically perused confirmed the fact those 
‘Ssipsŏnbi’, who should have set morality and value ahead, in fact are “like us”. Those 
who had monopolized the sacred value represented by democratization collapsed without 
hesitation and trembled before the cowardly attack of Ilbes. As a result, the users of Ilbe 
do not understand the criticism of “being demoralized for attacking the dead”. Rather, the 
accusation itself is the reason why they have to push such practice more strongly, and 
behind this is the exhilaration and cynicism witnessing other’s anger. (Kim, 2014, p. 140) 
A user of Ilbe, in Hakchun Kim’s study (2014) answered to the question why they shared the hate 
toward Roh enthusiastically: 
So, when we do satirize like Noala, those left-wingers are judgmental. But, what about 
the picture in last time, the one of President Park Geun-hye giving birth the Park Chung-
hee? Isn’t that the same kind of blasphemy? I don’t understand why this picture is a satire 
while our image productions of Roh Moo-hyun is blasphemy. I just cannot understand 
this. Just accept both as satire, or they should accept what they were doing was the same 
kind of blasphemy. (Kim, 2014, p. 110) 
 One fact should be clarified here. If various Ilbes’ memory-representations of Roh were 
to contest people’s forgetfulness of Roh when he lived, their reproductions should be regarded as 
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mnemonic practices equally originated from an archival drive. Although rough artistic 
representations, Ilbe images are an interpretation of Roh, which should be qualified as a mode of 
remembering him. The images confront archived memories at that time. Nevertheless, the noje 
was performed as a temporal archive of memories, inviting and collecting peoples’ other 
recollections (Chapter 2). In contrast, Ilbe images collected particular images that confronted the 
memories gathered during noje and its prosthetic extensions inside popular culture during their 
era. It allows a politically expanded territory, and that is the power of having space. The function 
of the very existence of such images makes Roh susceptible to being vulnerable. 
The cartography of Roh’s memories drawn during 2010-2014 can be summarized as 
follows. On the one hand, there is an aura of remembrance, from the noje of 2009. After this 
media event, people tried to locate signs of him, the memory’s presence, in the narratives they 
could find. Roh’s struggle inside noje-related memories became universalized. Roh became one 
of the other heroes who had repeatedly been betrayed throughout history. On the other hand, we 
have new memories from Ilbe, which attempted to trace back to the source and challenge pre-
existing memorial practices. The two memories’ relationship reminds us of the connection 
between trace and aura in Walter Benjamin’s (2002) thought: 
Trace and aura. The trace is appearance of a nearness, however far removed the thing that 
left it behind may be. The aura is appearance of a distance, however close the thing that 
calls it forth. In the trace, we gain possession of the thing; in the aura, it takes possession 
of us. (M 16a, 4) (Benjamin, 2002, p. 447) 
In aura, as Benjamin outlines, we found that the people’s recognition of time and history that has 
been circular and repetitive will create a victim in the near-future. In trace, we found the “fact” 
that attempted to nullify the memory of now; the practices aimed for cancellation of the aura 
from memory in order to make a counter memory. To put it differently, for those who see Roh 
through the minjung meta-narrative, Roh is an omnipresent hero from “our” collective memory; 
the fact that Roh’s memory revealed its existence is almost beyond space-time. In every moment 
of audience interpretations, the decoder could claim they found another of Roh’s story. Ilbe 
memories of Roh attempt to make that sacred collective memory to be profane. By humanizing 
and humiliating Roh’s memory, they instead purposed to cut the tie in their era’s imagination 
between the meta-narrative of minjung and that of meta-memory, with han from Moohyun Roh. 
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The Failure of Acknowledging the Other Memory 
The last proposition of this chapter is to test the reasons why Roh’s collective memory could not 
be “public.” Earlier, Casey (2004) and Margalit (2004) characterized the idea of public memory 
as interpretive encirclement of collective memory, which would provide a sense of inter-
connectivity and inter-subjectivity. Moo-hyun Roh could achieve such a grounding position, 
since regardless of what he did, his suicide shocked and was mourned by the nation as a 
“flashbulb memory” (Brown & Kulik, 1977).19 As Chapter 2 of this dissertation mentioned, there 
were “spontaneous shrines” to commemorate him as well as any memories of suffering (Santino, 
2006). Then, as this chapter observes, as memories of Roh were widely reproduced, he seemed to 
have the potential to be the symbolic figure triggering society’s recollections in positive terms. 
However, memories of Roh during the period of our observation were rather floating in 
dissonance between those two bases. Each attempted to involve the other’s memory-
institutionalizing process. From the beginning, Ilbe’s Roh-memory was established as a denial to 
the noje’s intended memory. Then, when these mirroring memories became viral through 
incidents such as displaying Rohala in public places, mourning memories attacked such 
mnemonic practices as depravity (see footnote 4 in this chapter). 
What does this mean for the studies of collective memory? In one perspective, for 
Jacques Derrida (1989) remembering the deceased with rightfully shared language is an 
impossible mission. Collective memory, for him, is not collective from the beginning. Our 
commemoration of the dead remains unavoidably an activity of assuming the face hidden under 
the prosopopoeia; memories are solely owned by the individual mourner, not by the one in the 
coffin. What we can share about the dead should be an individual trace of private interpretation 
and cannot be of collective memory. Thus, any recollection creates constant slippages in 
interpretation (Derrida, 1989, p. 28). By summoning different moments, faces, and participants, 
individuals “of the present” create a unique attachment to the diverse past. 
However, I will address what could be otherwise. On one hand, Derrida’s doubt on 
collective memory is rooted in his discrediting of (written) language. In his prime work Of 
Grammatology, Derrida’s (2015) concern was to find the underlying “condition of all linguistic 
                                               
19 The term refers to a mode of memory characterized as accurate, long lasting, and 
detailed for highly significant, emotional events. 
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systems” (p. 60). For him, the minimal unit of language (which Derrida calls “grammatology”) is 
to be always an iterable trace. A “trace” is a mark remaining after the moment of its inscription, 
and this means that after that moment, an established meaning during one instance can be 
dismissed by creating another trace on it. But in this paper, I will begin my argument from the 
assumption that what remains in our memory can be agreeable by many who shared the same 
remembrance. For this opening and before making common sense of this particular time-
memory, we can consider the tradition of hermeneutics that claims “individual memory is shaped 
and maintained in and through communal action, in and through tradition” (Ruin, 2015, p. 212), 
both in and through “the language that we are” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 470). Of course, the cases we 
observed in this chapter could not achieve such a point. However, by checking the condition of 
memory’s communicative mediation, I will identify the circumstances other than the 
impossibility from the aperture in between two contesting memory practices. 
Different Languages in Remembering Moo-hyun Roh 
The choice of language should be a foremost ground to access memories. In “The Social 
Frameworks of Memory,” Maurice Halbwachs (1992) contended that language is “the most 
elementary and the stable framework” because it is how human beings process, translate, and 
articulate memory (p. 45). He underlined how the reciprocal relationship between language and 
memory forms a more complex, personal knowledgebase over time. In addition, language 
triggers recall, and people use language to identify and make sense of what they see in both 
stored and present images. For example, memory gives words meaning, while names conjure 
particular meanings developed from previous social interaction and experiences; therefore, 
“words” and “relations with others” give us the ability to remember (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 45). 
In coining the term “shared memory,” Avishai Margalit (2004) also underlined the 
importance of language. But here language takes a bigger position. In the passage, he 
differentiated his notion from “a common memory” because shared memory would be mediating. 
The simple mode of aggregated memory cannot be “shared” because it does not apply the 
language of communication. He explained: 
A shared memory… requires communication. A shared memory integrates and calibrates 
the different perspectives of those who remember the episode … each experiencing only 
a fragment of what happened from their unique angle on events … into one version. 
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Other people in the community who were not there at the time may then be plugged into 
the experience of those who were in the square, through channels of description rather 
that by direct experience. Shared memory is built on a division of mnemonic labor. 
(Margalit, 2004, pp. 51-52) 
Hence, what he calls “shared memory” will be accomplished by on-going communication 
actions, which make other memories inclusive to a dialogue. “Flashbulb memory,” the memory 
of a dramatic event, is not enough and must be involved with a conversation. Edward Casey 
(2004) also required “direct communication” in a place that “nurtures (or at least allows) 
communal presence” for his notion of “public memory” (p. 33).  Furthermore, Casey noted, “The 
praxis of public memory is primarily discursive” (p. 33). Already in his repeatedly referenced 
book Remembering (2000), Casey argued that our reminiscing casts us back into the past which 
trying to relive it and is most often done in the company of others, through the medium of 
language. The role of language in this situation is to articulate what might have remained 
sequestered and undiscussed, held in private thoughts or emotions. Discourse, spoken or written, 
enables memories that concern many to appear in a common arena of appearance that is 
tantamount to a shared reality. 
However, in two cases of Roh’s afterlife memories, we see that the languages used in 
both groups were not a means of communication with the other. As noted, for example, Ilbe users 
named Roh’s sympathizers Ssip-sŏnbi as insulting to their blind remembering. Similarly, the term 
minjuhwa refers to democratization and is also used as a vulgarism on their site, for they claimed 
the term has been used everywhere, with and without the right context by Roh’s sympathizers. 
Unji, the term originally referring to “moving the finger”, was used as a way to mock the way of 
Roh’s death. Also, Roh’s mourners (sympathizers) called the users of Ilbe as Ilbech’ung, the 
insects in Ilbe, looking down on their online activities. The mourner’s obsessive language to 
trace Roh’s image, literally everywhere, served to isolate their space; hence, the others outside 
the circle named these people noppa, the group of enthusiasts of Roh. The language both use, 
terms and the expressions of Moo-hyun Roh, seemed quite intentional, making the deifying of 
Roh more than evident. Each used words that were decontextualized and deviated from universal 
use, often attacking the other’s mind. 
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Indeed, while these words are undoubtedly insulting, as well as morally and ethically 
unjustifiable, there have been cultures like this where the high rate of anonymity and relative 
absence of rules creates an environment where “anything goes,” and where one is “likely to 
encounter pornography, gore, misogyny racism, homophobia, or any combination of the above” 
(Mitchell, 2012, p. 277ft). One might be able to say, as Bernstein et al. (2011) noted, the 
anonymity of Internet sites creates the conditions under which strange and progressive modes of 
expression, political and otherwise, can take place. As such, one can point out that the new 
technicality of our age produced this change, which we must consider natural. As I demonstrated 
in Chapter 1, the language that we use in the present has added more complexity in itself. As 
such, our use of new technology does not merely facilitate the efficiency of mediation but reveals 
more “complexity and flexibility of technology … by a wider range of actors” (Feenberg, 2000, 
p. 449). The language under these circumstances has been deeply associated with the presence of 
new technology, which can be a condition as well as a possibility for being that is given to us and 
imagined by us (Dreyfus, 2009; Heidegger, 1977a, 1977b; Ihde, 1990). As Heidegger (1998) 
advised us:  
With the unconditional reign of modern technology there is an increase in the power — 
the demand as well as the performance — of the technological language that was devised 
for the widest possible spread of information. Because this [power] is scattered in 
systems of formalized reports and signals, the technological language is the severest and 
most menacing attack on what is peculiar to language: saying as showing and as the 
letting-appear of what is present and what is absent, of reality in the widest sense. (p. 
141) 
The language of trauma against the language of play 
In our two contesting remembrances, the precise dissonance in their languages rests on the point 
that they do not acknowledge the presence of the other in memory-practices. Perhaps, the 
language in our day has changed as proposed above. However, this does not justify the 
immorality of the hostile comments. It is not my intention here that we consider any facet of the 
revealing of modern technology to be a “problem” that must be “solved”. Nevertheless, I suggest 
instead to think about the nature of language. 
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Hermeneutics like those of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul Ricoeur 
underlines articulations on understanding, language, and the world established upon our ability 
of communication. For them, one’s understanding of lived experiences enables one to, in turn, 
pose further questions about the experience of being-in-the-world that is our communicative life. 
For instance, according to Heidegger’s articulation, the essence of language and the relationship 
of Dasein and the world imply that media and the means of representation are not merely 
instruments of communication or secondary phenomena that relate information about entities 
already “out there.” Rather, they are direct and active participants in revealing the being of those 
things that we subsequently think they merely represent. In other words, the precise issue in 
communication is not just about how we speak, but more importantly, also about how we are 
spoken to. Communication should be principally “letting someone see with us what we have 
pointed out by way of giving it a definite character” (Heidegger, 1968, p. 197). This type of 
understanding transpires as an “occurrence” rather than an “act,” and Dasein is the “opening” or 
“clearing” where this event takes place. In that sense, the very experience of communication is 
the discovery of what is being unconcealed before us, rather than corresponding to an extended 
reality. 
Also, for Gadamer (2004), the ethical aspect of language is crucial because dialogue 
occurs in language, and that understanding is always mediated by language, which is itself 
formed in the process of dialogue. For him, hermeneutical endeavor entails broadening our 
perspectives through the fusion of horizons, which can only occur when one is open, so the other 
can challenge one’s own perspectives. As Gadamer pointed out, “The fusion of horizons that 
takes place in understanding is actually the achievement of language” (p. 370). Thus, only 
through language do humans have a world at all. In this procedure, the openness of the self can 
be sensed through language; within language anything to be understood is interpreted, and 
similarly, it is within language that we encounter ourselves and others (Gill, 2015). In this regard, 
language is dialogue and is, in part, human’s being-in-the-world. The guidance of the 
hermeneutical experience determines that our mode of being in the world is through our being in 
language. On one hand, like Heidegger, Gadamer also considered language as the foremost 
ground of understanding, since language discloses the world (p. 370). On the other hand, 
according to Gadamer, the world overflows the categories of language (p. 421). This insight 
explains why unexpected experiences can overwhelm us to the extent that we fail to find the 
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words to describe them. As a result of his analysis, Gadamer argued that language both discloses 
and hides the world. This double-edged quality of language can be seen in the distinction 
between the said and the unsaid. 
Communication, if following Paul Hedges’s (2016) interpretation of Gadamer (2004; see 
also Vilhauer, 2010) is a play of this circumstance. Play is something which is non-serious but 
also possesses a state of intensity. We may become lost in fascination as we are taken over by the 
game itself, and if played fully, we live within the game world. With the “primacy of play over 
the consciousness of the player” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 94), play is something outside of the 
“normal seriousness” of the world, and its work-a-day habits and routines, become almost a 
counter or reversal. In addition to this, Gadamer says play “represents an order in which the to-
and-fro motion of play follows of itself” (p. 94). Between an active (sense of agent as doer) and 
passive (acted upon), play is an event in which both the players and the play (and other players) 
co-create the play. Moreover, play is medial; it is neither (or not solely either) active nor passive, 
but part of a middle place. The player does not “actively control” the play because the player is 
within the rules; at the same time the very play is also constituted merely because there is a 
player willing to play and who is also involved in determining and potentially changing those 
rules. Therefore, the player is not simply passively receiving the game. In relation to 
hermeneutics, this mediality might be related to understanding because any interpreter is both 
receiving (taking in information) and creating (developing an understanding). Neither partner 
controls the dialogue, but rather it is a co-created activity. 
The language of play or dialogue must assume the presence of the other. Gadamer (2004) 
argued that through this medial, co-creative activity of dialogue (through play), the “unsaid” is 
the “more” that frames the proposition of the text. Here, Gadamer stresses openness rather than 
closure (which, of course, can never be excluded as long as we are finite beings). While we can 
never transcend the realm of prejudices (because we are always implicated in our understanding), 
we can transcend those that have proven inept or fruitless. Gadamer contended, “All this shows 
that a conversation has a spirit of its own and that the language used in it bears its truth within it, 
that is, that it reveals something which henceforth exists” (p. 345). In other words, a new 
realization, new interpretation, or a re-creation comes about through the conversation that stands 
on the other’s side: 
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In human relations the important thing is, as we have seen, to experience the Thou truly 
as a Thou—i.e., not to overlook his claim but to let him really say something to us. Here 
is where openness belongs. …Without such openness to one another there is no genuine 
human bond. (Gadamer, 2004, p. 361) 
Consequently, it is language that broadens one’s range of horizon. One’s horizon is not static as 
long as one is in conversation. This does not mean either giving up one’s framework or 
abandoning it to the other (as empathy would suggest), but it does mean participating in a 
“higher universality,” which the concept of “horizon” denotes. Meanings in any communication 
situation are constantly redefined as the expression of the values, beliefs, customs, and social 
practices of the community, or the world of the community and the community’s experience of 
the world. 
Contrasting this hermeneutics’ position to the dialogues, the memories of Roh, 
represented and repeatedly remediated, seemed to be out of this conversational play-norm. For 
both sides, expansive reproductions of their interpretation of Roh remains inward, although they 
see more or less their own practices as a play (H. Kim, 2014). For Roh’s mourners, this remained 
just a taboo from those “who do not know anything about him.” This also troubles one of the 
social norms that existed in South Korea, as to mock and tease the dead is traditionally 
considered taboo (Alford, 1999; S. Kim, 2009). Ilbe’s opinion to the sympathizers stood in 
similarly negative position. Calling them Chwajom, the brainless zombies of the left, they 
themselves kept justifying their own mocking behavior (I, 2013). Meanwhile, the name Ilbe 
became an insult to the mourners, and Noppa did similarly to the Ilbes. The moniker was a play, 
but it was neither communal nor medial for refusing to acknowledge the other. In contrast, the 
name just enhanced the preexisting norms of reproducing their own memory, which would be 
considered as an affront by the other. 
Perhaps Gadamer’s (2004) solution would be acknowledging the negative aspect of the 
hermeneutic experience. On his account, experience in general is a process that is essentially 
negative. By “negative,” Gadamer means that our expectations of what something is or means 
are regularly disappointed and disconfirmed. As Gadamer explained, experience “cannot be 
described simply as the unbroken generation of typical universals. Rather, this generation takes 
place as false generalizations are continually refuted by experience and what was regarded as 
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typical is shown not to be so” (p. 353). To put it another way, when we are surprised, we begin to 
see things from a new perspective and come to know them with more clarity; then we experience 
what experience is: “Thus the negativity of experience has a curiously productive meaning” 
(Gadamer, 2004, p. 353). 
However, this idealization should expect several barriers. The first issue is on the power 
relation outside the two groups. As commonly known and accepted, both neo-Marxist cultural 
studies and the Frankfurt School provided the logic that language and power are organized 
around economic and political structures of domination, and changes in such structures also 
entail the promise of power-free communication. For cultural studies, the relationship between 
meaning and power takes the form of ideological domination; “hegemony” focuses precisely on 
language as an instrument for constructing the common sense of culture, rather than considering 
economic interests to be the driving force of social dynamics (Lewis & Jhally, 1994). The 
Frankfurt School, similarly, has focused upon the analysis of social power and culture, with 
important contributions to the study of mass popular culture and the emergence of consumer and 
media culture in capitalist modernity. Therefore, these lines of thinking introduce a cultural-
linguistic perspective into political analysis and render culture a significant battleground for 
social and political change. Jürgen Habermas (1977) also shared this point and actively 
participated in the discussion of the issue. Habermas’s specific criticism of Gadamer’s (2004) 
approach to the “hermeneutic” theory of knowledge centers on the idealization of “tradition.” For 
him, the concept of “tradition” leads one to ignore significant dimensions of ideology, which 
may come with hegemonic power, and the sway that powerful allies, forces, and domineering 
groups within a tradition (textual, authorial, religious, cultural) have over the development of 
social justice and transformations anticipated in the conversations (Habermas, 1977; Mendelson, 
1979). 
Having in mind this argument, we can identify whose languages they are speaking. For Ilbe, 
while they claimed their reproductions of memories were for the fun of making counter-
memories, what they eventually spoke behind those memory objects would be, in fact, what had 
not been spoken by the then-government. In an earlier chapter, I described the government’s 
attempts to silence the death in yŏnggyŏlsik, to mute Roh’s sympathizers. In Ilbes’ mocking 
languages, such desire was expressed similarly. Memories gathered in the Ilbe site, therefore, 
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served to nullify what Foucault (1977) called “counter-memory” (p. 18). While noje memories 
performed as the loci of anti-archive against the government’s institutionalizing memory, Ilbe’s 
memory practices can be thought of as creating an anti-anti-archive that serves the hegemon of 
the era. The mnemonic practices they were playing here were with the assured excellence of the 
dominant political power. Their archive would function as an alternative institutional memory; it 
would create a vacuum by the elimination of symbolic memory. Here is a reminder by Pierre 
Bourdieu about the language in public discussion with the invisible presence of power. 
[E]xcellence, in most societies, is the art of playing with the rules of the game, using this 
playing with the rules of the game to render a supreme homage to the game. The 
controlled transgressor is the complete opposite of the heretic. The dominant group co-
opts members on minimal indexes of behaviour that are the art of respecting the rules of 
the game in the regulated transgressions of these rules: correct behaviour, bearing. In 
Nicolas de Chamfort's famous phrase, "The vicar-general can smile at a statement against 
religion, the bishop can actually laugh, and the cardinal can add a word of his own"20. 
The higher you rise in the hierarchy of dignitaries, the more you can play with the rules 
of the game, but ex officio, on the basis of a position that is beyond any doubt. The 
cardinal's anti-clerical humour is supremely clerical. (Bourdieu, 2014) 
Ricoeur contended that the foremost question of memory is to think of whose memory it 
is (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 4). While the memory of Roh is from noje, even though it was loosely 
related to history, it served as a symbolic connecting link to other memories. Mourners’ 
identifications in this chapter, although they were based on the imagined remembrance, were 
responding to their ongoing political struggle. As noted earlier, Roh’s memories were recalled 
when there was a crisis on a social or political level (p. 9 of this chapter). On the other hand, 
Ilbes was trying to make a symbolic link to be perceived as void. Their remembrance was for the 
cancellation of the solidarity among many other unvocalized memories under the banner of 
                                               
20 The original text was by Nicolas de Chamfort, Maximes et pensees (1795), foot-noted 
in the same book (Bourdieu, 2014, p. 387ft29). The English edition of the book used a shorten 
passage: “the priest must believe, the canon may have doubts, the cardinal can be an atheist” 
(Bourdieu, 2014, p. 62). Since the French essay, La Fabrique Des Débats Publics (Bourdieu, 
2012), used the same text on the footnote, I replaced the quote above.  
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Roh’s imaginative appearance. The issues regarding power and whose memories should be 
vocalized were prominent here. 
Moreover, for the sympathizers’ minds, Roh is more the serious object of mourning rather 
than a play. Aleida Assmann (2001) indicated three (collective) memory anchors: affect, symbol, 
and trauma. By identifying Roh in terms of (pseudo) memory-objects, sympathizers connect their 
memories of the past in an intimate way that recalls the time as having uniquely identifiable 
referents. Their equating of Roh with the tragic heroes in narratives, indeed, cannot be a play. 
Rather, by this process, the mourner, who is internally re-experiencing the past in a rite of 
individual remembering, conveys in detail as media content the scene of events and the emotions 
he/she associates with them to his/her interlocutor. As Sigmund Freud (1914) explained, their 
“way of remembering” is the compulsion to repeat a “motive for remembering” (p. 154), or more 
precisely an “impulsion to remember” (p. 151). Through this practice, they are re-experiencing 
their past via the frequent use of activated forms that index the cognitive status of themselves, 
while recounting the memories and their current center of attention. This repeated intrusion of 
past events into the sympathizers’ present awareness is indicative of traumatic memory, as well 
as their way of working through that trauma by giving triggers of recollections to it and seeking 
the empathy of what Anna Green (2004) referred to as an “affective community” (p. 38). Having 
a dialogue with the ones who mourners think are on the murderers’ side would be quite painful 
and create an unacceptable imagination. 
Contesting in Parallel without Forgetting 
Inspired by Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida (2000a, 2000b) considered the ethic of 
hospitality for two different types. The first is conditional (Derrida, 2000a, pp. 3–5, 2000b, p. 
25). Receiving the visitors, the others, in this case should accord to more or less formalized rules. 
There should be an invitation from the host always, and the guest should accept it. This is an 
agreement, a pact that allows both of them to coexist safely. While the invitation initially appears 
as a gesture of openness and acceptance of the otherness, it very quickly becomes a clear 
presentation of the conditions of the agreement that the newcomer should abide by. 
One of the crucial norms in conditional hospitality is that language is necessary to 
formulate the invitation (Derrida, 2000a, p. 5, 2000b, pp. 17, 53, 135). In The Gift of Death 
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(1996), Derrida notes “The first effect or first destination of language therefore involves 
depriving me of, or delivering me from, my singularity” (p. 60). Once the host speaks, he is no 
longer himself, “alone and unique.” Hence, the language of the host is the code (Derrida, 2000a, 
p. 6, 2000b, p. 139). Using common, understandable vocabulary, both sides may achieve a sense 
of familiarity and security, as desired by family members facing a stranger’s visit. Using 
common vocabulary, the host removes the unfamiliar “otherness” of the invitee out of sight. 
However, Derrida also pointed out that the language should be enforced to the stranger. Making 
the other person use the same language is intended to fill in the terrifying abyss of estrangement, 
to neutralize the separateness of the unknown, of a nameless stranger or foreigner. 
Derrida further points out that there is another type of hospitality that is unconditional 
(Derrida, 2000b, pp. 75–83). This is hospitality based on ignorance; it rejects the codes of rules, 
laws, conventions, and courtesy, to authentically invite the “other” to its house. The host does not 
know—and will not know—whom they give shelter to. Instead, the host should simultaneously 
enter what is unstable, flickering, dynamic, and only ambiguously outlined on the horizon of 
thought. In this way, one can open oneself totally to the unknown, not seeking at all costs to 
understand and domesticate the newcomer. Nonetheless, one waits for the unexpected, the 
ignorance that is to come, à venir. 
Absolute hospitality does not need words; what is more, it shuns them, because 
unconditional hospitality uses the speech of silence. As noted, Derrida thinks that as soon as the 
host starts to speak, to use common vocabulary, use the institution of language, he or she ceases 
to be a stranger, the idiomatic other. “[The one who speaks is] neither a separate entity, nor 
myself any longer” (Marzec, 2011, p. 22). Abandoning a common language, hosts cannot define 
conventions, set conditions for receiving strangers, place restrictions on them, sign contracts with 
them, or ask for compensation for hospitality. 
While it is true that this absolute hospitality without saying a word was more a challenge 
posed to us as “the possibility of the impossible” (Marzec, 2011, p. 22), I propose that this is 
another way of conscious by forgetting through actively performing silence. In the earlier 
section, we witnessed two groups’ political positions that created an obsessive repertoire of 
turning Roh’s memory into objects that stood in a hostile manner to each other. Another 
difficulty is that two memories have gone in parallel without diminishing the trace in time. The 
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desire of remembering Roh met with digital hypomnemata (Stiegler, 2010, p. 85) of 
unforgettability. Of course, the new complexity that the advanced technology brought is not 
merely a total recall. As illustrated in Chapter 1, the question on the possibility of forgetting can 
be more perplexing. However, at least in each groups’ memory-reproductions, with seemingly 
the limitless availability of technology, the images have been reproduced and circulated 
continuously for nearly a decade. With repeated commemorative-practice from both sides, the 
time and the emotion—the feeling of loss for one, and the cynicism for the other—were 
constantly stamped again in the present. The contestation, as not-involving the conversation, 
continues to be re-inscribed in the present. 
As I have discussed in this project, forgetting is a prerequisite of historical life 
(considered in the wholeness of its aspects and width) as the element per excellence that 
contributes to the alleviation of the burden of historical existence. Nietzsche (1997) made this 
argument, using this graphic metaphor: 
All acting requires forgetting, as not only light but also night is required by all organisms. 
A man who would feel everything historically would resemble someone who refrained 
from sleeping, or an animal expected to live only on ruminating and ever repeated 
ruminating. (p. 10) 
If, while much memory will be redeemed, not everything can or should be exchanged, and that 
which cannot be redeemed should be forgotten. The conversation was never placed. If the 
authentic memory were “dismembered” (Connerton, 2008, p. 70) even only temporally, it could 
bring more openness to the horizon, inviting other memories to create a sense of common, 
bonding memories. Although he eventually highlighted the obligation of remembering, Paul 
Ricoeur (2004) proposed the concept of “receding horizons” as complementary to Gadamer’s 
“fusion of horizons,” in an attempt to counterbalance what was the pre-dominant discourse of 
understanding (p. 413). In Ricoeur, suggestive forgetting is not the erasure of memory traces. On 
the contrary, it is the latency of the trace as unconsciously inscribed. Latency as a mode of 
preservation forms the basis for Ricoeur’s notion of forgetting “held in reserve,” l’oubli de 
réserve (p. 428). To him, if an indestructible past may cause a dialogic issue, latency as a mode 
of remaining anticipates the reanimation of traces and evinces the idea of a mind without 
discernible borders. Although he later described his position as the concept of forgetting held in 
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reserve (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 501), at least in his last chapter, Ricouer seemed to suggest that 
forgetting “is a primordial attribute of affections to survive, to persist, to remain, to endure, while 
keeping the mark of absence and distance” (p. 427). 
In contrast to these suggestive conceptualizations, what we witness in Roh’s after-life 
memories is Freud’s (1914) unwavering counter-Nietzschean assumption of forgetting, who said 
it was far from being productive: “Forgetting impressions, scenes or experiences nearly always 
reduces itself to shutting them off” (p. 148). For both mourners and accusers of Roh, with their 
actively reproduced afterlife memory-reproductions, they remained to work simultaneously at 
strengthening their loopholes. A repeatedly circulated and strengthened way of remembering in 
my perspective would not consign this humane mode of forgiving memory to oblivion. For both, 
communicating inside a given territory, using their own language, and being surrounded by 
repetitively reproduced mnemonic discourse, resulted in a closed and haunting interpretation of 
the past in the present. Under this circumstance the memories remained rigid and resilient. Thus, 
unlike Casey’s idealization to public memory, what we can find instead is an inert disavowal, but 
not a contestation. 
Given this, we can understand, in the languages of the two, their dissonance was 
predestined. Instead of making one image to the past after a series of conversations, the 
technologically expanded space created a larger loop to monologues—one is full of sadness, the 
other is full of cynicism. Nonetheless, the result is a memory of Roh that remains prominent in 
many spaces in South Korea, with neither communicative nor aggregated into the same horizon 
of understanding. Also, their repetitive practices circulated online created hard-to-forget traces 
and failed to generate the suspension of emotional unsettlement toward each other. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter depicts how the reproduction of Moo-hyun Roh’s memories from 2010 
remained deinstitutionalized as well as decentered. Focusing on three core objectives, I 
attempted to demonstrate (1) the integration of various modes of memory and (hi)stories of Roh 
after his death, (2) the telling of (hi)stories from an experiential vantage point in order to make 
the past come alive and in doing so, highlighting and celebrating the particular and (3) the 
language of two contesting memories of Roh created two parallel understanding of the past. 
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Rather than emerging differences into one, both parties' remembering practices only strengthened 
the self-affirmative memory which they had. 
With their memory-practices, the language of neither the Ilbe’s nor Roh’s sympathizers 
was open to communication, which many have pointed to as the foremost condition of public 
memory. Repeatedly reproduced Roh’s memories were prevailing in many spaces of South 
Korea. Confirmation bias in remembering Roh by two different parties was widely separated. 
Unlike Casey (2004), who considered basso profundo to be the arch-memory for all other 
collective memory practices, the melody that memories of Roh played during this era remained 
basso continuo, momentarily improvised from minimally given references. 
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Prologue Four. Silence on Display 
One day in late autumn 2017, I stood at the Tongdaegu station waiting for a transfer to the 
Jinyeong station. It would take another hour from there for me to reach my final destination: a 
town called Bongha, the village where Moo-hyun Roh was born and where he died. 
During this trip I was presented with many small mysteries. For example, I could not find 
any rational explanation of why such a small town would have a station on a train line with the 
most luxurious stops. Some argued that the three small cities combined – Jinyeong, Bongha, and 
Kimhae – generated a fair number of passengers; however, the station only serves about 47,000 
people, which is far less than the other stations (Tongdaegu, for instance, has a population of 2.5 
million). The rumor was that Jinyeong had a station on that line because Bongha is located 
nearby. In fact, a parliament member proposed changing the name of the station to “Roh Moo-
hyun Station” after Roh’s death, a motion that no other members would visibly support (Kim, 
2010). 
Another mystery is that instead of displaying the locality (which would not be unusual for 
a South Korean rail station), Jinyeong station chose to decorate their building in a muted fashion, 
with abundant greys and blues in keeping with the design scheme of the railroad corporation. 
There was no mention at the station about the nearby towns or the most famous figure from 
Bongha, Moo-hyun Roh. There was only one small photograph (about 10 by 12 inches) of the 
late president’s restored home hanging in an odd place — in front of the men’s restroom. I have 
no words to explain why there was only one picture, and why that picture was hanging in this 
particular spot.  
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Figure 12. A picture of Moo-Hyun Roh’s old home in front of the men’s restroom. Bongha, 
South Korea. October 26, 2017. 
Silence dominated Bongha. On the way to the town, some memories were violently ruled 
out from the display. Sometimes memories appeared in unexpected places, like the picture in 
front of the toilet, while at other times there was complete taciturnity, like the taxi driver who 
took me to the village. When I climbed into the cab, I told him, “Please take me to Bongha,” and 
he neither answered my request nor said a word during our short journey. A quiet taxi-drive is 
somewhat rare in Korean culture. Instead of talking, I saw his eyes scanning me through the 
rearview mirror two or three times. 
Was this because of Moo-hyun Roh, a liberal candidate in one of South Korea’s most 
conservative regions? Did the taxi driver feel as though asking him to drive to Bongha – 
although it was his job – was akin to asking him which side he was on? In that case, going to 
Bongha after nine years would say something about me. The driver answered to my “going” by 
his silence. 
In Bongha, some spoken memories were even intended to be eternal, like the pavestones 
in the graveyard. It is said that upon the construction of his tomb, Roh Moo-Hyun’s foundation 
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asked for donations from people who wanted to carve a message and 15,000 requests were 
solicited (Song, 2009). There was some guidance provided for choosing a message on the 
carving (the foundation rejected any messages if they were religious, prayers for fortune, or 
swore revenge); many included terms like “resurrection” and “Maitreya (bodhisattva).” In the 
graveyard, a gigantic black flagpole stood, hoisting the national flag. Interviewers asked tourists 
whether they would return if the town had a bigger museum. 
 
Figure 13. The pavement outside Roh Moo-Hyun’s tomb. Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 
2017. 
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Figure 14. A pavestone in the graveyard that reads “Come live again to the mind of the 
commoner.” Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017. 
Behind what was spoken, there was an absence that one could easily sense. While all the 
visitors were able to identify where the Roh’s death site, the site erased any sign of how he died. 
There was no mark of “Owl’s Rock” in the legend, nor in the tourist map. Climbing up to the 
cliff, an official fence with barbed-wire had a sign that said, “By the order of Gimhae Police 
Station, entering this area is forbidden.” That wall stood to make his death materially, 
symbolically, and ritually empty, vacant, and, void. It involved the scattering or diasporization of 
memory.  
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Figure 15. The wall which prevents access Owl’s Rock. Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017. 
Silence was not all I found there. On that day, with clear sky and humming birds flitting 
nearby, I stood near the wall, watching as a few tourists came and went. The prohibition created 
a shared silence between us, but, in a sense, it gave us a thrill too. It was as if we were having a 
silent conversation about how and why he died through surreptitious glances and clandestine 
expressions, much like my non-conversation with the taxi driver. In our shared silence, memories 
which had been passed over, unnamed, unmarked, not built up as taboo places, found a brief 
moment to come to the surface, as if our quietness were a ritual act. Standing there was our ritual 
for the memories of Roh. But it was for breaking the curse. Instead, I felt, it was to be haunted by 
the memories of his life after the death. 
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Chapter Four: Talking to the Small Tableau - Indebtedness and Obligation in Bongha 
Introduction — Entering to Bongha 
 Ironically located in the deep south of South Korea,21 a small suburban town named 
Bongha is a living museum of Roh’s memory. Designed as a place that can put Roh’s past to rest 
and imagine the future, the village, where his birthplace as well as the place of death occurred, 
serves following an enduring tradition of archival sites as the prosthetics of our creating the  
oblivious. Every year, a million people dressed in black and holding a chrysanthemum try not to 
laugh out loud, while travelling to this remote town to access such memories (Lee, 2017). 
Visitors perform, by walking through the streets and standing before Roh’s graveyard, 
constructing the experience so the “lived present holds a past and a future within its thickness” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 321). 
For Roh’s supporters, visiting Bongha is desirable for confirming their cultural memories 
that are juxtaposed with media spectacle as well as with their unsettled emotions. From the time 
when the town gains media attention as a background for Roh’s rise and fall, and when those 
images are reproduced repeatedly in the media, Bongha co-presents with Moo-hyun Roh his 
activity, his speech, and his death. Like the tourists whom I encountered during my field trip, a 
million may have wanted to confirm their memories, like with any other popular destinations: 
I feel like Bongha is my second home. I once visited here when Roh was alive. Back then 
if you were lucky, you could meet him. I was not that lucky enough, but I remember this 
field, rice pads and birds, all of this scenery here. As soon as I saw the town on TV when 
he was gone, I just could not sit at home; so I came to this town at that day, too. Including 
those trips, today will be my fourth or fifth time to be here. I feel secure as well as 
melancholy when I come here. I will meet Roh (pay my tribute) and go back home 
shortly. — Interviewee A 
                                               
21 Not just geographically, but the region is also well-known as one of the most politically 
conservative areas in South Korea. 
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In the landscape of Bongha, there are invisible but notably present codes of remembering, which 
delineate certain performativity to the place’s visitors. For describing Roh’s death, the word has 
been carefully replaced with “passed away,” rather than signifying what could be a more 
accurate way of death, such as suicide. Mourners, in many cases unknown to each other, take a 
picture at the same place standing in the same pose. This shared code is also applied to their 
oblivious gesture: no one dares to speak about what is absent on the wall of the museum, 
explaining why and how he died. Additionally, visitors share a desire to climb up the owl’s rock 
while sharing the silence, as if they are adventuring into the forbidden place. That is, in the 
village, they perform with Moo-hyun Roh’s most glorified memory intersecting with their past. 
They see the desired present from this crossroad and predict the future with certainty, but only by 
mere and selective memories, which they believe they have just witnessed. 
To engage the dimensions of the most contemporary mode of memories in the ways 
Roh’s memory can interact with South Koreans, in this chapter I will draw attention to the 
memory performance of the site of commemoration which prescribes specific modes of behavior 
to the place. Chapter 4 has two aims. First, I will attempt to demonstrate how the town 
functioned as a large scale of memory-depositif. There was a clear irony to build this town as a 
memorial site, which was directly contradictory to the late president’s last wish. My other goal in 
the second part of this essay will illustrate how the visitors’ performativity has been drawn to the 
space of commemoration. I will use my personal experience as well as observe the materials 
which the other visitors produced. The chapter will concentrate exclusively on those aspects of 
significance and relevance in people’s remembering of Roh, and what forgetting allows them as 
recourse to a past, through which, I suspect, it provides the feeling of indebtedness. 
 “Only a small tableau” — Museumification of Bongha 
Social place of commemoration 
 After reading Chapter 1, we by now understand that remembrance is not a simple 
restoration of the memorized object; anamnesis is engaged with the subject’s acknowledgement 
as awakening. To create the moment of awakening, ironically, forgetting is required because 
memory has the unusual characteristic of contracting the past, of compressing a massive wealth 
of material into the temporal present (Benjamin, 2002, p. 481 (K15, 1)). This opens up an even 
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broader sense of memory-recollection: “Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration 
pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad” 
(Benjamin, 1968, pp. 262–263). For this moment, remembrance holds the future open by 
paradoxically looking to the past, as not yet-unleashed and unrealized possibilities. 
However, contemporary commemorations did not plan for such an experience, that of an 
open-text. The forms and modes of public commemoration include not only public gatherings, 
ceremonies, and media events, but also artifacts like ordered material, prizes, books, films, and 
exhibits. Even more, a cemetery is understood as the place where the dead rests, that is, as the 
space of our socio-culturally defined ways of remembering and dealing with the past in the 
present (Vanderstraeten, 2014). Furthermore, we commemorate the dead not privately or quietly. 
Instead, we do so publicly and visibly, so that what we do (or not do) can be noticed by the 
public (Durkheim, 1995, pp. 49–58). Mourners, by this mnemonic practice, “experience a past 
that is collectively commemorated not collectively experienced” (Bavidge, 2013, p. 321). As Jay 
Winter (1995) wrote, memorials “were built, as places where people could mourn. And be seen 
to mourn” (p. 93). Cemeteries are places which were already carved out of the natural 
environment. The artifacts that make up a cemetery reveal underlying social and cultural 
sensitivities. 
 “A small tableau” committee 
 The same understanding and intention can be found in the museumification in Bongha for 
Roh’s collective memory. The small town, where Moo-hyun Roh was born in 1946 and his 
coming-back location after the end of his term in 2008, is intended to be a symbolic space. A 
year after his suicide, which happened at a rocky hill called Owl’s Rock behind his house, Roh’s 
graveyard was erected in the same town. Roh could have been buried in the national cemetery as 
the former president of the nation. There were some other dramatic moments in his life that 
occurred elsewhere, such as in Seoul or Busan, where he began his career as a humanitarian 
lawyer. Nevertheless, Bongha remained the most palpable location of his memory in the nation.  
He famously wished not to be remembered. In the note he left before his purposeful 
death, Roh specified how he wanted to be buried: “I want to be cremated. And only leave a small 
tableau nearby my home” (2009b). Given the fact that cremation still “remained something of a 
social taboo” (Park, 2010, p. 22), this wish resonated with his other last writing. Admitting that 
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his family members violated the law, he noted that his life should be forgotten: “You should 
forget me. You should step forward after me. No longer can I be a symbol of the value which you 
should protect” (Roh, 2009a). Not having a tomb may also be, along with his choice of suicide, 
reflective of his moving into oblivion. 
Against Roh’s wishes, what followed after his national funeral was the museumification 
of Bongha. Soon after his suicide, a group of famous architects, art historians, and cultural critics 
organized what was named “a small tableau committee.” By them, Roh’s graveyard was 
designed to be far more extensive than “a small tableau” that Roh wished for. In the letter to Roh 
as a statement of finishing the construction, the chairman of “a tiny tableau committee,” 
Hongchun Yu (2010) cried: 
Have you seen in heaven the tide of mourning for your death by people? …. Which 
sentence has written such mournful grief, and which artist has shown such a magnificent 
installation art? If the mind of the people is this way, how is it to leave only one “small 
tableau”? We decided not to make monuments. Instead, we decided to leave this 
unforgettable memorial scene as a space of history that can be forever remembered. (Yu, 
2010) 
As promised in Yu’s emotional speech, architect H-Sang Seung designed Roh’s graveyard 
to make a timely, vivid, and memorable experience. In the post-construction note, Seung recalled 
that Roh’s graveyard aimed to be a “landscape of experiencing the sublime and telling a narrative 
about life and death.” His design referenced other prominent figures’ sanctuaries such as 
“Gandhi, … Lenin and Mao Zedong’s,” where collective commemoration was centered and yet 
imagined identity to their nation-state was mediated (Seung, 2010). By his hand, the cemetery 
occupies now up to 4000 square yards, and an 80 x 80 x 15 inch stone lays at the middle. To get 
there visitors have to walk down a path which leads them slightly below the ground level; by this 
trick, if one looks into in the distance, Roh’s grave appears to be a small tombstone. However, 
once visitors get close to it, there sits a giant flat dolmen (Seung, 2010). “Anyway, it is a tableau. 
It is a [tomb]stone,” Yu replied to the reporters who asked whether this was not what Roh wanted 
(Nomuhyŏnjaedan, 2009). The tombstone, as well as the other space, for sure, was not to be 
forgotten but remembered. 
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Figure 16. Roh’s “tableau,” Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017. 
As a result, Bongha in 2017 possesses various mnemonic apparatuses, and these guide 
the reciprocal exigencies of visitors as they participate in the memories, that is, in the imaginary 
and various mediatized, scripted, and embodied mnemonic performances. The village — as the 
place in reality as well as a much mediatized place — provides such an experience to its visitors. 
As the birthplace as well as the death place, it is clear that Bongha is entangled with a living, 
highly mediated, and material past. 
The design to follow a narrative 
 Being already carved out of the natural environment (Durkheim, 1995, pp. 49–58), 
Bongha easily fits what is called a heritage. A heritage, Vida Bajc (2006) explained, is “a 
medium through which cultural and historical particularity and distinctiveness can be 
constructed, and then attributed to a particular place and its people as distinctive from all others” 
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(p. 11). Bongha is a cultural place of memory, where specific kinds of environments and precise 
objects are arranged to make them conducive to visitors’ awareness of the experience of a 
particular narrative. As multiple scholars clarify, a location as such associates how these objects 
and their narratives are exhibited, displayed, enacted, and otherwise interpreted, and they 
facilitate a relation, a link between the tourists and that which is being remembered (Casey, 
2000; Edensor, 1998; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 2005). 
Bongha was designed to guide visitors to identify a narrative from selective memories out 
of Roh’s life. Currently, the village consists of a restored house of Roh’s old home, his late-
home, a museum, a memorial park, a graveyard, and a souvenir shop. Although the village is 
located on open land, the architectural design makes visitors’ movement flow to deliver a 
coherent experience that represents his life story in chronological order. To illustrate, for the 
usual sequence of visits, from the only bus-stop of the village, visitors enter the site by 
encountering Roh’s old home, which is a restored thatched hut made of mud.22 After the souvenir 
shop, there is the house where he lived until his last day, now publicly accessible. Across from 
the house, there is a museum that displays Roh’s glorious past, such as the days when he was a 
famous humanitarian lawyer and when he won the presidential election. The black and white 
pictures, the posters of elections, and supporters’ letters to him are on display. Then, as the final 
destination of this short pilgrimage, visitors arrive at the graveyard located right below Owl’s 
Rock, the nationally acclaimed mountain-hill where Roh threw himself off the cliff. The 
experience of this sequence sketches a narration, which is one of the first endeavors of tourism 
(Bendix, 2002). 
                                               
22 Roh’s old home was already undergoing restoration by the local government to make 
the town a tourist attraction. 
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Figure 17. The map of Bongha (Bongha, South Korea). October 26, 2017. 
Indeed, as the most famous narrative of Roh originated from the noje (Chapter 2), some 
of the crucial scenes of his life remained in silence. Roh’s memory is revealed in accordance to 
the already popularized route of remembrance, such as the erection of the landscape that 
highlights such moments as his humble birth, life as a humanitarian lawyer, a dramatic 
presidential election, and his death spectacle; they are actively practiced in silence. Here, Roh’s 
memory is (re)enforced as the symbol of anti-dictatorship. Like other examples of collective 
memorial sites, the expectations that visitors bring to the cultural places of memory are shaped 
through a shared past and articulated through familiar narrative and particular symbolic 
expressions. 
Display of mediatized memories 
 Many memories from visitors seemed to rely on what has been mediatized. Although the 
tourists were visiting the place to confirm and witness the landscape, what they were seeing had 
already been dominated by the impact of mediatized memories. Sabine Marscha (2012) confirms 
that memory can be “a […] decisive factor in people’s travel choice” (p. 323). Regarding our 
choices, she points out, the experience of a landscape can be exclusively under the expectations 
from preexisting knowledge. In fact, “experience” should be closely related to memory itself 
(Erll, 2011, p. 111). As Kember and Zylinska (2015) argued, media not only creates 
representations of the world but is involved in “enacting” or “performing” the social-ecological 
world. This approach to the relationality of mediation, social practice, and the environment 
echoes recent moves toward more-than-representational theories that draw attention to the 
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interplay of discourse, the effect, and the embodied performances of humans and non-human 
nature (Nash, 2000). 
Media images of Bongha circulated through various media sources, even before the death 
of Roh. It was known that Roh was from the area, but the specific location was not popular until 
his retirement. For 15 months after Roh’s return, the images of the village began to become 
popular throughout the country. For the first year until early 2009, Bongha was on the Internet 
showing Roh’s retirement life, such as bicycling with his grandchild or sliding from the hill. 
Then from February 2009, when the prosecutor’s investigation began, the press pictured all the 
corners of his hometown to find any glimpse of Roh’s reaction to the charges. Even Roh asked 
the press to be a bit prudent. There was one rumor televised on the TV news that his family 
members “dumped” an expensive watch at a rice pad, and people used to talk about visiting there 
to find that abandoned treasure (Chosun Ilbo, 2009). 
Then, when his suicide happened, the media brought the reality of death rather too close 
for comfort. The last shot of his presumptive presence in the ambulance and the Owl’s Rock 
behind his house were repeatedly and widely circulated in the media. Considerable coverage was 
given to how Roh’ s death had attracted the attention of the media itself. It was reported that the 
news was covered even in Japan, China, and the U.S. Shortly thereafter, the media began to 
prepare for his funeral, and one of the hottest topics of speculation was the question of when and 
where the funeral would be held. Additionally, the grief of mourners received extensive 
coverage. Mourners of all ages were interviewed across the country, but one of the main 
spectacles was an endless line of people in Bongha, gathered from everywhere. Many seemed 
deeply upset about what had happened and wanted to attend the various events arranged to 
celebrate Roh’s life there. His death had mobilized the masses, and Bongha became the center of 
mediatized spectacle. 
In the present day, some of the memory-artifacts in museumified Bongha are deliberately 
associated with selective mediatized memory. For instance, visitors are able to see a bicycle in a 
museum that can be readily identifiable as the one in a famous picture of Roh with his 
grandchild. A straw hat and farming clothes are also symbolic representation of mediated 
memory. Furthermore, selective scenes from movies and documentaries are present, and visitors 
may conjure up mediatized memories. Explicitly, for instance, the museum displays a memorable 
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quote from the famous film Pyŏnhoin (2013), saying “(from this moment) I will not live 
cowardly,” which he spoke to the victims of the state’s violence in 1981. 
In Bongha, tourists become secondary witnesses to Roh’s life up to his suicide. Artifacts 
and displays in the landscape secure “a” collective memory. Experiencing places falls into a 
matter of experiencing mediations, and physical encounters reactivate a series of mediated 
memories (Bærenholdt, Haldrup, Larsen, & Urry, 2004; Crouch, Jackson, & Thompson, 2005; 
Lagerkvist, 2013). This is what Astrid Erll (2009) termed “premediation,” that is, “the use of 
existent patterns and paradigms to transform contingent events into meaningful images and 
narratives” (p. 114). While she used as examples the colonial wars that premediated the 
experience of the First World War, which in turn became a model for understanding the Second 
World War, Erll (2009) also highlighted; “but it is not only representations of earlier events that 
shape our understanding and remembrance of later events. Media which belong to more remote 
cultural spheres, such as art, mythology, religion or law, can exert great power as premediators 
too” (p. 111). Likewise, in Bongha, coherently designed experience that affords a visceral, 
emotive and imaginative sense in visitors of having traveled in time—both forward and 
backward—with some invisible absences. Visitors are encouraged to relive, “remember,” and 
replay a particular past simultaneously. 
Touring the indebtedness — (Re)experiencing emotional unsettlement 
Mediating the code of self and emotion 
One mourner reported, “It was just regrettable that he’s gone like that. I do feel that now 
too” (Interviewee B). Another responded, “I am sorry that we cannot protect him; we could not 
save him from that pitfall…. Whenever I came here, I feel that and found myself tearing” 
(Interviewee A). There has been a discussion incited by an enigma: Why do particular gestures 
come so easily to visitors in certain memorial settings? How do visitors know how to easily, 
almost effortlessly, acclimatize to the memorial sites and engage in gestures and behavior there? 
Does mediation or the media have anything to do with the emotion visitors feel in the memorial 
place, or does the space itself set off these feelings (cf. Assmann, 2011, p. 281; cf. Treib, 2009)? 
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For Edward Casey (2000), being in a place means to be situated and oriented concerning 
where we are in the world and what kind of memories can be attached to the objects we see 
around us (pp. 181–210). To be located in a place means to be sheltered, held, and contained by a 
boundary which encloses us so that our awareness is not dispersed in time or beyond the 
horizons of that place (Heidegger, 1971). A place that allows us to be held within it acts as a grid 
with points of attachment onto which particular memories can be connected. In addition, the act 
of attaching a particular kind of image or narrative to one specific object transforms the 
experience of imagining that narrative into the experience of reliving the story. According to the 
explanation by Bajc (2006), for tourism, such places are cultural environments created through 
the effort to preserve particular objects and arrange them in place in such a way as to invite 
particular memories and discourage others. The experience of being in such a position can 
subsequently be revisited in one’s mind through a narrative order that follows the recalling of the 
order of objects in that place. 
At the heart of the questions posed above, there is a problem that has long been of 
concern to sociologists and anthropologists; it boils down to the relationship between structure 
and agency or between scenario and performance/ritual. In one of the defining works by Erving 
Goffman (1956), he noted that the social world functions as a scene, where social roles are 
performed according to customary scenarios that adhere to specific inner regions. Here the 
experience of visiting Bongha occurs through what Goffman called “teamwork” (Goffman, 1956, 
pp. 77-105). In other words, memory agents work together to produce, recall, and re-enact an 
imagined past. These memory practices are non-commemorative forms of social memory 
(Schudson, 1997) in the sense that they are not always consciously keeping the past alive; yet 
this is the result of those residues of the past within us, the hauntologies of both the spatial 
imaginary and of the place itself. As Goffman (1956) put it, “A given social front tends to 
become institutionalized, in terms of the general stereotyped expectations to which it gives rise, 
and tends to take on a meaning and stability apart from the specific tasks which happen at the 
time to be performed in its name. The front becomes a ‘collective representation’ and a fact in its 
own right” (Goffman, 1956, p. 27). 
There is, however, something more in seeing Bongha than just visiting a media spectacle. 
By deciding to visit there, not just to witness a sensational site itself, the journey the tourists take 
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is also involved with their sense of self. Previous researchers (Coman, 2011, p. 284; Doss, 1999; 
Rojek, 2001) of celebrity studies argue that the famous, such as Elvis Presley or Michael 
Jackson, should be perceived as having iconic abilities, and thus the potential to satisfy spiritual 
needs and respond to personal notions of what we could call contemporary piety (see also 
Macklin, 2005). Pilgrimage as an example of mediatized ritual practice can thus be interpreted as 
a replacement strategy that promises order, meaning, and solidarity (all essential functions of 
ritual) among the devoted (e.g., the fans) in an era when traditional institutions such as world 
religions no longer carry out these functions (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). Here, media 
audiences can actively contribute to producing completely new ritual practices that then become 
mediatized rituals. Also, understanding Bongha visitors as the fan base may confirm the easiness 
of their emotional reaction to the place. 
Not delivering just a single narrative that is being displayed, Bongha also allows an 
immensely emotional experience for its tourists. During my second trip, I witnessed visitors’ 
expectations of a narration. They attempted to write down their experience into a predestined 
route. The emotions of the visitors were followed by the changes in sites, which was designed by 
Roh’s life story. Here, tourists did not dare to juggle their actual experience against the promised 
experiences that have been paid for. When they arrived at Roh’s old house, people smiled, took 
pictures, talked about old lifestyles, and found Roh’s home was no different from their own. In 
the museum, they listened to his speech and identified with the nostalgic atmosphere. At the 
tombstone, they were speechless, spending a considerable amount of time reading carved 
messages in the paved stones. Some offered a mum, which they bought at the gate of the village. 
In Owl’s Rock, they acted as if facing a secret; many were muffled to speak to each other. On the 
20 minute trip to Owl’s Rock, they also kept a certain level of silence. 
Another clue to the singularity of touring memory can be found in the use of cameras. 
Taking photographs is common practice as people are at tourist destinations. On one hand, 
tourists have shared identically similar frames of pictures. Figure 18-20 and Figure 21 and 22 are 
pictures taken at distinct times by different tourists. The homogenized reproduction of images by 
visitors might symbolize that their touring experiences remained somewhat mechanical. 
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Figure 18. Roh’s old home 1 (Cjnews, 2009). 
 
Figure 19. Roh’s old home 2 (Kwangbaek’o, 2011). 
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Figure 20. Roh’s old home 3 (Namch’ŏn’gang, 2009). 
 
Figure 21. Pavestone 1 (Kŭlbinmoe Kimgwangsan, 2010). 
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Figure 22. Pavestone 2 (P’eiji, 2013). 
However, there are other notable behaviors. Specifically, during multiple visits to the 
memorials, I observed no posed photos with friends or family smiling at the lens, which is still 
the most common facial reaction before any lens. If tourists were to take such pictures, they 
would no doubt earn disapproving looks from fellow tourists. The context of the site is part of 
the photographic experience. The setting is so loaded with significance that something as 
common as taking a picture can engender introspection, if not in the tourist with the camera, then 
in other tourists observing the scene. 
As if there were an authentic attitude to the site, visitors participated in what is a dynamic 
memory of Roh. When they take the picture, when they cry for the late president, and when they 
read the messages on the paving stones, their reactions are somewhat coherent and almost 
unified. In Bongha, visitors seemed to behave as if their role was that of inheritors. They acted as 
“the agents of memory” (Vinitzky-Seroussi, 2002) who take the lead in complex decisions about 
what is to be forgotten and what must be remembered. Moreover, tourists remind themselves to 
dress appropriately, speak softly, and not to call unwanted attention to themselves. They 
reproduce Bongha, in cooperation with the place’s apparatus, as being indexed through mediated 
memories; knowledge from the memories identifies the tourists’ relationship to codes of conduct 
that tourist sites enunciate (Reynolds, 2016). In Richard Meyer’s (1993) explanation, “Far more 
than … space … set aside for the burial of the dead, cemeteries are … open texts, there to be 
read … by anyone who takes the time to learn … their special language” (p. 3; see also 
Vanderstraeten, 2014). 
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Visiting the site where one can find his/her own emotional debt 
 Furthermore, a visitor’s journey also may be about dealing with his or her sense of 
obligation. In Memory, History, Forgetting, Paul Ricoeur (2004) elaborated on his conception of 
social cohesion and collective memory: “It is only by analogy, and in relation to individual 
consciousness and its memory, that collective memory is held to be a collection of traces left by 
the events that have affected the course of the history of the groups concerned, and that it is 
accorded the power to place on stage these common memories, on the occasion of holidays, rites 
and public celebrations” (p. 119). This analogical relation between individuals and groups comes 
to expression in the two principal categories of analysis of memory that Ricoeur (2004) adopted: 
on the one hand, the moral category of the “debt” (p. 89) and of the “obligation to remember” 
(p. 88); on the other hand, the psychological concept of the “work of memory” modeled on 
psychoanalytic therapy (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 88). 
Such obligations and the feeling of indebtedness had been dominant from the moment 
when the suicide was announced on TV nationwide, as we already observed in Chapter 2. 
Visiting Bongha may originate from visitors’ this sense of duty. This duty may be instigated by 
the emotional unsettlement called Han, that is Nietzschean ressentiment as we discussed earlier 
in Chapters 2 and 3. That unsettlement was represented in noje, enabling Roh to be an irresistible 
but ironic martyr of the 21st century, a symbol of the democratic movement in post-democratic 
South Korean politics. That indebtedness was carved with different languages on the pavement 
stones in Bongha. There, they inscribed their regrets, guilt, and wishes to be forgiven. The 
indebtedness was also displayed as religious language, asking for Roh’s resurrection (Figures 23-
25). 
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Figure 23. “Come alive to the heard of the People” (Mincho). Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 
2017. 
 
Figure 24. “Moohyun Roh, the Buddha!” Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017. 
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Figure 25. “To our baby: please remember him.” Bongha, South Korea. October 26, 2017. 
In an earlier mentioned book, Ricoeur (1999) situated the duty to remember as a 
relationship between the past, present, and future. He wrote, “[t]he duty to remember consists not 
only in having a deep concern for the past, but in transmitting the meaning of the past to the next 
generation” (p. 9). The duty to remember is less of a forced or enforceable mandate than an 
obligation to be responsible to and for the dead. He also notes that the work of memory and 
mourning is an “exercise in telling otherwise, and also in letting others tell their history, 
especially the founding events which are the ground of a collective memory” (Ricoeur, 1999, p. 
9). Ricoeur casts the responsible use of memory in terms of a debt to the past in which we 
recognize an obligation to preserve and take up the unfulfilled hopes and broken promises that 
others have made in our name, as well as accept responsibility for our forbearers’ actions that 
resulted in the unredeemed suffering of others, so that their suffering can be underlined 
otherwise. 
We can suspect that the reason the mourners went through their emotional journey to 
Bongha is to forgive. By forgetting a partial life of Roh, by covertly silencing his twisted years, 
they may attempt to forgive him, as well as themselves. This is forgiving otherwise. Again, 
Ricoeur (1996) developed his notion of forgiving as follow: “Forgiveness is a specific form of 
the revision of the past … a specific form of that mutual revision, the most precious result of 
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which is the liberation of promises of the past which have not been kept” (p. 9). Forgiving 
complements the exchange of memories in that it is an exchange of memories of suffering—both 
those inflicted and those endured. Ricoeur claimed that it is through this exchange that the “debt” 
can be shattered. This shattering of the debt, owed on account of suffering inflicted, lifts a burden 
that has driven a person or a community into isolation; it is not the abolition of the debt and 
certainly not its forgetting. Rather, forgiveness consists in lifting the pain of the debt (Ricoeur, 
1996, p. 10). Hence, forgiveness can be linked to the gift: “I want to consider the particular 
structure of the dilemmas of forgiveness along with the difficulties that result from extending the 
problematic of forgiveness to a model of exchange tied to the concept of the gift. The etymology 
and the semantics of numerous languages encourage this comparison: don-pardon, gift-forgiving, 
dono-perdono, Geben-Vergeben” (Ricoeur, 2004, pp. 479–480). Forgiveness, realized through 
the exchange of memories of suffering, has the poetic power to change the past in the present. 
Ricoeur offered various examples of such moments of forgiveness which do not annihilate the 
past but rather release a community from the shackles of the past into the freedom of imagining a 
new future: Willy Brandt at Warsaw or Sadat in Jerusalem. These events are not part of the 
political order and are not “institutional” as such. Rather, they take on meaning due to their 
“exceptional character” (Ricoeur, 2004, pp. 477–478). In essence, the events effectively rupture 
an existing political order, creating something new in political space.  
Given this understanding of the memory-dispositif in Bongha and their practitioners, the 
visitors are negotiated in the interplay between the social and individual organization of memory. 
On one hand, Bongha is designed to function as delivering a single narrative centered with a 
heroic image of Roh, who is martyrized. On the other hand, the visitors’ indebtedness makes 
them coordinate their behavior, spontaneously silencing the past. This is “a process of co-
narration, a social process of telling and enacting in which teller and listener are not stable and 
permanent positions but moments of an interplay whose outcome remains open” (Brockmeier, 
2002, p. 35). 
The tourists attempt to intertwine this performative narrative with Roh’s graveyard. They 
attempt to forgive Roh as well as to be forgiven by him by acting with coded practices. Although 
Bongha as a memory-dispositif attempted not to include Roh’s end, the absence of signs did not 
make them forget why and how he died. Apparently this is what the landscape of Bongha 
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suggests: signs of absence and of something missing, ciphers of a void that cannot even be filled 
by memory, and traces of an attempt of forgetting through forgiving. If Bongha’s original design 
was to establish a specific narrative as a particular sign system, a semiotic order, what the 
visitors actually made is a narrative as a performative or discursive order. In their mind, they 
would meet Roh as neither a sinner nor a forgiver, but as the one who shared similar burdens 
before the brutality of the contemporary time. As Ricoeur (2004) thought, forgetting is always 
more than a dysfunction of memory, or the purging of memory at will from unpleasant and 
disturbing contents and the consequent creation of some “happy memory” through the exercise 
of the ars oblivionis (p. 413). For the visitors, Bongha may be the place of forgiving, as the most 
elevated form of forgetting, where they can leave only “happy memor[ies]” behind. 
Conclusion 
 The tour to Bongha aligns the reconfirmation of mediatized memory with physical 
performativity. Indeed, this performativity of memory also captures how performances and re-
enactments may occur in a variety of ways and without any given finale. They are in this sense 
unpredictable, since both performances and performed spaces are complex and uncertain 
(Gregson & Rose, 2000). Diana Taylor’s (2003) concept of the scenario works as an intermediary 
between the archive and the repertoire. Taylor suggested that some cultural memories may be 
non-verbalized, and yet they are invoked in certain settings and situations: they belong to the 
scenario. Taylor further stresses that the intriguing aspect about the scenario is that it “predates 
the script and allows for many possible ‘endings’” (p. 28). Taylor also defined the scenario as 
open to the radical possibility of change, critique, and detachment. The performances are defined 
as reflecting particular pre-established behaviors in social situations and everyday life, repeated 
individually or collectively. Repetition and reiteration are probably the keys for thoroughly 
understanding memory practices. In Bongha, we can suppose by constituting themselves through 
stylized repetitions of acts (Butler, 1988), the mourners reenact a mythic presence of Roh’s 
memory and identity as followers of his legacy. This aspect, which relates to learning, refers to 
what Henri Lefebvre (2004) discerned through the notion of training: “To enter into a society, a 
group, a nationality is to accept values (that are taught), to learn a trade by following the right 
channels, but also to bend oneself (to be bent) to its ways” (p. 39). 
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The willingness of surrender to given performativity may have arisen from the mourners’ 
feeling of indebtedness to Roh, as well as the collective sense of obligation to remember him. 
Seemingly, the act of atonement and engaging in a pilgrimage to this remote town, played with 
the pre-given memories of Roh. Their coordinated performative practices incorporated with 
explicit memory-depositif as well as implicit silence. The feeling of obligation guided such 
behaviors at the site, and by this, they dreamed that Roh memories would be transferred to South 
Korean collectives as shared memory. In this case, supplementing Connerton’s deliberations on 
how societies remember, memories may be conceived of as “awaiting” a remembering agent to 
become activated (cf. (Bærenholdt et al., 2004; Erll & Nünning, 2010; Möckel-Rieke, 1998). 
Thus, through embodied practice in certain settings, mediated memories become alive and 
significant. 
Some questions should remain unanswered. Can a collective memory that has been re-
scripted provide an epicenter to the social movement cohesively? In the previous chapter, we 
mentioned already that there were different perspectives about Roh that noticed inner 
contradiction and mocked such blindness. Can this collectiveness be sustainable? The answers to 
these questions cannot be known yet. Perhaps Roh, as in the other cases (cf. Basu, 2012; Rigney, 
2012), can survive over the period of collectiveness by transforming its shape and territory. 
Alternatively, he can be entered into oblivion in the near future, which would ultimately be the 
fulfillment of Moo-hyun Roh’s last wish. 
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Conclusion 
 
This final chapter discusses the overall findings of this dissertation. 
Summary of the Previous Chapters 
This work is the first to analyze much of the vast body of Roh memory representations, which is 
an important step for understanding how he is understood by those within his country, caught 
among multiple scenes of remembering and forgetting. 
Over the course of the different chapters of this dissertation, we traversed extensive 
territory, guided by Roh’s memory. I used various instances of the presence of Roh’s memory 
over the period from 2009 to 2015 to highlight how the memory of this same figure can be 
shifted and forgotten by changes in temporal perspective. Each chapter was intended to 
contribute to the philosophical basis of the concept of collective memory, delimiting the scope of 
this concept in relation to active forgetting. This is also intended to depict living examples of 
covert silence about contradictory images of Roh from the past. The exploration of many faces in 
a single case has allowed us to shed light on complex processes of remembering and forgetting, 
which are implied in the intertwining of temporality and media technology so frequently 
discussed. 
The initial premise of this dissertation was that an ongoing remembering and forgetting is 
underway of Moo-hyun Roh’s memory, as it is held in various modes by South Korea. The 
cultural memory of Roh is composed of a tangle of medial, temporal, and political relations, 
revolving around his personage. South Koreans invest him with certain identities, and in turn, he 
provides transformation and proliferation of those identities. Most notably, memory as such is 
composed in good part as forgetting: remembering via dispositif and the identities it produces 
change over time. On the one hand, memories must always be anchored in the past; in this case, 
the other figures of the minjung movement form a “fixed point” of cultural memory (Assmann, 
1995, p. 129). On the other hand, those identities that are linked to the imagined nation that are 
generated are more hallucinatory. The memories of Roh are multiple and, what is more, 
thoroughly contradictory. 
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In Chapter One, I argued that forgetting should be regarded as a lens for interpreting 
memory and temporality. The work of several philosophers on memory was examined, and it 
was recalled that anamnesis is categorized as remembering tied now to action. In this 
remembering, forgetting is not a bankruptcy of human capability, but the product of a time which 
often entails that parts of the past be omitted. Here, oblivion, as we imagined it existing in 
remembering, is a way of molding one's identity as well as giving oneself a greater degree of 
choice in the flux between selective tradition and the sense of now. As Martin Heidegger (2004, 
p. 140, 2008) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1997) suggest, forgetting is the process of forging the 
realization of now-time behind a perceptive yesterday. 
The later part of that chapter explores the possible meanings of the fact that contemporary 
media technology has the power to reshape our ways of remembering and forgetting. 
Contemporary new technology is rooted in digital hypomnemata (Stiegler, 2010, p. 85), meaning 
that, on the one hand, we can more easily remember by inscribing and recall by re-accessing our 
memories. However, this cannot secure complete recollection of the past, as changes impose 
other issues onto our sense of the timeline. Instead of there now being a completely linear time, 
we now possess plural time spaces. Thanks to this plurality, I argue, the sense of now is blurred 
and is no longer a singularity. In a way that techno-positivists do not recognize, thanks to the 
new hypomnemata, we are as likely to forget the past as the present. 
This theoretical excursion brought us to a point where we could begin to understand the 
way Roh was memorialized in May 2009, in particular, the noje ceremony, not as to efface him 
but to remember him in a different way, which was the core of Chapter Two. To deal with an 
issue of political urgency, Roh's mourners chose to covertly silence the past (Vinitzky-Seroussi & 
Teeger, 2010). His image was emptied out, and its contents were replaced by another truth. 
During noje, sympathizers imagined Roh using the tropes of collective ressentiment, called han, 
and thought of him as a member of the minjung, or an oppressed class maintaining an unsettled 
emotion. To create the imagination of Moo-hyun Roh’s life, the ceremony was performed using 
particular aesthetics. Notably, during the ceremony, many parts of Roh’s life that appeared to 
contradict this freshly imagined memory were silenced. However, with this forgetting practice, 
room was spared to invite other memories. Here, noje functioned as a hallowed symbol, inducing 
other emotions tied to other unsettled memories of the near past, rather than to Roh’s life itself. 
133 
 
Chapter Three depicted a pair of contested memories of Roh that emerged following the 
funeral. That is, the memory of Roh, which was maintained and strengthened through dialectics 
between truth and myth, became layered in his mourners by 2010, through the interpretation in 
popular media content as a variation of Roh’s narrative. However, there also began to appear 
other memories of him. The radical meanings hidden in the memories of Roh, centered in the 
online community Ilbe, were attacked to neutralize them by parodying the contradiction between 
the real figure and the memory of him. With this practice, opponents attempted to skim the aura 
from Roh’s memory, which was largely done by sympathizers of the government. For them, Roh 
should not have a role in the present social imaginary. Thus, the mediatized memory of Roh 
became political, on the one hand, while on the other, it did not function as a stabilizer for further 
social conversation. Instead of being a publicly owned object (Casey, 2004), Roh’s memory 
existed as fragmented, antagonistically forgotten by different groups of people who refused to 
talk to each other. 
Chapter Four examined the way Bongha constructs the tourist experience, using 
continually maintained silence regarding certain aspects of the past. This town serves as 
memory-dispositif, putting forward memory aids for Roh that are chosen to selectively highlight 
his life. The most important point is the following: from my observation of the site, visitors 
participate in this covert silence by coordinating their behavior into unscripted but noticeable 
norms. Touring Bongha brings one into an encounter with mediated memory, and the mourners 
atone and engage in a pilgrimage to this remote site, full of pre-given memories of Roh. 
Why Does This Matter? 
Active Forgetting for Reclaiming the Political Sovereignty 
This dissertation aimed to illustrate how a collective memory was selected under the norms of 
covert silence. The selective nature of memory has been known from the beginning; it remained 
a question how the process of memory’s intertwining with forgetting is actually enacted. While 
the dominant Platonic “mnemic subjectivity” tradition had made forgetting an irresponsible and 
unreliable human fallacy, I instead wanted to promote the idea that memory and forgetting do not 
stand as a simple contradiction but as mutually enabling and constitutive factors. As Aristotle 
(2004) suggests, remembering is the process of recollection that requires our being able to attend 
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to the differentiation of magnitudes or proportions of the interval between “now” and “before” 
(p. 177 [452b7]). For any given search of our memory, as anyone who has dug through archives 
can tell, there is always the possibility of finding something unexpectedly forgotten, going down 
the wrong path, or finding nothing at all. Traversing a particular interval of time through 
recollection is ultimately a form of reasoning because it follows a chain of inferences from the 
starting point of a recollection to a successfully recalled event or object. 
Based on this way of thinking, I attempted to draw out the possibility not of remembering 
but of forgetting. As noted in chapter 1, always future-oriented, Nietzsche (1989) attempts to 
secure us against the indigestible (that is, against trauma) by championing forgetfulness as a 
“positive faculty of repression” that allows us to “make room for new things” (Nietzsche, 1989, 
pp. 57–58). In more ways than one, therefore, he is a natural ally of all those concerned about the 
surfeit of memory and the need to begin anew. And here, as Muldoon (2017) notes, forgetting 
was Nietzsche’s designated possibility for the future of humanity; we should close the door on 
the past and make a new beginning. This is to embrace life as it is, that Kaufmann highlighted to 
amor fati (1989, p. 11). After Nietzsche, a series of philosophers’ ideas contributed scopes on 
forgetting as the momentum to rediscover the time of now, and to reconsider the surroundings. 
Forgetting is an identity-creating behavior. It is thus a spontaneous gesture of subversive social 
activity. Forgetting, like remembering, can offer a space for a new sense of temporality; for 
Heidegger, this is even an essential process, behind everyday sensation for realizing things anew. 
The concept of active forgetting allows considerations of the memory–identity–politics 
nexus of contemporary South Korea. This project shows that identity is, in fact, never purely 
faithful to the past, but is always trans- and sub-formative for the given conditions, and 
forgetting plays a role in constructing identity, which is always on the move. Some traces of Roh 
were erased to provide a pivotal space, open to the other memories. The memory of Roh was 
influenced by the ongoing events of the present. In other words, remembering Roh by South 
Koreans becomes a focus of political struggle among the then-government and the various 
groups of people including mourners, ilbes, as well as the strangers who were participating as 
they were looking for a sole cast to sculpture their desired memories in the real world. Roh and a 
large group of sympathizers were produced as antithetical to the then-government, especially its 
policing policy, reinforcing the identification with the minjung movement for the collective 
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emotional memory that has been reproduced continually since the 1970s. Notably, the memory 
of Roh is based on forgotten memories. With this empty signifier, it opened up the possibility for 
other memories to become vocalized, through the very community it constructed. Through the 
practice of active forgetting, individuals in South Korean society undertook their political 
sovereignty. It also proves that if collective memory were the memory of the contemporary, 
forgetting would be a huge contribution that makes remembering to be contemporary. By 
selectively delinking the past, forgetting edits the memory for “making sense” of the present. Not 
shaping the present by the past conversely, with selective remembering as well as silently 
performed active forgetting, collective memory serves the desire of the present. Their divergent 
interpretations of the past and of emerging events keep bringing up contentions about the 
personal history of Moohyun Roh, as he who lived in this world with a level of complexity. 
Regardless of who he really was, the remembering practice to a large extent empowered 
individual authority to shape an ongoing event, enabling individuals to challenge institutional 
narratives.  
South Korean Minjung Identity in the Post-Minjung Era 
In this work, I wanted to depict a particular emotion named han as surviving in the era of post-
minjung of 2009. During the 1980s, the ideologues of the minjung movement illustrated that 
minjung’s mind was dominated by what they named han. This is a collective memory that has 
accumulated through a series of generational experiences, such as unjust violence by those in 
power and the locals’ failed resistances (Abelmann, 1996, p. 39; cf. Doucette, 2013; Kang, 2010; 
Lee, 2009; Manabe, 2015). Reminding ourselves of Nietzschean ressentiment (Nietzsche, 1989; 
see also, Fassin, 2013, p. 252), han is the emotion out of historical alienation; it relates to long-
term oppression and the effects of domination and, in most cases, can be generational. 
With the 1987’s democratization, the era of Minjung movement passed in South Korea 
(Doucette, 2013). But this emotional memory from historical alienation survived, and was 
reshaped by the socio-historical condition. In 2009, at Moo-hyun Roh’s noje funeral, we saw that 
the memory invited all other memories of being the underdogs of the nation. Claims of oblivion, 
instead of being what they are generally understood to be — a deficit in human capability — can, 
in fact, be used as a subversive gesture against power. In the past, political suicides created 
political rituals which provided a powerful historic motivation of minjung movements by 
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established diachronic linking of memories, maintaining the continuity. Then, in the late 2000s, 
memories of the deaths were rather synchronic and “portable” (Kockelman & Bernstein, 2012, p. 
326). In Noje a number of unmourned deaths were each situated in different, or only loosely-
related contexts (Chapter 2). Here gathered memories responded to Roh's sympathizers’ 
empathic gesture.  
Contemporary people's remembering of Roh provided a baseline to commemorate not 
just Roh but also these mobilized deaths at the time. The mourning was for a false martyr. 
However, by this mnemonic performance, South Koreans who had limited sovereignty attempted 
to reclaim their own interpretation of history. Forgetting was an actively coordinated silence for 
this cause. By this, mourners were able to create a link of empathetic emotion which "does not 
lead the subject (…) to seek to enter into the shoes of the individual experiencing trauma and to 
take his or her place. Instead, it brings him to identify precisely with the traumatic dimension of 
his existence” (Goldberg, 2015, p. 61). Empathic unsettlement compels us to react 
empathetically to “others” while being fully aware of their otherness, and at the same time helps 
us to recognize the component of trauma that prevents any structure, narrative, or relationship 
from reaching wholeness and closure. As Dominick LaCapra notes, empathic unsettlement in 
response to traumatic events should be discursively registered in the historical text, but as a 
creative and unpredictable process, which is oriented at gaining some control of the trauma while 
at the same time convincing the historian to relinquish the fantasy of completely mastering it. “A 
posttraumatic response of unsettlement becomes questionable when it is routinized in a 
methodology or style” (LaCapra, 2001, p. 47). This made Roh’s memory to function as a sort of 
basso continuo, a ground providing other South Koreans a reason for joining the solidarity, 
although they had not shared the same feeling to Moo-hyun Roh as a living person. Their 
memory-practices in contrast to what really happened revealed South Koreans’ unreleased 
emotion, such as anxiety, concernment, worrisomeness and rancor over the present politics. The 
findings here draw contrasts with two major perspectives on Minjung and South Korean society 
in the twenty-first century. Neither minjung and han become the things of the past (Hayes, 2005; 
Lee, 2009) nor preserve the past as it has been (Chae, 2015; Ko, 2007). The memory survived 
with more flexibility, being capable of vocalizing all the “people’s remembering” (Doucette, 
2013). 
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From the perspective of performative theory, it can be said that democracy is not a pre-
given structure but rather needs to be constructed repeatedly. "The people" is a heterogeneous, 
open, and dynamic entity. Thus democracy is the politics of the people who are not a coherent 
entity. Politics in democracy is an effect produced by repetitive performative acts and "the 
people" is produced as the source of democratic sovereignty. For a democracy to be recognized 
and maintained as such, it needs to be performed by participants, such as citizens, institutions, 
office-holders, the media. Acts made by these players – voting, demonstrating, and law-making – 
give form to the abstract concept of democracy, thus producing it as their (imagined) source. 
Effective performative democracy processes having to do with the forms and genres of speech, 
broadly understood, constitute public action and bring about change. There is, indeed, no finite 
set of actions that can determine once and for all that a social structure is indeed the democracy, 
for the regime is not a stable and pre-given structure, but instead produced and imagined through 
a multitude of acts and procedures. 
Out of this democratic performativity, such acts have been associated with South Korean 
modern political history. Democracy, although a short history, has been understood as the power 
of people who exercise their sovereignty with visibility. Especially in the case of 
commemorations of political deaths and suicide, there is collective symbolism associated with 
the “death(s) of the young guiltless soul(s)” (S Kim 2009, p. 67). This symbolism has been 
imprinted since May 1991 on the hearts of the Korean people during the agonizing process of 
democratization (or, even in the entire history of “Korean moralpolitik”) and often exercises 
itself as a mobilizing power for the Korean public (S Kim, 2009 p. 67). For instance, in his last 
wish before political suicide, Sang-jin Kim wrote: 
There is no time left to hesitate or to contemplate … you know democracy is not a 
product of knowledge but struggles. Instead of being regretful of yesterday or frustrated 
about tomorrow, let us charge toward the castle of this horrible dictatorship, with 
thoughtful reason and unyielding determination… If this is the way for the nation and 
history, if this is the way for achieving democracy for our loving country, and if this is the 
way for realizing social justice forever, I will not hesitate to sacrifice my life.” (Sang-Jin 
Kim, in H Kim, 2008, p. 566)  
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The sense of urgency has been requested for many historic moments of political change, 
including the noje of 2009 and the following “remembering through forgetting” of Moo-hyun 
Roh. People's anger and feeling of loss arose not just because of his death. It was more directed 
to the other deaths, including suicides and sacrifices around 2007-2009. The emotion was 
notably elevated by their witnessing those deaths. Then, as Kim Sungmoon (2008) notes, "Uri-
responsibility" as collective moral responsibility contributes a multitude of otherwise separated 
and disjointed "I"s into a common forum and impels them to reflect upon their sociopolitical 
identity through various forms of talk, and, finally, helps them revitalize citizenship by 
reconstructing "our" world (S Kim, 2008, p. 73). 
The Role of Media Technology in Collective Memory 
It should also be noticed that this dissertation aims to understand the role of technology in 
collective memories in the process of remembering as well as that of forgetting. On the one hand, 
it is undeniable that media technology made such an outcome. Structured, instrumentalised, and 
familiarised media helps us remember as a society. It may frame how a past is more recalled than 
other possibilities. The speed and coverage of technology may guarantee enhanced visibility of a 
time's collective memory, and this could make a notable political change which otherwise would 
take a much more extended period of time. In fact, much emerging research seems to regard 
media-technology as the decisive power for creating a collective memory. A number of studies 
concentrated on how the memory became possible in relation to the media’s decisive role in the 
capturing storing, retrieving, reactivating, preserving, (re)constituting, and shaping of collective 
memories and understandings of the past (Connerton, 1989; Halbwachs, 1992; Han, 2016; 
Hoskins, 2014; Landsberg, 2004; Neiger, Meyers, & Zandberg, 2011). Others such as Kuhn 
(2010) and Lagerkvist (2013) consider the media’s utility as a methodological entrance through 
which to explore how personal, individual memory intersects with shared, collective, cultural, 
public forms of memory. 
In this dissertation, my argument was instead that memory is enacted and performed with 
media and these processes are intrinsically linked to issues of identity, power, and agency in the 
competition to privilege one's own remembering (see, Sturken, 1997). Capturing the past is 
becoming increasingly sophisticated, and memory tools such as television, film, photocopiers, 
digital archives, photographic albums, camcorders, scanners, mobile phones and social network 
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sites help us to remember. Media cannot be the foremost, decisive, and preemptive reason of the 
mode of remembering. As Joanne Garde-Hansen notes (2009), memory is a physical and mental 
process and is unique to each of us. It is this uniqueness and differentiation that often makes it 
difficult to generalise about memory’s relationship with media. Memory is emotive, creative, 
empathetic, cognitive and sensory.  
The case I discussed here proves that technology functions as the mean, which brought an 
unexpected end. As noted in the second half of the first chapter, the use of technology existed as 
another dispositif of memory that mediates the experience of collective memory, including the 
images forgotten. Through various media activities, from noje to writing blog entries, individual 
media products that together develop and maintain the collective memory of Roh continuously 
assert their authority and bid for authenticity. These were not just fighting for representation, but 
also were time-defining practices among the possible plurality of our reality. People’s 
communication in new technical forms opens them to connect the particular past to their present, 
to find the other similar thoughts on the space, and maintain their resilient and persistent 
memory-preserving practices. However, this also contributed to the rise of hate, withdrawal of 
the dialogue, and seemingly blind obsession with the symbol itself. As in the writings of Micheal 
De Certeau that I quoted at the beginning of chapter 1, the collective memory of Roh rose by 
“using the means, the circuitry already in place, but reemploying them in the service of an 
anxiety that comes from afar, unanticipated” (De Certeau, 2000, p. 1). The media assisted the 
process of remembering, and perhaps enhanced modern technology made this broader and more 
rapid than ever before. 
However, in the collective remembering of Roh with silent forgetting, the contemporary 
media were facilitated for the people but unexpectedly exploited. At first, the role of technology 
was to pave a way for the willpower of those who were looking for a symbol so they could 
express their own sense of the unjustness and unsettlement of their time. For this necessity, 
forgetting was required and it was actively performed by the mourners. In that sense, “[t]hese 
languages of social anxiety seem to reject both the limits of a present and the real conditions of 
its future. Like scars that mark for a new illness the spot of an earlier one, they designate in 
advance the signs and location of a flight (or return?) of time” (De Certeau, 2000, p. 1). 
Accordingly, we found two contesting memories of Roh, in chapter 3. While communication 
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should be principally “letting someone see with us what we have pointed out by way of giving it 
a definite character” (Heidegger, 1968, p. 197), the new media environment, which supposedly 
provides a space of free-exchange of ideas through enhanced accessibility of dialogues, could not 
contribute by creating an emerging horizon for the people’s memory of Roh after his death 
(Chapter 3). It seemed, unlike some of the descriptions of the omnipotent role of media-
technology in memory-making, recollection, together with remembering and forgetting, are in 
ever-in-search, easily decontextualized and recontextualized, with outcomes immediate. The 
sense of time here instead reaches to be synchronous. People relate historical memories less 
clearly but more relatively. 
Epilogue - Seeing Fireflies in A Dark Night 
The dissertation may be fruitfully extended in multiple directions, whether in media or memory 
studies. The process of how forgetting can be imposed on voluntary participants in memory 
making may prove highly valuable to the field; it allows us to look at exactly how memories are 
made, maintained, and neglected and multiply within a society. This work also depicts how the 
different modes are developed over time. Further, I hope this dissertation can open new 
dimensions for existing ideas within media studies, such as closer consideration of the 
multitemporality of new technology and its relation to memory and aphasia. Likewise, the 
introduction of the ideas of how memory holders engage in a memory-site might further our 
understanding of how memory and forgetting can present performativity, thereby illuminating 
the broader workings of power and agency. This study also phenomenologically analyzed the 
intersections between mediation, temporality, and power relations, which are fundamental to the 
composition of cultural memories, and further work could be done in this regard. An important 
next step would be the study of how more discursive aspects are linked with social actors, the 
agents involved in memory work. 
Like a cenotaph –- a word that means empty tomb and is the monument for an individual 
or group whose remains are elsewhere — Roh’s hollowed memories highlight how narratives are 
constructed and can reinforce South Korean identity. The lack of a corpse in a cenotaph 
preserves a fundamental absence. Jay Winter describes the Cenotaph in London as “elemental in 
form and structure” (Winter, 1995, p. 103). With mathematical and geometrical precision, it lacks 
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ornamentation and overt symbolism. This lack of decoration evokes the mood of collective loss 
and bereavement. Winter suggests that its form is “a form on which anyone could inscribe his or 
her own thoughts, reveries, sadnesses;” it nevertheless helps to evoke absence and loss that 
underlie the traumatic experience of war (Winter, 1995, p. 103). According to Jenny Edkins, “it 
represents the lack, the trauma” of the Great War and “the impossibility of closure” in the wake 
of the destruction and horror of that war (Edkins, 2003, p. 66). The lack of closure and the 
inability to fill the tomb with meaning ensures that its significance is not the property of any 
single individual or political group. That is, this empty tomb can be filled with meaning made 
from mourners’ mnemonic practices.  
Our response to such memory has significant implications for our understanding of 
ourselves as a community. Like this empty tomb, with Roh’s memory, we can reinterpret 
meaning and alter selfhood; the identity that arises from a particular understanding of what 
happened is not final or restricted. The lack of a clear, central meaning for Roh’s memory 
preserves a fundamental absence, allowing sympathizers to identify, modify, and change their 
relationship to the past and to the meaning of the past in the light of our hopes for reconciliation. 
This vision of hope is thus to be understood as part of a community’s practices and is directed 
toward the possibility of regenerating freedom in anticipation of a revived humanity. To 
paraphrase Immanuel Kant23, memory without hope is dead, hope without memory is blind. 
In the people who have forgotten Roh's lived past, I see a desire not to be blind to the 
hope of their time. But, what hope? The hope was out of despair; it was from the people's wish 
"in spite of all" (George Didi-Huberman, 2012c). We should separate this from a blind hope. It is 
only that the memories of Moo-hyun Roh prepared a small and temporal victory from the 
transient solidarity that lightens the dark only for a moment. With this light, although being faint, 
survivors could have a space for enduring against suffering. Georges Didi-Huberman illustrates a 
similar moment for describing the attempt of Sonderkommando, those who were forced to work 
in the gas chamber of Auschwitz as Jewish prisoners. For the hope they had, Didi-Huberman 
compares the light of fireflies on a dark night. It does not bring the day sooner, but it helps to live 
the time of darkness. Then it testifies later how the time was after Sonderkommandos were gone. 
                                               
23 “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (Kant, 
2013 A5I/B75) 
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Only in the moments of messianic exaltation, perhaps, it is possible to dream of a horizon 
that would make visible all the images. This is what rarely appears in Walter Benjamin 
when it comes to a well-hypothetical story coming to its ends. Where each moment – 
each image – could be summoned in the absolute, paradoxical duration of the final 
judgment: (…) But that “day” is not given to us. What is given to us is instead sweet 
glows of the fireflies crossed by the cruel ray of the reflectors. (Georges Didi-Huberman, 
2012b, pp. 89–90)24 
Perhaps, as in Didi-Hubermans' description, collective memory was never that "day". It may not 
provide a solid and undeniable understanding of our past. As an alternative against the written 
history, collective memory is rather colligated individual attempts at remembering and forgetting 
to deal with the darkness we are facing. Given this, active forgetting may have a small function 
to ignore the "cruel ray of the reflectors" before the cruelty of political struggle (Georges Didi-
Huberman, 2012b, p. 90). If these small memories were "on the move", it might be evading the 
search-light of the official. By filling the empty Cenotaph, people attempted to forget who Roh 
was because it was more crucial to find a right room to endure their time. South Koreans from 
2009 to 2015 practiced a spontaneous and vernacular mode of silence while creating Moo-hyun 
Roh's apotheosized memory. From 2017, their memory-practices turned into a call for a sense of 
political purism, but this is remembering toward the future which would be outside the purview 
of our research. 
 
 
                                               
24 The quotation here is translated from the Spanish edition (Georges Didi-Huberman, 
2012b) then checked with the Korean translation (Georges Didi-Huberman, 2012a). The English 
translation of the book is forthcoming. 
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